^■.^' 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY   GERMANIC   STUDIES 


WIELAND  AND  SHAFTESBURY 


COLUMBIA 

UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

SALES  AGENTS 

NEW  YORK : 

LEMCKE  &  BUECHNER 
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LONDON  : 

HUMPHREY  MILFORD 
Amen  Corner,  E.G. 

TORONTO  : 
HUMPHREY  MILFORD 
25  Richmond  Street,  W. 


WIELAND  AND  SHAFTESBURY 


BY 

CHARLES  ELSON 


Submitted  in  Partial  Fulfilment   of  the  Requirements  for 

THE  Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  in  the  Faculty 

OF  Philosophy,  Columbia  University 


|:efa  fork 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1913 


Copyright,    191 3 
By  Columbia  University  Press 

Printed  from  type,  September,  1913 


PRESS  OF 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  COMPANY 

LANCASTER,  PA. 


Approved  for  publication,  on  behalf  of  the  Department  of 
Germanic  Languages  and  Literatures  of  Columbia  University. 

Calvin  Thomas. 

New  York,  July,  1913 


282307 


Meinem  hochgeschatzten  Lehrer 
HERRN   PROFESSOR  GUIDO   C.   L.   RIEMER 


vu 


PREFACE 

The  subject  "Wieland  and  Shaftesbury"  was  first  men- 
tioned to  me  by  my  former  teacher,  Professor  Guido  C.  L. 
Riemer  of  Bucknell  College.  But  the  idea  of  writing  a  disser- 
tation on  this  subject  was  not  fully  decided  upon  until  after  I 
had  written  a  seminar  paper  on  Shaftesbury's  relation  to 
German  thought  in  the  i8th  century,  the  seminar  being  con- 
ducted by  Professor  Calvin  Thomas  of  Columbia  University. 
I  owe  an  unpayable  debt  to  Professor  Thomas  for  his  encour- 
agement and  assistance  in  the  preparation  of  this  study  and 
for  excellent  training  in  German  scholarship.  I  also  acknowl- 
edge my  deep  obligation  to  Professor  Riemer  of  Bucknell,  who 
has  ever  been  an  inexhaustible  source  of  guidance  and  inspira- 
tion to  me.  And  to  Professor  John  A.  Walz  of  Harvard 
I  express  my  sincere  gratitude  for  his  constant  deep  interest 
in  my  work. 

Charles  Elson 

New  York  City, 
April,  19 1 3. 

Note  :  When  this  dissertation  was  nearly  through  the  press, 
there  appeared  in  Stuttgart,  Germany,  a  monograph  by  H. 
Grudzinski,  entitled  "  Shaftesburys  Einfluss  auf  Wieland," 
Breslauer  Beitrdge,  Heft  34,  1913. 

C.  E. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction i 


CHAPTER  I 

Direct  Evidence  of  Wieland's  Interest  in  Shaftes- 
bury        6 

CHAPTER   II 

The  Salient  Features  of  Shaftesbury's  Philosophy 

1.  Esthetics  and  Morality.    Art  and  Virtue 20 

2.  Moral  Sense   24 

3.  Man  is  a  Social  Creature.    Virtue  is  Natural  and  is  the 

Highest  Good 25 

4.  Deism.    Virtue  and  Religion.    Culture  as  a  Means  of 

Developing  Character.     Philosophy  as  the  Problem 

of  Daily  Life 31 

5.  Eudemonism.     Virtuoso  36 

6.  Soliloquy.    Wit  and  Humor.    Enthusiasm.    Raillery. .  38 
17.  Optimism  43 

8.  The  Doctrine  of  a  Supreme  Being 46 

9.  Shaftesbury's  School 47 

Summary 51 

CHAPTER   III 

Shaftesbury's  Moral-Esthetic  Philosophy 
in  Wieland 

1.  The  Good  and  the  Beautiful.     Spiritual  Beauty  and 

Moral  Charm 54 

2.  Esthetic  and  Moral  Sense.    Morality  and  Nature 63 

3.  The  Inherent  Worth  of  Virtue 72 

4.  The  Relation  of  Beauty  and  Virtue  to  Harmony yy 

xi 


J 


CHAPTER   IV 
Virtue,  Happiness  and  Culture 

PAGE 

1.  Virtue  and  Happiness.    Vice  and  Misery 82 

2.  Culture  and  Character.    Philosophy  and  Life 88 

3.  The  Virtuoso 94 

CHAPTER  V 
Wit  and  Humor 

1.  The  Gloomy  and  the  Cheerful.      Good  Humor  and 

Raillery.     Enthusiasm  and  Fanaticism 98 

2.  Wieland's  Poetry  of  the  Graces 109 

CHAPTER  VI 

Miscellaneous 

1.  Optimism 115 

2.  Doctrine  of  Divinity 117 

3.  Dialogue 118 

4.  "  Tablature  of  the  Judgment  of  Hercules " 119 

5.  "  Advice  to  an  Author  " 119 

6.  Soliloquy   121 

Conclusion  123 

Bibliography 124 

Chronological  List  of  Wieland's  Works 134 

Index 138 


INTRODUCTION 

It  has  long  since  been  recognized  that  Shaftesbury  was 
one  of  the  most  important  teachers  of  Germany  in  the  i8th 
century.  During  the  great  century  of  German  letters,  when 
there  was  much  speculation  about  Virtue,  Goodness  and 
Beauty,  and  much  interest  in  the  ideal  of  a  versatile  and  esthet- 
ically  cultivated  personality — it  is  not  at  all  strange  that  the 
German  mind  should  have  turned  eagerly  to  a  philosopher 
who,  at  the  beginning  of  the  century,  had  been  advocating  the 
same  ideals.  Herder  was  quite  right  in  saying  that  Shaftes- 
bury "  exerted  a  signal  influence  on  the  best  heads  of  the  cen- 
tury, on  men  who  honestly  devoted  themselves  to  the  culture 
of  the  true,  the  beautiful  and  the  good."^ 

Shaftesbury  influenced  both  the  men  of  letters  and  the  phi- 
losophers of  Germany.  As  M.  Koch  observes,-  he  was  studied 
in  Germany  no  less  than  in  England.  His  works  began  to 
appear  in  German  translation — the  first  English  edition  of 
Shaftesbury's  "Characteristics"  appeared  in  1711^ — as  early 
as  1738.  In  that  year  appeared  in  Magdeburg  a  translation 
by  Venzky  of  "  Soliloquy  or  Advice  to  an  Author  "  under  the 
title  "  Unterredungen  mit  sich  selbst."*  Translations  of  the 
"  Moralists  "  and  the  "  Inquiry,"^  entitled  respectively  "  Die 

i"Briefe  zur  Beforderung  der  Humanitat "  (1794),  Suphan  edition  of 
Herder's  works,  XVII,  158. 

2 "  Beziehungen  der  englischen  Literatur  zur  deutschen  im  iSten  Jahr- 
hundert,"  Leipzig,   1883,  p.  9. 

3  For  a  list  of  the  English  editions  of  Shaftesbury,  some  of  which  Wie- 
land  is  known  to  have  used,  see  the  bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  book. 

4  For  the  data  of  the  Shaftesbury  translations  I  am  indebted,  unless 
some  other  authority  is  mentioned,  to  P.  Ziertmann  :  "  Beitrage  zur  Kennt- 
nis  Shaftesburys,"  in  Archiv  filr  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  XVII  (1904), 

497  ff. 

B  A  French  translation  of  the  "  Inquiry  "  by  Diderot  appeared  in  Amster- 
dam, 1745;  2d  edition  in  1751  in  Venice.  In  1709,  in  the  Hague,  there 
appeared  a  French  translation  of  "  Letter  concerning  Enthusiasm ;  "  in 
17 10,  in  the  Hague,  a  French  translation  of  the  "Essay  concerning  the 
Freedom  of  Wit  and  Humor." 

2  1 


Sittenlehrer  "  and  "  Untersuchnng  iiber  die  Tugend,"  appeared 
in  Berlin  in  1745  and  1747.  Both  translations  are  by  Spald- 
ing." Another  translation  of  the  "  Inquiry  "  appeared  in  Leip- 
zig, 1780.  This  was  translated  not  from  the  original  but  from 
the  French  version  of  Diderot.  Ziertmann  has  no  information 
concerning  the  author  of  the  translation.''  The  "  Letters  to  a 
Young  Man  at  the  University  "  appeared  in  German  transla- 
tion in  Halle,  1772.^  Here  again  we  are  not  informed  as  to 
the  translator.  In  1768  Wichmann's  translation  appeared  in 
Leipzig,  under  the  title  "  Anton  Ashley  Cooper  Grafen  von 
Shaftesbury  Characteristics,  aus  dem  Englischen  iibersetzt." 
The  translation,  in  spite  of  its  pretentious  title,  is  not  com- 
plete.® In  1776-9  a  complete  translation  appeared  in  Leipzig: 
"Des  Grafen  von  Shaftesbury  philosophische  Werke"  in  three 
volumes.^"  According  to  Hirschling,  Biographische  Nach- 
richten,  Leipzig,  XII,  1809,  p.  61,  H.  Vosz  translated  the 
second  volume  and  also  a  part  of  the  first  volume,  which  was 
begun  by  Holty.^^  According  to  Gizycki,^-  Holty  and  Bentzler 
are  the  translators. 

Judging  by  this  interest  of  the  Germans  in  Shaftesbury  it  is 
quite  evident  that  the  investigator  will  find  a  very  fruitful  field 
in  the  general  topic  of  Shaftesbury's  influence  on  German 
thought.  Several  phases  of  the  subject  have  already  been 
treated  in  individual  monographs.  From  its  purely  philo- 
sophical side  the  subject  is  approached  by  G.  Zart:  "  Der  Ein- 
flusz  der  englischen  Philosophen  seit  Bacon  auf  die  deutsche 

6  H.  Jordens :  Lexikon  detitscher  Dichter  nnd  Prosaisten  (1809),  IV, 
706,  713.  Cf.  also  Scheffner's  letter  to  Herder,  Oct.  27,  1767:  "Herder's 
Lebensbild,"  1-,  281. 

■^  A  very  recent  translation  of  the  "  Inquiry  "  by  P.  Ziertmann  appeared 
in  1905  in  Diirrs  philosophische  Bibliothek,  CX,  Leipzig.  Cf.  Oscar  F. 
Walzel:  "Shaftesbury  und  das  deutsche  Geistesleben  des  18  Jahrhunderts  " 
in  Germanisch-Romanische  Monatschrift,  1909,  p.  420. 

8  See  Ziertmann,  p.  499. 

9  Gizycki :  "Die  Philosophic  Shaftesburys,"  Leipzig  &  Heidelberg,  1876, 
p.    V. 

10  A  French  translation  of  Shaftesbury's  works  and  letters,  in  three  vol- 
umes, entitled  "  Les  Oeuvres  de  Mylord  Comte  de  Shaftesbury,"  appeared 
in  1769. 

11  Quoted  by  Ziertmann,  p.  498. 

12  "  Die  Philosophic  Shaftesburys,"  p.  v. 


Philosophie  des  i8  Jahrhunderts."^^  Among  the  other  Eng- 
lish philosophers  Zart  also  treats,  but  rather  briefly,  Shaftes- 
bury's relation  to  German  philosophers,  such  as  Mendelssohn, 
Eberhard,  Sulzer,  etc.  Shaftesbury's  influence  on  Herder  is 
dealt  with  by  I,  C.  Hatch  in  his  dissertation :  "  Der  Einflusz 
Shaftesburys  auf  Herder."^*  And  Shaftesbury's  influence 
upon  Haller  is  treated  by  Georg  Bondi  in  his  dissertation: 
"Das  Verhaltnis  von  Hallers  philosophischen  Gedichten  zur 
Philosophie  seiner  Zeit."^^  But  above  all  I  wish  to  mention 
here  Oscar  F.  Walzel's  excellent  article :  "  Shaftesbury  und  das 
deutsche  Geistesleben  des  i8  Jahrhunderts,"  which  appeared 
in  Die  Germanisch-Romanische  Monatsschrift,  1909,  pp.  416- 
437.  Here  Walzel  enumerates  the  more  notable  works  dealing 
with  Shaftesbury's  philosophy  in  general  and  with  his  relation 
to  German  thought.  Besides  setting  forth  what  had  already 
been  accomplished  in  the  field,  the  author  suggests  here  and 
there  what  is  yet  to  be  done.  I  am  indebted  to  this  article  for 
giving  me  a  starting  point  in  my  special  study  and  for  furnish- 
ing me  with  bibliographical  data,  of  which  I  made  considerable 
use  in  my  preliminary  orientation  for  the  main  work. 

The  purpose  of  this  dissertation  is  to  trace  the  nature  and 
extent  of  Shaftesbury's  influence  on  Wieland.  This  investi- 
gation, however,  does  not  pretend  to  be  a  pioneering  work  on 
the  subject,  for  Wieland's  relation  to  Shaftesbury  has  more 
than  once  been  mentioned  by  critics  and  biographers.  In  the 
aforementioned  article  O.  F.  Walzel  refers  to  Wieland's  rela- 
tion to  Shaftesbury  as  belonging  "  Unter  die  bekanntesten  Par- 
tien  der  deutschen  Geistesgeschichte  des  18  Jahrhunderts."^® 
In  his  "  Beziehungen  der  englischen  Literatur  zur  deutschen 
im  18  Jahrhundert"  M.  Koch  remarks  that  no  other  philoso- 
pher exerted  as  much  influence  as  Shaftesbury  on  Wieland's 
entire  philosophy  of  life."  The  same  statement  is  repeated 
in  his  article  on  Wieland  in  "Die  Allgemeine  Deutsche  Bio- 

13  Berlin,   1881. 

14  Published  in  Studien  zur  vergleichenden  Liter aturgeschichte,  edited 
by  M.  Koch. 

15  Leipzig,  1891. 

16  Germanisch-Romanische  Monatschrift,   1909,  p.  430. 

17  Cf.  p.    12. 


graphic."^®  In  his  biography  of  Wieland,  J.  G.  Gritber  states 
that  Shaftesbury  was  Wieland's  intimate  friend.  He  tells  us 
that  Wieland  adopted  Shaftesbury's  suggestion  concerning  the 
importance  of  self-communion  or  self -investigation,  also  that 
Wieland  identified  Socrates'  kalokagathia  with  Shaftesbury's 
virtuoso-ideal.  Without  attempting  to  prove  his  statement 
Gruber  also  remarks  that  everything  written  by  Wieland  in 
1753-5  shows  the  influence  of  either  Plato  or  Shaftesbury.^* 
And  from  J.  W.  Loebell  we  have  the  statement  that  Wieland 
and  Shaftesbury  resembled  each  other  in  their  entire  way  of 
thinking,  in  the  method  by  which  they  sought  for  the  good  and 
beautiful,  in  the  conviction  that  happiness  has  its  source  in  the 
predominance  of  noble  and  benevolent  feelings,  in  the  notion 
that  a  cheerful  mind  is  a  touchstone  of  a  right  disposition.^" 

As  can  readily  be  seen,  no  attempt  is  made  in  any  of  these 
statements  to  make  an  actual  contribution  to  the  subject.  Such 
an  attempt,  however,  has  been  made  by  F.  Pomezny :  "  Grazie 
und  Grazien  in  der  deutschen  Literatur  des  18  Jahrhunderts  "^^ 
and  by  E.  Ermatinger:  "Die  Weltanschaung  des  jungen  Wie- 
land."-^ In  the  fourth  chapter,  entitled  "  Wieland's  Grazien," 
4  Pomezny  says  that  Wieland's  moralische  Grazie  comes  from 
Shaftesbury's  "moral  grace,"  and  that  Wieland  had  learned 
from  Shaftesbury  and  Plato  his  conception  of  spiritual  beauty. 
To  illustrate  his  point  he  quotes  a  few  passages  from  the  fol- 
lowing works,  which  appeared  prior  to  1760:  "Anti-Ovid," 
"  Erinnerungen  an  eine  Freundin,"  "  Cyrus,"  "  Theages."  He 
also  mentions  three  personal  references  of  Wieland  to  Shaftes- 
bury. Ermatinger  devotes  several  pages  to  Shaftesbury's  in- 
fluence on  Wieland.  He  discusses  briefly  the  relation  between 
the  Greek  kalokagathia  and  Shaftesbury's  "  virtuoso "  and 
mentions  Wieland's  relation  to  both.  He  also  mentions  several 
personal  allusions  of  Wieland  to  Shaftesbury  and  points  out 
Shaftesburian   views   in  a   few  passages   from   "  Timoklea," 

18  Cf.  XLII  (1897),  412. 

19  "  Wieland  geschildert  von  Gruber,"  Leipzig  and  Altenburg,    1815    (in 
2  volumes),   I,   164-6,   76. 

20  "  Die  Entwicklung  der  deutschen  Poesie  von  Klopstocks  erstem  Auf- 
treten  bis  zu  Goethes  Tode,"  Braunschweig,   1858,  II,   142—3. 

21  Edited  by  B.  Seuffert,  Hamburg  &  Leipzig,  1900. 

22  Frauenfeld,  1907. 


"  Sympathien,"  "  Theages,"  "  Plan  einer  neuen  Art  von  Privat- 
Unterweisung "  and  "  Plan  einer  Akademie  zu  Bildung  des 
Verstandes  und  Herzens  junger  Leute."  Shaftesbury's  in- 
fluence on  Wieland,  however,  is  but  very  slightly  touched  by 
making  a  general  remark  or  by  quoting  a  passage  here  and 
there  from  the  youthful  works  of  our  author.  In  fact,  the 
great  bulk  of  Shaftesbury's  influence  comes  into  Wieland's 
works  after  1760  and  abides  more  or  less  in  his  entire  literary 
career.  A  real  investigation  of  this  influence  necessitates  the 
careful  consideration  of  Wieland's  whole  life-work.  Such  an 
investigation,  as  Walzel  very  properly  suggests,^^  is  still  lack- 
ing, and  my  monograph  undertakes  to  supply  this  want. 

The  following  general  plan  has  been  adopted  as  the  most 
suitable  for  this  study.  The  first  chapter  treats  the  direct  evi- 
dence of  Wieland's  life-long  interest  in  Shaftesbury — the  evi- 
dence consisting  of  Wieland's  own  utterances.  The  second 
chapter  discusses  the  principal  aspects  of  Shaftesbury's  phi- 
losophy. In  this  chapter  I  also  treat  as  briefly  as  possible 
Shaftesbury's  points  of  contact  with  other  philosophers,  both 
ancient  and  modern.  The  remaining  chapters  are  then  devoted 
to  tracing  Shaftesbury's  doctrines  in  Wieland's  poetical  and 
philosophical  works  and  in  his  letters.  Instead  of  pursuing 
these  doctrines  in  chronological  order  it  seemed  best  to  me  to 
arrange  them  in  categories.  This  method,  however,  at  once 
presents  a  difficulty,  because  certain  philosophical  doctrines 
almost  defy  classification  into  categories.  The  classification, 
it  must  be  admitted,  is  in  some  cases  arbitrary. 

For  Wieland's  works  I  refer  for  the  greater  part  either  to 
the  Hempel  or  the  Goschen  edition.  Gruber's  edition,  how- 
ever, is  more  convenient  in  the  case  of  Wieland's  youthful 
works,  such  as  "  Natur  der  Dinge,"  "  Moralische  Briefe," 
"  Briefe  von  Verstorbenen,"  etc.,  because  it  numbers  the  verses ; 
and  so,  for  quotations  from  these  works  I  refer  to  Gruber's 
edition.  For  the  same  reason  I  refer  for  "  Musarion "  to 
Prohle's  edition  in  the  "  Deutsche  National-Literatur."  In  the 
case  of  Shaftesbury  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  Baskerville 
edition  (1773)  of  the  "Characteristics." 

23  Germanisch-Romanische  Monatschrift,  1909,  p.  430. 


v/ 


CHAPTER   I 

Direct  Evidence  of  Wieland's  Interest  in  Shaftesbury 

There  is  abundant  evidence  in  Wieland's  own  words  of  his 
life-long  admiration  for,  and  interest  in,  the  writings  of  Shaftes- 
bury. The  earliest  datable  reference  known  to  me  is  from  the 
year  1755.  On  March  15  of  that  year  he  conversed  with 
Friedrich  Dominicus  Ring^  concerning  Shaftesbury  and  the 
"  Characteristics,"  and  in  his  diary  Ring  reports  him  as  saying 
in  efifect:  that  Shaftesbury  never  misses  an  opportunity  of 
mocking  at  religion;  that  his  principle  of  raillery  has  been 
harmful  to  religion ;  that  the  best  way  to  refute  him  is  to  accept 
the  notions  of  virtue  taught  by  him,  and  to  show  that  the 
Christian  religion  is  not  inconsistent  with  his  own  notions. 
At  this  early  period,  therefore, — Wieland  was  born  in  1733 — 
he  was  already  acquainted  with  Shaftesbury's  ideas  of  virtue 
and  his  doctrine  of  raillery.  With  regard  to  the  latter  subject 
he  afterward  changed  his  mind,  as  will  be  seen  later  when  we 
come  to  discuss  Wieland's  treatment  of  the  doctrine. 

In  the  "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  written  in  1756  but  not  pub- 
lished until  1758,  he  refers  to  Shaftesbury  as  "  der  geistreichste 
und  feinste  aller  modernen  Scribenten  "  and  alludes  to  a  spe- 
cific passage  in  the  "  Miscellaneous  Reflections,"  where  the 
"  virtuoso  "  is  discussed.^ 

In  January,  1758,^  in  a  document  issued  against  Nicolai  and 
Uz,  Wieland  explains  his  attitude  as  a  poet,  declares  that 
Shaftesbury  has  taught  him  what  it  means  to  be  an  author, 

1  See  Schnorrs  Archiv  fiir  Literaturgeschichte,  XIII  (1885),  485  ff. 
Wieland's  remarks  concerning  Shaftesbury  occur  on  p.  496.  Ring  was  a 
student  at  Zurich  in  1753-5  and  kept  a  diary  in  which  he  recorded  among 
other  things  the  substance  of  several  conversations  with  Wieland.  This 
particular  conversation  was  contributed  to  Schnorrs  Archiv  by  H.  Funck 
in  an  article  entitled  "  Gesprache  mit  Chr.  M.  Wieland  in  Ziirich." 

2  "  Prosaische  Schriften  "  (Zurich,  1758),  III,  112. 

3  This  is  the  date  of  the  appearance  of  the  document,  according  to  B. 
Seuffert :  "  Mitteilungen  aus  Wielands  Junglingsalter,"  Euphorion,  XIV,  228. 

6 


and  expresses  a  desire  that  all  German  authors  should  know  it.* 
His  thorough  acquaintance  with  Shaftesbury's  "Inquiry" 
and  "  Moralists "  is  attested  by  his  praise  in  a  letter  to  Zim- 
mermann  of  Sept.  6,  1756,  of  the  method  of  these  works: 
"  Shaftesbury  knew  what  method  is.  His  '  Treatise  upon 
Virtue '  and  his  '  Moralists '  are  more  fit  to  teach  good  method 
than  the  most  detailed  treatise  on  the  subject.  The  '  Moralists,' 
which  par  ironie  he  calls  a  rhapsody,  is  just  as  systematic  as 
the  '  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue ' ;  but  in  the  former  the  syste- 
matic treatment  is  concealed  behind  an  appearance  of  pleasant 
negligence."^ 

Wieland's  study  of  Shaftesbury  was  thorough  enough  to 
include  even  such  a  minor  work  as  the  "  Letter  concerning 
Design."  In  "  Theages  "  (1755-1758)  he  refers  to  an  opinion 
expressed  by  Shaftesbury  in  the  "Letter"  aforesaid.  "I  am  of 
the  opinion,  says  Nicias  (one  of  the  speakers  in  "Theages"), 
that  a  moral  code  consisting  of  allegorical  paintings,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  idea  expressed  by  Shaftesbury  in  his  '  Letter  on 
the  Choice  of  Hercules,'*^  would  be  an  excellent  means  to  culti- 
vate the  taste  and  heart  of  young  people."'^ 

Oct.  18,  1758,  Wieland  writes  to  Zimmermann  that  among 
his  books  "  there  are  only  a  few  choice  ones  which,  like  bread, 
do  not  become  intolerable  even  when  all  other  spiritual  food 
is  disgusting.  Among  these  (choice  works)  are  Xenophon, 
Plutarch,  Horace  and  Shaftesbury."^     In  a  letter  of  July  4, 

4  Ibid.,  p.  236. 

5 "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe  von  C.  M.  Wieland  an  verschiedene  Freunde " 
(Zurich,   1815,  4  volumes),  I,  280. 

6  Shaftesbury's  "  Letter  concerning  Design  "  was  occasioned  directly  by 
his  treatise  "  A  notion  of  the  Tablature  of  the  Judgment  of  Hercules." 

7  Goschen,  XXXIII,  232.  Wieland  alludes  here  to  Shaftesbury's  idea 
found  in  the  "  Letter  concerning  Design  "  in  the  "  Characteristics  "  III, 
409,  which  is  expressed  as  follows :  "  The  picture  itself,  whatever  the 
treatise  proved,  would  have  been  worth  notice  and  might  have  become  a 
present  worthy  of  our  court  and  princes'  palace.  Such  a  piece  of  furniture 
might  well  fit  the  gallery  or  hall  of  exercise,  where  our  young  princes 
should  learn  their  usual  lessons.  And  to  see  virtue  in  this  garb  and  action 
might  perhaps  be  no  slight  memorandum  hereafter  to  a  royal  youth  who 
should  one  day  come  to  undergo  this  trial  himself." 

'    8  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  297. 


8 

I759»  to  the  same  correspondent,  he  speaks  of  his  difficulty  in 
vying  with  Shaftesbury,  Diderot  and  Rousseau." 

By  May  i,  1760,  he  was  planning  a  translation  of  Shaftes- 
bury: "Among  my  other  plans,"  he  writes  to  Zimmermann, 
"  is  to  give  Germany  a  complete  translation  of  Shaftesbury. 
Since  his  '  Inquiry '  and  '  Moralists '  have  already  been  trans- 
lated by  Mr.  Spalding  there  remain  only  the  *  Letter  concern- 
ing Enthusiasm,'  the  treatise  on  '  Wit  and  Humor,'  the  '  Advice 
to  an  Author  '  and  the  '  Miscellanies.'  "^° 

In  1782  Wieland  makes  considerable  use  of  Shaftesbury  in 
the  translation  of  Horace's  epistles.  In  the  introduction  to  the 
third  letter  to  Piso  he  says  that  he  will  present  at  once  the 
point  of  view  from  which  the  letter  must  be  considered,  and 
adds  that,  "  following  a  hint  of  the  excellent  Lord  Shaftes- 
bury," he  has  employed  the  same  procedure  in  all  the  other 
letters  of  Horace. ^^  Speaking  of  the  character  of  Maecenas, 
*^  he  says  that,  without  knowing  the  characters  of  Maecenas, 

Augustus,  Florus  and  the  like,  one  cannot  find  sufficient  relish 
in  the  letters  written  to  them,  unless  he  has  a  tender  feeling 
for  the  true  and  the  beautiful.  This  opinion  is  introduced  by 
the  statement,  "  Ich  bin  mit  Shaftesbury  vollig  iiberzeugt,"  and 
is  concluded  by  an  allusion  in  a  foot-note  to  the  "  Character- 
istics, Vol.  Ill,  Misc.  I,  C.  3."^-  Speaking  of  Horace,  he  says 
that,  even  if  he  had  not  been  such  a  good  poet,  he  would  have 
become  Maecenas'  friend  through  the  elegance  of  his  mind  and 
morals,  through  his  wit,  his  pleasant  humor — "  kurz,  durch 
alles  das,  weswegen  ihn  Shaftesbury  the  most  Gentleman-like 
of  Roman  poets  nennt."^^  And  in  a  foot-note  we  are  referred 
by  Wieland  to  the  "  Characteristics,  Vol.  I,  p.  328."^*  Further 
on  he  expresses  a  certain  opinion  concerning  the  relation  be- 
tween Horace  and  Brutus,  but  he  gets  the  opinion  from  Shaftes- 
bury, for  he  says :  "  Ich  glaube  mit  Shaftesbury  nicht  zu  irren, 

0  Ibid.,  II,  47. 
^ojbid.,  II,  132. 

11  "  Horazens  Briefe  iibersetzt  "  (Leipzig,  1816),  II,  187. 
^2  Ibid.,  I,  5.      The  passage  referred  to  is  found  in  our  edition,  III,  21. 
isibid.,  1,   19. 

14  This  passage  occurs  in  our  edition  in  exactly  the  same  volume  and  on 
exactly  the  same  page  (I,  328). 


9 

wenn,"  etc.^^  All  these  references  go  to  show  that  Wieland 
must  at  that  time  have  had  his  Shaftesbury  constantly  before 
him. 

Also  twenty  years  later  Wieland  has  Shaftesbury  open  before 
him,  for  he  quotes  specific  passages  from  the  "  Character- 
istics." In  the  Vorhericht  to  the  translation  of  Xenophon's 
"  Symposium  "  he  speaks  in  lofty  terms  concerning  Xenophon 
and  says :  "  Sehr  richtig  nennt  ihn  daher  der  scharfsinnige  und 
echt  classische  Shaftesbury  in  seinem  '  Advice  to  an  Author ' 
den  philosophischen  Menander  der  friiheren  Zeit."^*'  In  a 
foot-note  he  refers  to  the  Thurneisen  edition  of  the  "  Charac- 
teristics," Vol.  I,  p.  218.^^  A  little  further  on  we  are  told  that 
some  readers  unacquainted  with  the  Greeks  of  that  period  will 
conceive  exaggerated  notions  of  Xenophon,  but  that  it  is  not 
Xenophon's  fault  if  the  readers  lack  a  feeling  for — Wieland 
continues  in  Shaftesbury's  words — "  die  Gottlichkeit  der 
schonen  Einfalt  des  Liebenswurdigsten  und  Geist  und  Herz 
mehr  als  irgend  ein  anderer  erhebenden  unter  alien  bios  mensch- 
lichen  Schriftstellern."^^  And  in  a  foot-note  we  are  referred 
to  the  passage  where  these  words  occur,  the  Thurneisen  edition 
of  the  "  Characteristics,"  Vol.  Ill,  p.  205.^^ 

Dating  from  the  same  year,  1802,  we  have  from  Wieland's 
hand  a  long  eulogy  of  Shaftesbury  and  a  declaration  of  his 
indebtedness  to  him.  In  his  Neuer  Teiitscher  Merkur  he  pub- 
lished a  criticism  of  Herder's  "Adrastea,"  mentioning  among 
others  the  articles  on  Locke,  Swift  and  Shaftesbury,  and  add- 
ing the  following  significant  statement,  which  in  spite  of  its 
length  is  worth  giving  in  the  original :  "  Vor  allem  aber  kann 
ich  mir's  nicht  versagen,  Adrasteen  meinen  warmsten  Dank 
ofTentlich  darzubringen  fiir  die  herrliche  Karakteristik  des 
liebenswiirdigsten  aller  neuen  Schriftsteller,  des  Grafen  Anton 
von  Shaftesbury,  welchem  ich  selbst  einen  so  groszen  Theil 

"i-^  Ibid.,  II,  18.  This  opinion  is  expressed  by  Shaftesbury  in  the  "Mis- 
cellanies," III,  249-50,  of  our  edition. 

^^  Attisches  Museum,  IVi,  72. 

17  In  our  edition  of  Shaftesbury  this  passage  occurs  in  I,  255. 

^s  Attisches  Museum,  IVi,  73. 

19  In  our  edition  these  words  occur  in  III,  248  and  read  as  follows: 
"  the  divineness  of  a  just  simplicity  of  the  most  amiable  and  even  the  most 
elevating  and  exalting  of  all  uninspired  and  merely  human  authors." 


10 

meiner  eigenen  Bildung  in  meinen  friiheren  Jahren  schuldig 
bin  und  der  starker  auf  mich  gewirkt  hat  als  icli  ohne  Be- 
schamung  sagen  kann,  da  ich  demungeachtet  so  weit  hinter  ihm 
zuriickgeblieben  bin.  Dank,  herzlicher  Dank  sei  Adrasteen 
fiir  die  Gerechtigkeit,  welche  sie  diesem  Edeln  und  Einzigen 
widerfahren  liesz,  in  welchem  Platons  holier  Idealism  mit 
Xenophons  Sokratischer  Kalokagathie  und  Sofrosyne  und 
Horazens  weisem  Frohsinn  so  schon  vereinigt  war !  Dank  fiir 
die  vortreffliche  Apologie  dieses  (zu  ihrer  Schmach)  von  so 
vielen  Britten  noch  immer  verkannten,  so  oft  schief  und 
hamisch  beurteilten  Wiederherstellers  der  reinen  Sokratischen 
Lehre  gegen  seine  eigenen  Landesleute  und  ihre  Nachlaller 
unter  den  Unsrigen !  Dank  endlich  fiir  die  zartschonende 
Billigkeit,  womit  sie  die  wenigen  Bloszen  bedeckt,  wodurch  Er 
selbst,  nach  der  hochsten  Strenge  beurteilt,  zu  den  Miszver- 
standnissen  seiner  Tadler  und  Verleumder  Gelegenheit  gegeben 
haben  mag."-° 

And  even  as  late  as  July  ii,  1808,  Shaftesbury  is  still  Wie- 
land's  companion.  In  a  letter  of  that  date  we  are  told  that  in 
the  evening  between  5  and  7  he  may  be  found  "  in  the  com- 
pany of  a  Cicero,  Horace,  Lucian  or  Shaftesbury."-^ 

Wieland's  profound  interest  in  Shaftesbury  is  also  shown  by 
the  variety  of  Shaftesbury-editions  used  by  him.  He  is  not 
satisfied  with  merely  one  certain  edition,  but  knows  all  the 
German  translations  of  Shaftesbury  and  consults  several  Eng- 
lish editions  of  the  "  Characteristics."  In  1756,  speaking  of 
the  "  virtuoso  "  in  his  "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  he  refers  to 
the  "  Characteristics,"  Tom  III,  Miscellany,  III,  Chap.  1.^ 
This  must  have  been  some  English  edition  as  seen,  in  the  first 
place,  from  the  English  terms  "  Miscellany  "  and  "  Chapter." 
Secondly,  the  edition  referred  to  could  not  have  been  a  German 
translation,  because  whatever  German  translations  appeared 
prior  to  1756  did  not  include  the  "  Miscellaneous  Reflections." 

In  the  February  issue  of  the  Merkur  of  1777  there  is  a 
review  of  the  German  translation  of  Shaftesbury;  "  Des  Graf  en 
von  Shaftesbury  philosophische  Werke  aus  dem  Englischen 

^oNeuer  Tetitscher  Merkur,  April,  1802,  pp.  295-6. 

21  "  Auswahl  denkwiirdiger  Briefe,"  II,   118. 

22  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,  112. 


11 

iibersetzt.  ler  Band,  Leipzig,  1776.  In  der  Weigandschen 
Handlung."  The  review,  which  is  evidently  by  Wieland,  reads 
in  part  as  follows :  The  translation  is  very  good  and  the  author 
felt  the  irony  of  the  original.  It  is  a  good  sign  for  the  condi- 
tion of  religion  and  literature  of  the  times  that  it  did  not  seem 
necessary,  as  ten  years  ago.  to  edit  the  works  of  Shaftesbury 
with  notes  to  counteract  the  poison  of  the  original.  The  older 
translations  of  a  Venzky  and  a  Wichmann  contained  enough  of 
an  antidote  in  the  stifl  tone  of  their  pedantic  work.  Whatever 
may  be  said  against  Shaftesbury's  diction  or  character,  he  re- 
mains for  us  at  all  times  a  model  of  fine  composition,  of  which 
our  modern  authors  endeavor  to  know  so  little.^^ 

This  review  shows  not  only  Wieland's  acquaintance  with  the 
original,  but  also  with  the  German  translations  of  1738,  1768 
and  1776-9.  That  he  at  least  knew  of  Spalding's  translation 
of  the  "  Moralists  "  and  "  Inquiry "  appears  from  the  afore- 
mentioned letter  to  Zimmermann,  May  i,  1760. 

In  his  translation  of  Horace's  letters  (1782)  Wieland  men- 
tions that  Shaftesbury  calls  Horace  "  the  most  gentleman-like 
of  Roman  poets  "  and  refers  to  the  "  Characteristics,  Vol.  I,  p. 
328."  The  terms  are  again  English  and  the  reference  corre- 
sponds volume  for  volume  and  page  for  page  to  the  Basker- 
ville  edition  of  1773.  This  would  go  to  show  that  Wieland 
made  use  also  of  the  Baskerville  edition. 

After  1790  Wieland  seems  to  have  confined  himself  entirely 
to  the  English  Thurneisen  and  Legrand  edition,  which  appeared 
in  Basel  in  1790.  He  watches  the  edition  with  special  interest 
in  its  process  of  going  through  the  press  and  makes  constant 
use  of  it  after  its  appearance.  Thus,  in  the  October  number 
of  the  Merkur  of  1787  there  is  an  announcement  by  Wieland 
of  the  prospective  publication  by  Thurneisen  of  a  series  of  the 
best  English  historians,  philosophers  and  poets,  the  series  con- 
taining among  other  things  Shaftesbury's  "  Characteristics " 
and  Letters.-^  And  two  years  later  he  expresses  his  impatience 
at  the  delayed  appearance  of  the  edition  of  Shaftesbury.^^  The 
edition  was  finally  advertised  in  the   September  number  of 

23  Teutscher  Merkur,  Feb.,   1777,  pp.  201-2. 

-4  See  p.  cxlvi,  ff. 

25  July  number,  1789,  p.  112. 


12 

1792.^°  That  Wieland  made  considerable  use  of  the  Thurn- 
eisen  edition  appears  from  his  frequent  direct  allusions  to  it. 
Thus,  for  instance,  the  two  allusions  in  the  Vorhericht  to 
Xenophon's  "Symposium"  (1802),  the  allusion  in  the  notes 
of  "Der  neue  Amadis "  (2nd  edition,  1794)  and  the  one  in 
the  "  Sendschreiben  an  Prof.  Eggers"  (1792)  are  all  to  this 
edition  of  Shaftesbury.-^  In  the  last  allusion  Wieland  states 
the  names  of  both  publishers  and  the  year  and  place  of  publi- 
cation. 

These  notices  are  sufificient  to  prove  Wieland's  deep  and 
lasting  interest  in  Shaftesbury.  In  the  face  of  all  this  evidence 
it  would  be  strange  indeed  if  the  philosopher  had  not  exerted  a 
considerable  influence  on  the  poet.  Both  Shaftesbury  and 
Wieland,  however,  owed  a  considerable  debt  to  Greek  philoso- 
phy, especially  to  Plato-*  and  Xenophon.  Hence,  in  order  to 
see  how  and  when  Shaftesbury  came  into  Wieland's  intel- 
lectual life  as  a  distinct  factor,  it  is  necessary  to  devote  a  few 
words  to  Wieland's  early  studies  of  Plato  and  Xenophon. 

Wieland  became  acquainted  with  Plato,  Xenophon,  and 
through  them  with  Socrates,  very  early  in  life.  As  may  be 
seen  from  references  to  Plato  in  "  Die  Natur  der  Dinge  "-^ 
and  "  Moralische  Briefe,"^''  Wieland  must  have  made  a  study 
of  Plato  by  1752.  A  course  in  Plato  was  probably  a  part  of 
his  school  curriculum  at  Klosterbergen  (1747-1749).  The 
Platonic  influence  is  quite  evident  in  his  earliest  works, — his 
first  work  "Die  Natur  der  Dinge"  appeared  in  1752 — dating 
before  1755.  But  even  at  this  early  period  Plato  is  not  an 
independent  factor  in  Wieland's  intellectual  life,  for  what  he 
learns  from  Plato  he  blends  with  what  is  learned  almost  simul- 
taneously, or  a  very  short  time  afterwards,  from  Shaftesbury. 

-6  Sept.,  1792,  p.  102. 

27  Cf.  Attisches  Museum,  IVi,  yz  and  73 ;  Goschen,  XV,  293 ;  Hempel, 
XXXIV,  169. 

28  Herder  saw  enough  resemblance  between  Shaftesbury  and  Plato  to 
call  the  former  "  der  liebenswiirdige  Plato  Europas."  Cf.  R.  Haym : 
"  Herder  nach  seinem  Leben  und  Wirken,"  Berlin,   1885,  H,  268. 

29  Book  I,  line  10  (Gruber,  I,  13);  book  HI,  line  120  (p.  77),  line  331 
(p.  8s),  line  571    (p.  96). 

30  ler  Brief,  line  131  (Gruber  I,  229)  ;  2er  Brief,  line  i6i  (p.  240)  ;  7er 
Brief,  line  87  (p.  277)  ;  9er  Brief,  line  214  (p.  303). 


13 

As  a  result  of  this  a  good  many  things  in  Wieland's  earliest 
works  have  a  pronounced  Shaftesburian  tinge.  In  the  "  Sym- 
pathien"  (1755)  he  tells  us  to  learn  "Von  einem  Platon  oder  ^ 
Shaftesbury  was  Natur  und  Tugend  ist."^'^  And  in  the  Vor- 
bericht  to  "  Theages  "  he  speaks  of  the  leisure  which  he  had 
several  years  ago  to  study  the  works  of  Plato  and  Shaftes- 
bury.^- "Theages"  did  not  appear  until  1758,  but  Wieland 
had  been  working  on  it  since  1755.  It  is  impossible  to  deter- 
mine the  exact  time  to  which  Wieland  refers,  but  I  am  in- 
clined to  think  that  "  vor  einigen  Jahren"  refers  at  least  to 
the  beginning  of  the  fifties,  when  his  literary  career  begins. 
As  it  appears  from  the  above-mentioned  conversation  with 
Ring,  at  the  beginning  of  1755,  Wieland  was  then  famihar  with 
Shaftesbury's  philosophy  as  a  whole,  and  it  is  quite  likely  that 
the  study  of  Shaftesbury  claimed  his  attention  several  years 
before  1755.  In  his  brief  statement  concerning  Wieland's  rela- 
tion to  Shaftesbury,  M.  Koch  even  goes  so  far  as  to  assert  that 
it  was  through  Shaftesbury  that  Wieland  acquired  an  interest 
in  Plato. ^^ 

Also  with  Xenophon  Wieland  becomes  acquainted  very  early, 
for  already  at  Klosterbergen  (1747-9)  Xenophon  is  his  favorite 
and  contributes  much  to  his  education.^*  But  also  Xenophon's 
influence  is  manifested  aside  from  the  Shaftesburian  influence. 
Thus,  "Cyrus"  (1759)  and  "Araspes  und  Panthea"  (1760) 
are  largely  the  fruits  of  the  study  of  Xenophon,  but  in  both 
works  Shaftesbury  is  very  much  in  evidence.  In  the  intro- 
ductory verses  of  "  Cyrus  "  he  calls  upon  Truth  to  point  out 
to  him : 

"Jene  sittliche  Venus,  die  einst  dein  (Truth's)  Xenophon  kannte 
Und  dein  Ashley^^  j^it  ihm,  die  Mutter  des  geistigen  Schonen."^® 

The  character  of  Cyrus,  which  is  also  a  prominent  feature  in 

31 "  Sympathien,"  Goschen  XXIX,  25. 
32  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  I,  141. 

33 "  Beziehungen  der  englischen  Literatur  zur  deutschen  im  i8  Jahr- 
hundert,"  Leipzig,  1883,  p.  12. 

34  Letter  to  L.  Meister,  Dec.  28,  1787,  "  Ausgewahlte  Brief e,"  III,  382. 

35  Shaftesbury's  full  name  was  Anthony  Ashley  Cooper,  3d  Earl  of 
Shaftesbury. 

36  "  Cyrus,"  ist  Canto,  lines  28-9,  Gruber,  IV,  4. 


14 

"Araspes  und  Panthea,"  was  suggested  to  him,  as  he  tells  us 
in  the  Znschrift,  by  Xenophon's  Muse  and  Shaftesbury's  Moral 
Venus.^^  The  episode  of  "Araspes  und  Panthea"  is  also 
found  in  Shaftesbury's  "  Advice  to  an  Author."^^ 

The  most  important  result  of  Wieland's  study  of  Xenophon 
was  the  knowledge  acquired  of  Socrates.^''  On  several  occa- 
sions he  recommends  Xenophon's  Memorabilia  as  the  best  and 
purest  source  for  a  knowledge  of  Socrates.**'  He  was  espe- 
cially impressed  by  the  Socratic  ideal  of  kalokagathia.  He 
frequently  alludes  to  this  ideal*^  and  discusses  it  on  a  number 
of  occasions.  But  as  in  the  case  of  Plato  and  Xenophon,  so 
also  in  the  case  of  Socrates,  Shaftesbury  comes  in  for  his  share 
of  the  influence.  Wieland  blends  the  Socratic  kalokagathia 
with  the  Shaftesburian  "  virtuoso."*^ 

All  this  goes  to  show  that  Shaftesbury  was  a  prominent 
factor  even  in  the  earliest  period  of  Wieland's  literary  career — 
the  period  which  extends  roughly  to  about  1760 — and  that  he 
was  a  constant  companion  of  Wieland's  Greek  favorites,  Plato, 
Xenophon  and  Socrates.  Shaftesbury's  influence,  however,  is 
much  more  extensive.  He  is,  as  Goethe  said,  Wieland's 
"  wahrhafter  alterer  Zwillingsbruder  im  Geiste."*^  In  fact, 
Wieland's  transition  to  the  second  period  of  his  career,  that 
epoch-making  period  which  gave  us  his  "  Musarion,"  "  Aga- 
thon,"  "  Oberon,"  and  the  like, — this  transition  coincided  with 
his  more  intimate  acquaintance  with  Shaftesbury.  It  will  now 
be  in  order  to  compare  these  two  periods  in  order  that  we  may 

^T Zuschrift  to  "Araspes  und  Panthea"  (edition  of  1760,  Ziirich),  p.  vii. 

38  "  Characteristics,"  I,  176  ff, 

39  Wieland  refers  very  frequently  to  Socrates  as  early  as  1752.  Cf. 
"  Moralische  Briefe  "  (Gruber,  Vol.  I),  ler  Brief,  lines  72,  184;  4er  Brief, 
line  17;  ger  Brief,  lines  45,  98,  213,  233,  249. 

40  Teutscher  Merkur,  Dec,  1783,  p.  clxxviii.  Also  the  foreword  to 
"  Xenophons  Sokratische  Gesprache,"  Attisches  Museum,  Vol.  III. 

41  Letter  to  Zimmermann,  Feb.  24,  1758,  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  256; 
to  Hottinger,  Jan.  30,  1797,  ibid.,  IV,  38;  "  Der  neue  Amadis "  (1771), 
Goschen,  XV.,  135;  "  Agathon,"  Goschen,  IV,  4;  "  Socratische  Gesprache" 
in  Attisches  Museum,  IIP,  129;  "Aristipp,"  XXIII,  206.  In  none  of  these 
allusions,  however,   is  the  doctrine  directly  discussed. 

42  "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,  112;  also  note 
to  "Theages,"  Goschen,  XXXIII,  414. 

43  "  Werke,"  Hempel  edition,  XXVII2,  60. 


15 

clearly  see  the  part  played  by  Shaftesbury  in  Wieland's  transi- 
tion from  the  first  to  the  second  period. 

Wieland  was  born  at  a  time  (1733)  when  pietism  had  made 
considerable  headway  in  Germany,  owing  to  the  efforts  of 
Spener,  Francke  and  others,  and  was  brought  up — his  father 
was  a  minister — in  a  strictly  pietistic  atmosphere.  He  re- 
ceived a  similar  training  at  Klosterbergen  (1747-9)  under 
Steinmetz  and  breathed  the  same  general  atmosphere  in  the 
home  of  Bodmer  (1752-4).  His  mind  became  seraphically 
inclined  and  began  to  wander  in  etherial  regions.  He  acquired 
a  peculiar  religiosity,  which  he  combined  with  his  Platonic 
studies,  and  became  a  Schwdrmer.  The  sexual  nature  of  man 
had  no  part  in  his  philosophy  of  life  at  that  time,  his  early  love 
for  his  cousin  Sophie  von  Gutermann  having  been  a  Platonic 
passion.  From  the  heights  of  his  seraphic  aversion  to  the 
common  herd  he  glorified  those  "worthy  men  who  live  far 
from  the  world  in  lonely  valleys."**  He  was  very  fond  of 
solitude  and  often  spent  entire  days  and  nights  in  the  garden 
to  observe  and  to  portray  the  beauties  of  nature.*^  He  even 
entertained  the  idea  of  becoming  a  hermit.**^  His  early  zeal 
for  religion  and  piety  was  without  the  spirit  of  tolerance  and 
had  rather  the  nature  of  fanaticism.  This  is  shown  among 
other  things  by  his  condemnation  of  Ovid,  Anacreon,  Tibul- 
lus*'^  and  several  French  and  English  poets  such  as  Chaulieu, 

44 "  Brief e  von  Verstorbenen  an  hinterlassene  Freunde "  (1753),  3ci 
letter  lines,  94  ff.     Gruber,  II,  234. 

45  Letter  to  Bodmer,  1752,  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  47. 

46  "  Sympathien,"  Goschen,  XXIX,  13.  Alcest  is  here  the  man  desiring 
to  retire  into  seclusion,  but  in  a  letter  to  Zimmermann  of  Sept.  6,  1758,  we 
are  told  that  Alcest  is  none  other  than  Wieland  himself.  Cf.  "  Ausge- 
wahlte Briefe,"  I,  285. 

47  In  his  "  Schreiben  von  der  Wiirde  und  Bestimmung  eines  schonen 
Geistes  "  (1752)  Wieland  identifies  himself  with  the  cause  of  "  Belehrende 
und  bessernde  Dichtung "  and  attacks  the  "  Priester  der  Unsinns."  Cf. 
p.  xxvii  of  Sauer's  introduction  to  Uz'  "  Sammtliche  poetische  Werke," 
Stuttgart,  i8go  (in  numbers  33-8  of  the  Deutsche  Liter aturdenkmale,  edited 
by  B.  Seuffert).  In  the  second  edition  of  the  "  Schreiben  von  der  Wiirde," 
etc.,  which  appeared  in  1754  in  "  Fragmente  der  erzahlenden  Dichtart  von 
verschiedenem  Inhalte,"  Wieland  attacks  directly  "  the  innumerable  Tibul- 
luses  and  Anacreons  "  of  today  (cf.  Sauer's  Introduction,  p.  xxvii). 


16 

Gay  and  Prior,  To  this  period  belongs  also  the  attack  upon  Uz.*® 
Gradually,  however,  there  came  a  change  in  Wieland's  view 
of  life,  and  this  change  began  to  manifest  itself  precisely  at  the 
time  Avhen  he  acquired  a  deeper  interest  in  Shaftesbury.  As 
he  enters  upon  his  second  .period,  which  may  be  said  to  extend 
from  1760  to  178Q,  Wieland  leaves  his  seraphic  world  of 
pietism.  He  gets  rid  of  Bodmer's  influence,  and  fanaticism 
falls  away  from  him.  He  is  no  longer  an  ascetic  and  begins 
more  and  more  "to  familiarize  himself  with  the  people  of  the 
low  world"  (bas-monde).^°  He  regrets  his  former  fanatic  act 
of  condemning  poets  like  Ovid,  La  Fontaine  and  especially  Uz. 
He  apologizes  for  this  atack,  announces  his  fondness  for  Prior 
and  Gay,  speaks  of  Uz  as  one  of  the  best  minds  of  the  nation 
and  characterizes  his  former  attitude  to  him  as  "  alberne 
Severitat."^'' 

This  great  change  which  led  Wieland  to  declare  "  non  sum 
qualis  eram  "°^  was  also  noticed  by  his  contemporaries  Lessing 
and  Goethe.  On  the  appearance  of  "Lady  Johanna  Gray" 
(1758)  Lessing  rejoices  that  "Wieland  has  left  the  etherial 
spheres,  and  that  he  wanders  again  among  the  children  of 
men."^-  And  Goethe  speaks  of  this  transition  as  follows: 
Wieland's  youth  passed  in  realms  of  the  idealistic  world,  but 
in  his  maturity  he  came  out  into  the  real  world  and  has  ever 
since  kept  the  balance  between  the  two.^^ 

Among  the  causes  that  contributed  to  this  change  in  Wie- 
land's entire  attitude  should  be  mentioned  his  intercourse  with 
Julie   Bondeli    during   his    sojourn   in    Bern    (1759-60)    and 

48  The  Uz  controversy  is  discussed  by  L.  Hirzel  in  his  "  Wieland  und 
Martin  und  Regula  Kiinzli,"  Leipzig,  1891,  pp.  121-32  and  in  Sauer's 
Introduction  to  Uz'  poetical  works,  pp.  xx-lxii. 

49  Letters  to  Zimmermann,  Apr.  26,  1759;  Nov.  8,  1762;  Mar.  12,  1758; 
"  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  L  365;  H,  194;  I,  259. 

50 "  Unterredungen  mit  dem  Pfarrer  ..."  (1775),  Hempel,  XXXII, 
225.  Letter  to  Julie  Bondeli,  July  16,  1764:  "Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  II, 
241-5;  to  Zimmermann,  March  12,  1758,  ibid.,  I,  260;  Gleim,  Feb.  4,  1768, 
ibid.,  II,  296.  Riedel,  Jan.  19,  1769,  "  Auswahl  denkwiirdiger  Briefe,"  I, 
247.     Geszner,  May  4,  1764,  ibid.,  I,  9. 

51  To  Zimmermann,  Nov.  8,   1762,  "Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  II,   194. 

52  Lessing's  "  Briefe  die  neueste  Literatur  betreffend,"  63d  letter,  Lach- 
mann-Muncker   edition,   VIII,    166. 

53  "  Dichtung  und  Wahrheit,"  Book  7,  Hempel,  XXI,  54. 


17 

especially  his  contact  with  Stadion  and  La  Roche.  After  a 
long  activity  in  the  service  of  the  Elector  of  Mainz,  Count 
Friedrich  Stadion  had  retired  to  his  castle  at  Warthausen 
near  Biberach.  He  had  with  him  his  secretary,  La  Roche, 
and  Wieland,  who  was  at  this  time  councilor  at  Biberach,^* 
spent  very  enjoyable  and  profitable  hours  at  Warthausen. 
Stadion  and  La  Roche  were  both  men  of  the  world,  perfectly 
virtuous,  free  from  fanaticism,  always  serene  and  cheerful. 
To  use  in  substance  Gruber's  words :  Wieland  found  at  Wart-  y 
hausen  religion  without  superstition,  philosophy  without  empty 
metaphysics,  fun  and  cheer  free  from  all  blemish,  love  which 
is  without  fanaticism  and  makes  life  happy.^^  His  association 
with  La  Roche  andi- Stadion,  the  latter  especially,  contributed 
very  much,  as  Wieland  himself  reports  a  quarter  of  a  century 
later,  to  the  rectification  and  extension  of  his  knowledge  of 
men  and  the  world.^^ 

But  this  great  change  in  Wieland's  life  began  to  manifest 
itself  before  his  coming  into  contact  with  La  Roche  and  Sta- 
dion. It  is  in  Shaftesbury's  philosophy  that  he  first  found  the 
healthy  atmosphere  of  a  man  of  the  world,  religion  without 
fanaticism,  self-communion  without  asceticism,  spiritual  refine- 
ment without  warfare  against  the  sensual  nature  of  man. 
Wieland's  study  of  Shaftesbury  is  especially  prominent  be- 
tween 1755-60,  which  is  precisely  the  time  when  the  change 
begins.  His  works  and  letters  of  this  period  are  full  of  allu- 
sions to  the  English  philosopher.  To  the  allusions  discussed 
above  the  following  may  be  added.^^  In  1755  he  urges  Amyn- 
tor,  the  hero  of  the  13th  Sympathie,  to  be  "  one  of  the  few  for 
whom  the  wise  Shaftesbury  has  not  written  in  vain  his  '  Advice 
to  an  Author.'"^^     March  12,  1758,  he  refers  to  Shaftesbury 

54  He  was  elected  to  this  position  in   1760. 

55  "  Wieland  geschildert  von  Gruber,"  I,  152. 

56  Letter  to  L.  Meister,  Dec.  28,  1787,  "  Ausgewahlte  Brief  e,"  III,  386. 
In  a  letter  to  Geszner  of  March  20,  1769,  he  glorifies  the  characters  of 
Stadion  and  La  Roche.     Cf.  "  Auswahl  denkwiirdiger  Briefe,"  I,  94,  ff. 

57  The  following  few  allusions  and  those  discussed  above  by  no  means 
exhaust  everything  said  by  Wieland  concerning  Shaftesbury  during  this 
period.  The  allusions  that  are  still  left  will  be  treated  in  connection  with 
the  discussion  of  the  various  Shaftesburian  views  in  Wieland's  works. 

58  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  I,  103,  or  Goschen,  XXIX,  55. 
3 


18 

as  saying  that  men  are  musical  instruments.^*  Oct.  i8,  1758, 
he  speaks  of  Klopstock's  "  Messias  "  and  remarks  that  Shaftes- 
bury would  find  non-sense  in  it  even  if  he  could  read  it  in 
German.""  Nov,  8,  1758,  he  again  criticises  Klopstock's 
"  JMessias  "  and  adds  that  these  and  many  other  things  would 
have  been  said  by  Shaftesbury  "  tausendmal  feiner,  sinnreicher 
und  bestimmter.""^  And  in  the  same  letter  he  remarks  that 
what  Shaftesbury  would  have  said  concerning  the  "  Messias  " 
appears  very  clearly  in  the  "  Advice  to  an  Author.""^ 

In  the  meantime  the  study  of  Plato  seems  to  be  neglected. 
References  to  Plato  occur  in  Wieland's  works  after  1760,"^ 
but  Nov.  8,  1762,  he  speaks  of  having  given  up  his  study  of 
Plato."*  Still  earlier,  March  12,  1758,  he  reports  that  he  is  not 
as  Platonic  as  he  is  considered  to  be."^  During  this  very  same 
year,  when  Wieland  ceases  to  care  for  Plato,  he  seems  to  have 
devoted  almost  his  entire  attention  to  Shaftesbury;  during 
1758  he  alludes  to  and  speaks  about  the  English  philosopher 
more  than  in.  any  other  year.  As  he  comes  into  the  new  world 
he  finds  it  necessary  to  modify  his  Platonism  considerably,  and 
he  reports  simultaneously  of  having  given  up  his  Platonic 
studies  and  of  having  ceased  to  be  a  mystic  and  ascetic.""  But 
just  at  this  time  his  interest  in  Shaftesbury  is  most  prominent. 
"  Cyrus  "  and  "  Araspes  und  Panthea "  are  indicated  by  him 

59  Letter  to  Zimmermann,  "  Ausgewahlte  Brief e,"  I,  261;  Wieland  un- 
doubtedly refers  here  to  the  following  words  of  Shaftesbury  (I,  274)  : 
"  Let  the  authors  and  poets  complain  ever  so  much  of  the  genius  of  our 
people,  'tis  evident  we  are  not  altogether  so  barbarous  and  Gothic  as  they 
pretend.  We  are  naturally  no  ill  soil  and  have  musical  parts  which  might 
be  cultivated  with  greater  advantage,  if  these  gentlemen  would  use  the  art 
of  masters  in  their  composition." 

60  To  Zimmermann,  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  298. 

61  To   Zimmermann,   ibid.,   I,   308. 
^^  Ibid.,  I,  306. 

63  See,  for  instance,  "Don  Sylvio  "  (1764),  Goschen,  I,  86;  "  Idris  und 
Zenide  "  (1768),  sth  canto,  83d  stanza  and  99th  stanza,  Hempel,  XVI,  108 
and  iii;  "  Der  neue  Amadis  "  (1771),  nth  canto,  31st  stanza,  Goschen, 
XV;  "Die  Abderiten  "  (i 774-1 781),  Goschen,  XIII,  17;  "Agathon,"  Part 
III,  Goschen,  VI,  66;  "Aristipp,"  Part  III,  Goschen,  XXIV,  154. 

64  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  II,  195;  "  Platon  a  fait  place  a  Horace,  Young 
a  Chaulieu,"  etc. 

65  To  Zimmermann,  ibid.,  I,  259. 
e^  Ibid.,  II,  241,  194-5. 


19 

as  the  first  fruits  of  his  transition  to  the  second  period.^'^  But 
in  both  these  works,  as  we  have  seen,  Shaftesbury  is  very  much 
in  evidence.  Moreover,  it  is  at  the  same  time  that  he  begins 
to  "  familiarize  himself  with  the  people  of  this  world,"  to 
"  love  the  beautiful,  the  good,  the  great  and  the  sublime,"  and 
— to  "  aspire  to  the  character  of  Shaftesbury's  virtuoso."*'^ 

67  To  L.  Meister,  ibid..  Ill,  385. 

68  To  Zimmermann,   March    12,    1758,  ibid.,  I,   259. 


CHAPTER   II 

The  Salient  Features  of  Shaftesbury's  Philosophy 

It  will  be  impossible  for  any  one  to  follow  the  reflection  of 
Shaftesbury's  doctrines  in  Wieland's  works  until  he  has  a  clear 
idea  of  the  more  fundamental  Shaftesburian  views.  It  is 
necessary,  therefore,  to  devote  a  chapter  to  the  exposition  of 
those  views. 

I.    Esthetics  and  Morality.    Art  and  Virtue 

Shaftesbury  was  a  moral-esthetic  philosopher,  and  the  iden- 
tification of  esthetics  and  morality  is  the  chief  feature  of  his 
philosophy.  The  good  is  beautiful,  the  beautiful  is  true.  All 
beauty  is  truth.  True  features  make  a  face  beautiful,  true 
proportions  make  the  beauty  of  architecture,  true  measures  the 
beauty  of  music.  Harmony  is  the  essential  feature  underlying 
both  goodness  and  beauty.  Harmonious  coordination  of  parts 
into  one  whole  makes  for  beauty  in  the  physical  world,  whil^ 
symmetry  and  proportion  in  our  sentiments  and  actions  pro- 
duce that  inner  beauty,  for  which  morality  is  only  a  synonym.^ 
The  most  delightful  beauty  pursued  by  virtuosos  and  cele- 
brated by  poets  is  the  beauty  drawn  from  real  life.  The  most 
natural  beauty  in  the  world  is  honesty  and  moral  truth.  "  Who 
can  admire  the  outward  beauties,  and  not  recur  instantly  to 
the  inward,  which  are  the  most  real  and  essential,  the  most 
naturally  affecting,  and  of  the  highest  pleasure  as  well  as  profit 
and  advantage?"^  Surely  there  is  ivorkmanship  and  truth  in 
actions.  "  The  real  honest  man  has  honesty  in  view,  and  in- 
stead of  outward  forms  or  symmetries  is  struck  with  that  of 
inward  character,  the  harmony  and  numbers  of  the  heart,  the 
beauty  of  the  affections,  which  form  the  manners  and  conduct 
of  a  truly  social  life."^ 

1  Cf.  especially  "Characteristics,"  III,  180  ff. 

2  "  Characteristics,"  III,  185. 

3  "  Characteristics,"  III,  34. 

20 


21 

And  since  the  harmony  of  beauty  is  the  model  for  the  har- 
mony of  spiritual  life,  so  harmonious  development  of  the  indi- 
vidual based  upon  esthetics  becomes  Shaftesbury's  moral  ideal.* 
We  should,  he  claims,  seek  for  the  beautiful  in  everything,  and 
by  attaining  beauty  we  shall  also  attain  true  wisdom ;  for  who- 
ever contemplates  beauty  must  be  good,  and  a  real  master  of 
beauty  knows  that  sensuality  is  ugly  and  that  only  in  beauty 
are  there  reason  and  order.  Such  a  man  may  be  said  to  be 
the  architect  of  his  own  life  and  happiness.  Virtue  and  art 
are  closely  related.  Life  is  the  highest  art,  and  the  wise  man 
is  the  artist  of  his  own  life  by  placing  in  himself  the  lasting 
foundation  of  order,  peace  and  harmony. 

And  so  nature  is  conceived  by  Shaftesbury  as  an  artist  every 
one  of  whose  works  is  conditioned  not  by  mere  arbitrariness 
but  by  pure  inner  adaptation  of  means  to  end.  The  beauty 
which  consists  of  uniformity  amidst  variety  is  found  by  Shaftes- 
bury in  the  universe  and  is  also  required  by  him  in  a  work  of 
art.  Only  he  is  a  true  artist  who,  like  the  "  sovereign  artist " 
or  the  "  universal  plastic  nature,"  creates  a  whole  where  every- 
thing stands  in  mutual  connection  and  where,  in  conformance 
with  nature,  the  individual  parts  are  properly  distributed  and 
subordinated.^ 

The  same  demands  are  also  made  of  the  poet.  The  true 
poet,  says  Shaftesbury,  is  a  "second  maker,"  a  "just  Prome- 
theus."® He  also  forms  a  coherent  and  proportioned  whole 
"with  due  subjection  and  subordinacy  of  constituent  parts. 

4  Schiller  in  his  "  Aesthetische  Briefe,"  also  advocates  esthetic  culture 
as  a  means  of  advancing  morality. 

5  Goethe  also  attached  great  importance  to  the  analogy  between  art  and 
nature.  Thus  in  his  "Fragment  iiber  die  Natur "  (1781-2)  he  says  of 
nature :  "  Sie  ist  die  einzige  Kiinstlerin.  Jedes  ihrer  Werke  hat  ein  eigenes 
Wesen,  jede  ihrer  Erscheinungen  den  isoliertesten  Begriff,  und  doch  macht 
alles  eins  aus."     Goethe's  Werke  in  the  Jubildums-Ausgabe,  XXXIX,  3. 

6  Goethe  was  strongly  impressed  by  this  notion.  In  the  introduction  to 
the  36th  volume  of  the  Jubildums-Ausgabe  of  Goethe's  works,  O.  Walzel 
calls  attention  to  this  similarity  between  Shaftesbury  and  Goethe  (cf.  p. 
xxxiii,  ff.).  Wilhelm  Dilthey  asserts  that  Goethe  was  never  a  strict 
Spinozist  and  that  he  always  stood  nearer  to  Shaftesbury  than  to  Spinoza. 
Cf.  "  Aus  der  Zeit  der  Spinoza-studien  Goethes  "  in  Archiv  filr  Geschichte 
der  Philosophie,  VII  (1894),  333. 


22 

He  notes  the  boundaries  of  the  passions  and  knows  their  exact 
tones  and  measures;  by  which  he  justly  represents  them, makes 
the  subHme  of  sentiments  and  actions  and  distinguishes  the 
beautiful  from  the  deformed,  the  amiable  from  the  odious. 
The  moral  artist,  who  can  thus  imitate  the  Creator  and  is  thus 
knowing  in  the  inward  form  and  structure  of  his  fellow- 
creatures,  will  hardly  be  found  unknowing  in  himself  or  at  a 
loss  in  those  numbers  which  make  the  harmony  of  a  mind. 
For  knavery  is  mere  dissonance  and  disproportion.  And  tho' 
villains  may  have  natural  capacities  of  action,  'tis  impossible 
that  true  judgment  and  ingenuity  should  reside  where  harmony 
and  honesty  have  no  being."  In  every  writing  relating  to  men 
and  manners  the  author  must  understand  the  "  beauty  of  senti- 
ments, the  sublime  of  characters  and  that  natural  grace  which 
gives  to  every  action  its  attractive  charm.  If  he  has  no  eye 
or  ear  for  these  interior  numbers  he  will  not  be  able  to  under- 
stand any  better  that  exterior  proportion  and  symmetry  of 
composition  which  constitutes  a  legitimate  piece.  And  thus 
the  sense  of  inward  numbers,  the  knowledge  and  practice  of 
the  social  virtues,  and  the  familiarity  and  favor  of  the  moral 
graces  are  essential  to  the  character  of  a  deserving  artist  and 
a  just  favorite  of  the  muses.  Thus  are  the  arts  and  virtues 
naturally  friends :  and  thus  the  science  of  virtuosos  and  that  of 
virtue  itself  becomes,  in  a  manner,  one  and  the  same."^ 

Shaftesbury  distinguishes  between  material  and  spiritual 
beauty,  between  the  "  beautified "  and  the  "  beautifying." 
"  Body  can  no  way  be  the  cause  of  beauty  to  itself  nor  govern 
nor  regulate  itself.  Must  not  that,  therefore,  which  regulates 
and  orders  it,  be  the  principle  of  beauty  to  it?  And  what  must 
that  be?  Mind,  I  suppose;  for  what  can  it  be  else?  "^  Beauty 
as  an  expression  of  inner  spiritual  greatness  is  a  dominant 
thought  with  Shaftesbury.  He  distinguishes  three  orders  of 
beauty:  First,  dead  forms  having  neither  action  nor  intelli- 
gence, such  as  are  formed  by  man  or  nature;  secondly,  forms 
that  have  action  and  intelligence  and  may  be  called  forming 
forms,  such  as  love  and  honesty  and  the  like ;  thirdly,  the  order 

7  "  Characteristics,"  I,  207-8,  336-8. 

8  Ibid.,  II,  404-5. 


23 

of  beauty  which  fashions  minds  and  contains  all  the  beauties 
fashioned  by  these  minds.  This  third  order  is  the  original 
fountain  of  all  beauty,  the  divine  beauty. 

Some  of  the  doctrines  just  described  were  also  held  by 
Socrates  as  represented  by  Xenophon,  Plato,  Plotinus,  the 
famous  expounder  of  Neo-Platonism,  and  Bruno.  Socrates 
considers  all  manifestations  of  virtue  as  good  and  beautifuP 
and  emphasizes  the  superiority  of  spiritual  to  physical  beauty.^'' 
Plato  identifies  the  good  with  the  beautiful  and  distinguishes 
three  orders  of  beauty,  physical,  intellectual  and  spiritual.^^ 
In  Plotinus  we  have  the  following  parallels  to  Shaftesbury's 
philosophy:  the  relation  of  inward  to  outward  beauty;^-  the 
beauty  of  virtue  and  the  enthusiasm  with  which  this  beauty 
inspires  one;"  finally,  the  well-known  doctrine  of  the  three 
orders  of  beauty.^*  The  connection  between  morality  and  the 
harmony  manifested  in  the  universe,^^  the  superiority  of  spir- 
itual beauty^^  and  the  distinguishing  of  three  orders  of  beauty^^ 
are  also  found  in  Bruno.  The  harmony  of  beauty  and  the 
harmony  of  morality  are  brought  into  close  connection  also  by 
Schiller.  Schiller's  ideal  of  the  "  schone  Seele,"  his  esthetic  ^ 
view  of  life,  his  notion  of  the  moral  grace  of  the  harmonious 
man, — all  these  are  doctrines  which  unite  Schiller  with  Shaf  tes- 

9  "  Xenophons  Erinnerungen  an  Socrates,"  German  translation  by  C.  E. 
Finkh  (in  a  series  entitled  "  Griechische  Prosaiker  in  neuen  Ubersetz- 
ungen,"  Stuttgart,  1827),  I,  547-8. 

10  "Xenophons  Gastmahl,"  Wieland's  translation  in  the  Attisches 
Museum,  IVi,  136,  137,  141. 

11  Plato's  "Banquet,"  Vol.  Ill  of  the  works  of  Plato  (English  transla- 
tion by  George  Burgess,  London,  1859),  pp.  518,  530-1,  537-8,  553-  See 
also  Robert  Zimmermann :  "  Geschichte  der  Aesthetik  als  philosophische 
Wissenschaft,"  Wien,   1858;  I,  5,  30,  82-4. 

12 "  Select  works  of  Plotinus,"  English  translation  by  Thomas  Taylor, 
1909,  pp.  76-7  (ninth  book  of  the  2d  Ennead). 

13 "  Les  Enneades  de  Plotin,"  French  translation  by  M.  N.  Bouillet, 
Paris,  1857-61  (in  3  volumes).  See  Vol.  I,  the  6th  book  of  the  ist 
Ennead,  pp.   104  ff. 

14  Bouillet,   III,    no  ff.    (8th  book  of  the   5th  Ennead)    and  Taylor,  pp. 

183-4. 

15  Bruno's  "Heroic  Enthusiasts"  (1585),  English  translation  by  L.  Wil- 
liams (in  2  parts:  Part  I,  London,  1887;  Part  II,  London,  1889).  See 
Introduction,  pp.  20,  22  and  Part  I,  163. 

^^Ibid.,  Part  I,  71-2,  75-6. 

^"^  Ibid.,  Part  II,  7-8,  Part  I,  134. 


24 

bury,  while  at  the  same  time  they  part  the  ways  of  Schiller 
and  Kant. 

2.    Moral  Sense 

After  discussing  the  import  and  power  of  beauty  the  next 
question  is,  whence  the  notion  of  beauty  comes.  According  to 
Shaftesbury  it  is  grounded  in  our  nature  and  constitutes  a  very 
essential  part  thereof,  for  without  this  "  imagination "  or 
"  conceit "  the  world  would  be  but  a  "  dull  circumstance  "  and 
life  a  "  sorry  pass-time."  "  The  gallant  sentiments,  the  elegant 
fancys,  the  belle-passions,  which  have  this  beauty  in  view, 
would  be  set  aside,  and  leave  us  probably  no  other  employment 
than  that  of  satisfying  our  coarsest  appetites  at  the  cheapest 
rate."^« 

We  have  an  innate  sense  of  beauty,  which  makes  us  appre- 
ciate a  beautiful  form  the  moment  we  see  it,  and  which  makes 
even  the  child  prefer  the  symmetrical  round  ball  to  the  irregu- 
lar figure.  Our  inward  eye  distinguishes  between  the  fair  and 
unfair,  between  the  lovely  and  detestable.  "  Nothing  is  more 
strongly  imprinted  on  our  minds  or  more  closely  interwoven 
with  our  souls  than  the  sense  of  order  and  proportion.  What 
a  difference  there  is  between  harmony  and  discord!  Between 
an  organized  body  and  that  which  is  ungoverned  and  acci- 
dental !  "^» 

Inasmuch,  however,  as  the  good  and  beautiful  are  one  and 
the  same,  so  the  faculty  that  judges  of  beauty  is  at  the  same 
time  the  faculty  of  moral  approbation.-"  Shaftesbury  makes 
no  distinction  between  an  esthetic  sense  and  a  moral  sense.-^ 

18  "  Characteristics,"  III,  31. 

19  Ibid.,  II,  284. 

20  In  his  "  Moralische  Vorlesungen  "  Gellert  professes  belief  in  a  moral 
sense.  Our  heart,  he  says,  discloses  to  us  the  disgraceful  and  the  praise- 
worthy, for  "  wir  haben  in  unserer  Natur  nicht  nur  das  Licht  der  Vernunft, 
das  uns  notigt  ein  gottliches  Gesetz  der  Tugend  zu  erkennen,  sondern  wir 
besitzen  in  unsrem  Herzen  auch  ein  Vermogen,  durch  welches  wir  empfin- 
den  konnen,  ob  etwas  edel  oder  unedel  ist,  erlaubt  oder  strafbar."  Gellert's 
Sammtliche  Schriften   (1867),  VI,  33. 

21  Shaftesbury's  "  moral  sense  "  is  severely  atacked  by  Berkeley  in  his 
"  Alciphron,  or  the  Minute  Philosopher  in  7  Dialogues  "  (the  first  American 
edition  1803,  from  the  4th  London  edition).     Alciphron  represents  Shaftes- 


25 

"  Is  there  a  natural  beauty  in  figures  ?  and  is  there  not  as 
natural  a  one  in  actions?  No  sooner  the  eye  opens  upon 
figures,  the  ear  to  sound,  than  straight  the  beautiful  results, 
and  grace  and  harmony  are  known  and  acknowledged.  No 
sooner  are  actions  viewed,  no  sooner  the  human  affections  and 
passions  discerned,  than  straight  an  inward  eye  distinguishes 
and  sees  the  fair  and  shapely,  the  amiable  and  admirable  apart 
from  the  deformed,  the  foul  or  the  despicable."-^  Sanction  of 
custom  and  religion  cannot  alter  the  immutable  and  independ- 
ent nature  of  worth  and  virtue.  A  man  "avoids  being  nasty 
even  when  nobody  is  present."'^  He  is  honest  because  his 
nature  abhors  dishonesty,  because  he  has  a  proper  sense  of 
what  is  becoming  him  as  a  human  being.  The  force  of  nature 
can  by  no  means  be  denied.  Every  one  is  a  virtuoso  in  a 
higher  or  lower  degree.  Every  one  pursues  a  grace  and  courts 
a  Venus  of  some  kind  or  other.  The  Venustum,  the  Honestum 
and  the  Decorum  of  things  will  force  its  way. 

This  innate  moral  and  esthetic  faculty  is  also  described  by 
Shaftesbury  as  a  "  taste  "  or  "  relish."  Most  of  our  pleasures 
in  life  could  not  be  relished,  he  says,  if  it  were  not  for  this 
"  taste."  Without  it  we  should  be  unable  to  admire  a  poem,  a 
picture,  a  charming  shape.  Without  it  love  would  be  the 
lowest  thing  in  nature.  If  brutality,  he  adds,  is  a  taste,  so  is 
humanity  a  taste,  and  who  would  not  choose  the  amiable  in 
preference  to  the  odious? 

3.    Man  is  a  Social  Creature.     Virtue  is  Natural  and  is  the 
Highest  Good 

In  close  connection  with  his  "moral  sense"  Shaftesbury 
develops  the  doctrine  that  man  is  by  nature  virtuous,-*  that  he 

bury's  view  and  Berkeley  makes  him  remark  again  and  again  that  man  must 
not  stop  to  examine  or  to  inspect  things,  that  he  has  a  moral  sense,  a  je  ne 
sais  quoi,  something  not  to  be  inquired  into.  Euphranor,  one  of  the 
speakers,  then  condemns  the  ideas  of  moral  sense  and  moral  beauty  as 
"mere  bubble  and  pretense."      Cf.  3d  dialogue,  pp.  124,  138. 

2^  "  Characteristics,"   II,  414. 

2Slbid.,  I,  124. 

24  Also  to  Goethe  morality  is  "  Angeschaffene  und  angeborene  schone 
Natur,"  Boucke :  "  Goethe's  Weltanschaung  auf  historischer  Grundlage," 
Stuttgart,   1907.     See  p.  417. 


26 

is  a  social  creature  joined  with  society  neither  by  force  nor  by 
pelf-interest,  but  by  pure  natural  affection.  This  part  of 
Shaftesbury's  philosophy  may  fairly  be  considered  as  a  protest 
against  Hobbes'  views  of  society  and  government.-^ 

Hobbes'  philosophy  of  society  is  rooted  in  thorough-going 
self-interest.  Religion,  sociability  and  virtue  are  deduced  by 
him  from  the  baser  side  of  human  nature.  Religion  he  bases 
upon  ignorance,  fear  and  superstition.  He  claims  virtue  to  be 
the  effect  of  mere  self-interest  and  regards  fear  as  the  chief 
passion  inducing  men  to  observe  the  laws.  A  strong  organized 
power  is  according  to  him  the  chief  means  of  holding  society 
in  peace.  The  state  of  nature,  he  says,  is  a  state  of  constant 
warfare  of  everybody  against  everybody  else,  a  state  in  which 
the  notions  of  right  and  wrong,  justice  and  injustice,  have  no 
place  whatever.^** 

How  different  are  Shaftesbury's  views  on  human  society! 
"  There  are  certain  moral  species  so  striking  and  of  such  force 
over  our  natures  that  when  they  present  themselves  they  bear 
down  all  contrary  opinion  and  passion.  Of  these  virtue  is  the 
chief  since  it  is  the  most  naturally  and  strongly  affecting."-^ 
Shaftesbury  then  identifies  morality  with  genuine  nature.  "If 
eating  and  drinking  be  natural,  herding  is  so  too.  If  any  appe- 
tite or  sense  be  natural  the  sense  of  fellowship  is  the  same."^* 
Every  creature  has  a  constant  relation  to  his  species.  Parental 
kindness,  care  for  posterity,  love  of  company, — all  these  are 
just  as  natural  as  it  is  for  the  lungs  to  breathe  or  for  the 
stomach  to  digest.    Man,  therefore,  is  by  nature  sociable^^  and 

25  Hobbes  (1588-1679)  began  in  1642  the  publication  of  his  philosophical 
rudiments  concerning  government  and  society  with  a  Latin  treatise  on  the 
citizen.  In  1650  he  published  a  treatise  on  human  nature  and  on  the  body 
politic.     In  1 65 1  he  summed  up  his  teachings  in  the  "Leviathan." 

26 "  Leviathan "  (3d  edition,  1887),  London,  Glasgow  and  New  York, 
No.  21  in  Morley's  Universal  Library,  pp.  58,  78,  75,  65,  137,  138,  99,  124, 
72,  64-6. 

27  "  Characteristics,"  III,  33. 

2S  Ibid.,  I,  no. 

29  That  man  is  a  social  animal,  that  he  derives  more  convenience  than 
injury  from  social  life,  that  he  cannot  lead  a  solitary  life — all  this  is  also 
upheld  by  Spinoza.  See  Ethics,  Part  IV,  Prop.  XXXV,  Schol.  And  yet, 
strange  to  say,  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  the  state  of  nature  is  similar  to  the 
one  advanced  by  Hobbes.     Spinoza  also  argues  that  in  the  state  of  nature 


27 

he  was  not  forced  into  a  social  state  against  his  will.  Deprived 
of  his  natural  affection  and  separated  from  his  fellow-men  he 
cannot  properly  be  called  man.  The  preservation  and  raising 
of  the  child  establishes  a  strong  union  between  husband  and 
wife.  Man  cannot  live  in  such  fellowship  with  his  partner 
and  offspring  without  the  art  of  storing  and  building  and  other 
kinds  of  economy.  If  a  whole  household  is  thus  naturally 
developed  the  next  natural  step  is  the  development  of  the 
household  into  a  tribe  and  then  into  a  nation ;  thus  "  out  of 
society  and  community  man  never  did  nor  ever  can  subsist."^** 
It  is  quite  natural  to  expect  that  Hobbes'  views  should  meet 
nothing  but  resentment  on  the  part  of  Shaftesbury.  Several 
times  he  refers  sarcastically  to  Hobbes,^^  and  certain  passages 
in  the  "  Characteristics  "  are  directed  specifically  against  him. 
It  is  ridiculous,  says  Shaftesbury,  to  think  that  man  is  obliged 
to  act  honestly  only  while  he  is  under  a  formal  government. 
Our  modern  philosophers,  he  continues,  claim  that  society  was 
founded  on  a  compact  and  that  every  man  promised  then  to 
surrender  his  private  right.  Yes,  but  this  very  promise  was 
made  in  the  state  of  nature,  and  that  which  could  make  a 
promise  obligatory  in  the  state  of  nature  must  make  all  other 
acts  of  humanity  as  much  our  real  duty  and  natural  part. 
Faith,  justice,  honesty  must  have  been  as  early  as  the  state 
of  nature,  or  they  could  never  have  been  at  all.  He  who 
was  free  to  any  villainy  before  his  contract  will  make  as 
free  with  his  contract  when  he  thinks  fit.  The  natural  knave 
has  the  same  reason  to  be  a  civil  one.  There  can  be  no 
human  state  which  is  not  social,  "  for  sooner  may  you  divest 
the  creature  of  any  other  feeling  or  affection  than  that  toward 
society  and  his  likeness."  Which  state  shall  we  call  nature's 
own?  Man  in  his  development  has  gone  through  many 
changes  and  each  change  was  as  natural  as  the  other.  Hence, 
many  different  states  of  nature  must  be  reckoned  "  or  if  one, 

every  man  thinks  only  of  his  own  advantage,  that  in  the  state  of  nature 
there  is  nothing  that  corresponds  to  justice  or  injustice.  This  doctrine  is 
developed  fully  in  the  "  Tractatus  Politicus  "  and  is  treated  briefly  in  the 
"Ethics,"  Part  IV,  Prop.  XXXVII,  Schol.  II. 

30  "  Characteristics,"  II,  317-19. 

31 "  Characteristics,"  I,  88-9,  119;  II,  319-20. 


28 

it  can  only  be  that  in  which  nature  was  perfect  and  her 
growth  complete.  Here  where  she  rested  and  attained  her 
end,  here  must  be  her  state  or  nowhere.  Could  she  then  main- 
tain and  propagate  the  species,  such  as  it  now  is,  without  fel- 
lowship or  community  ?"^^ 

In  closest  connection  with  Shaftesbury's  sociableness  of  man 
and  the  naturalness  of  virtue,  we  find  the  doctrine  that  virtue 
is  the  highest  good,^^  that  to  be  wicked  is  to  be  miserable,  that 
an  establishment  of  right  affection  and  integrity  is  an  advance- 
ment of  one's  own  interest.^*  To  Shaftesbury  individual  in- 
terest is  inseparable  from  common  welfare,  and  the  discharge 
of  public  duties  identical  with  the  advancement  of  personal 
benefit.  There  are  (i)  "natural  affections"  leading  to  the 
public  good,  (2)  "  self-afifections,"  which  concern  only  the 
private  individual  and  (3)  "unnatural  affections,"  tending 
neither  to  public  nor  private  good.  A  person  lacking  the 
natural  affections  cannot  be  happy,  for  if  his  mind  is  turned 
away  from  love  and  kindness  he  is  filled  with  aversion,  ill- 
humor  and  fear.  The  greatest  misery  is  often  caused  by  ill- 
temper  ;  vicious  acts  make  the  person  a  real  sufferer, 
"  Through  certain  humors  or  passions  and  from  temper  merely 
a  man  may  be  completely  miserable,  let  his  outward  circum- 
stances be  ever  so  fortunate."^^ 

The  pleasures  of  the  tnind  are  superior  to  the  pleasures  of 
the  body.  Mental  enjoyments  are  either  the  very  natural 
affections  themselves  in  their  immediate  operation,  or  they  pro- 
ceed from  these  natural  affections  as  their  direct  effects.  In 
the  first  place,  we  conceive  great  pleasure  when  our  mind  is 
under  an  affection  of  love,  pity  or  anything  else  of  a  social 

32  Ibid.,  I,  109;  II,  312,  313,  316. 

33  The  same  doctrine  is  also  emphasized  by  Spinoza.  See  "  Ethics," 
Part  II,  Prop.  XLIX,  Schol. ;  Part  IV,  Prop.  XXIV  and  LXIII;  Part  V, 
Prop.  XIX  and  XLII. 

34  Socrates  also  taught  that  it  is  better  to  suffer  injustice  than  to  inflict 
it,  that  sin  is  a  mistake,  that  happiness  is  the  necessary  consequence  of 
virtue.  (Cf.  Windelband's  "  Lehrbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie," 
4th  edition,  1907,  pp.  64-6.)  Plato  expresses  a  similar  thought  in  his 
"  Banquet."  The  good,  he  says  is  produced  by  justice  and  temperance  and 
procures  for  us  every  kind  of  happiness.  Cf.  Plato's  works,  English  trans- 
lation by  Burgess,  London,  1859,  III,  506. 

35  "  Characteristics,"  II,  84. 


29 

character.  Secondly,  we  have  a  natural  feeling  of  joy  when 
we  see  or  hear  of  the  happiness  of  others.  The  consciousness 
of  merited  esteem  is  another  great  enjoyment  which  proceeds 
from  the  natural  affections.  Even  the  most  selfish  person 
receives  the  greatest  satisfaction  from  admiration  and  esteem 
which  he  feels  to  have  been  honestly  deserved.  And  so  "  out 
of  participation  in  the  pleasures  of  others  and  belief  of  merit- 
ing well  from  others  arise  more  than  nine  tenths  of  whatever 
is  enjoyed  in  life."^^ 

Nature  demands  of  us  the  exercise  of  our  faculties.  With- 
out action  the  body  is  weakened,  without  its  natural  exercise 
the  mind  is  diseased.  Men  living  in  luxury  and  other  indul- 
gences of  sense  are  made  to  pay  for  such  a  life ;  their  failure  to 
apply  themselves  to  any  occupation,  either  common  labor,  or 
science,  or  public  affairs,  is  directly  followed  by  a  settled  idle- 
ness, by  an  inactivity  which  produces  total  disturbance  and 
irregularity  in  their  systems.  Nothing  else  is  as  necessary  as 
exercise,  and  no  other  exercise  is  as  essential  as  that  of  natural 
or  social  affection.  A  creature  which  is  so  dependent  upon 
society  must  be  very  unfortunate  when  it  loses  that  social 
feeling,  which  "  is  implanted  in  our  natures,  interwoven  with 
our  other  passions  and  essential  to  that  regular  motion  and 
course  of  our  affections  on  which  our  happiness  and  self- 
enjoyment  so  immediately  depend."^'^ 

All  this  applies  in  a  negative  way  to  what  Shaftesbury  calls 
"  self-affections  "  and  "  unnatural  affections."  Thus,  excessive 
love  of  life  leads  to  cowardice,  and  cowardice  leads  to  excessive 
fear,  which  oppresses  the  individual  even  when  no  dangers 
threaten.  The  pursuit  of  luxury  becomes  in  the  course  of  time 
an  unnatural  appetite,  which  increases  the  impatience  of  ab- 
stainment  and  lessens  the  pleasure  of  indulgence.  An  immod- 
erate passion  for  praise  renders  a  person  incapable  of  sustain- 
ing the  slightest  disappointment.  Excessive  love  of  rest  and 
indolence  results  immediately  in  ill  humor  and  languor,  which 
destroy  all  enjoyments.  Anger  and  resentment,  while  neces- 
sary in  a  moderate  degree  for  self-defense,  become  injurious 

36/&tU,  II,  109. 

37  Ibid.,  II,  139. 


30 

when  carried  to  an  extreme.  They  fill  the  mind  with  a  desire 
for  revenge,  which  in  the  course  of  time  becomes  a  sort  of 
disease. 

Equally  injurious  are  the  "unnatural  affections,"  such  as 
taking  pleasure  in  the  calamity  of  others,  a  gay  delight  in 
injuring  others,  malice,  envy,  treachery,  ingratitude,  a  general 
hatred  of  mankind.  All  these  are  entirely  groundless  passions. 
Agitated  by  such  passions,  man  knows  neither  rest  nor  com- 
fort, encounters  hatred  everywhere,  finds  horror  wherever  he 
goes.  Such  a  mind  is  a  real  desert.  If  banishment  from  one's 
country  is  so  terrible  a  thing,  "  what  must  it  be  to  feel  this 
inward  banishment,  this  real  estrangement  from  human  com- 
merce; and  to  be  after  this  manner  in  a  desert  even  when  in 
the  midst  of  society?  What  must  it  be  to  Hve  in  this  disagree- 
ment with  everything,  this  opposition  to  the  order  and  govern- 
ment of  the  Universe  ?"^^ 

Shaftesbury  warns  nevertheless  against  excessive  "  natural 
affection,"  and  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  a  moderate  degree 
of  "  self-affection."^^  The  former,  when  excessive,  and  the 
latter,  when  too  weak,  are  both  injurious.  Whenever  a  "  nat- 
ural affection "  is  strong  enough  to  make  a  person  neglect 
other  equally  important  affections,  it  defeats  its  own  end. 
Religion,  when  it  becomes  such  an  excessively  dominating 
passion,  prevents  a  man  from  discharging  his  earthly  duties ; 
in  such  a  case  religion  is  a  vicious  affection.  An  excessive 
love  for  the  child  may  destroy  the  mother  and,  consequently, 
the  child.  A  person  must  not  be  too  self-forgetful.  By  fail- 
ing to  preserve  himself,  man  injures  society,  just  as  an  eye, 
when  failing  to  close  itself  against  an  imminent  danger,  injures 
the  entire  body.  Self-preservation  becomes  in  this  respect 
self-love  after  the  truest  manner.  "  'Tis  the  height  of  wisdom 
to  be  rightly  selfish,  and  to  value  life,  as  far  as  life  is  good, 
belongs  as  much  to  courage  as  to  discretion."^" 

38  Ibid.,  II,  171. 

39  So  Spinoza  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  self-preservation.  "  Ethics," 
Part  IV,  Prop.  XXI  and  XXII. 

40  "  Characteristics,"  I,  121. 


31 

4-     Deism.     Virtue  and  Religion.     Culture  as  a  Means  of  De- 
veloping Character.    Philosophy  as  the  Problem  of 
Daily  Life 

Although  condemned  by  contemporaries  and  successors  as  an 
unbeHever,  Shaftesbury  was  nevertheless  filled  with  a  pro- 
found religious  feeling.  The  question  now  comes  up  as  to  his 
relation  to  the  movement  of  so-called  deism.  There  is  a  great 
variety  of  opinion  on  this  question.  Thus,  Alfred  Biese,  in  his 
"  Deutsche  Literaturgeschichte,"*^  considers  Shaftesbury  only 
as  the  leading  propagator  of  the  doctrines  of  deism.  Hermann 
Hettner,  on  the  other  hand,  considers  A.  Collins,  W.  Lyons 
and  J.  Toland  as  the  leading  deists  and  discusses  Shaftesbury 
under  a  different  head.*-  Diderot  strongly  objects  to  classing 
Shaftesbury  with  the  Asgils,  Tindals,  and  Tolands,  to  whom 
he  refers  as  "mauvais  protestants  et  miserables  ecrivains."** 
T.  Fowler  calls  Shaftesbury  "  a  deist  of  the  right,  who  was 
fully  as  much  occupied  in  presenting  the  positive  as  the  nega- 
tive parts  of  his  doctrine,  the  latter  being  rather  insinuated 
than  openly  avowed."**  A.  Wolfstieg,  in  his  article  "  Englischer 
und  franzosischer  Deismus  und  deutsche  Aufklarung,"  exam- 
ines the  English  movement  chiefly  from  its  negative  side  and 
characterizes  it  as  consisting  of  "  shallow  rationalism,"  "  short 
sighted  naturalism  "  and  "  gross  free-thinking."  He  considers 
Shaftesbury  as  a  prophet  of  the  movement,  as  the  one  who 
directed  the  movement  into  the  right  channel.*^  We  may  con- 
sider Shaftesbury  as  a  deist,  if  we  accept  G.  V,  Lechler's  defi- 
nition of  deism  as  "  an  elevation,  by  means  of  free  investiga- 
tion, of  natural  religion  to  the  standard  of  positive  religion."*® 
Certain  it  is  that  Shaftesbury  represented  the  very  best  side 
of  the  movement,  which  had  good  and  bad  elements ;  for,  while 

41  Miinchen,  1907,  I,  432. 

42 "  Geschichte  der  englischen  Literatur "  (5th  edition,  Braunschweig, 
1894),  Book  II,  Chapter  3. 

43  Discours  preliminaire  to  his  translation  of  Shaftesbury's  "  Inquiry." 
Oeuvres  Completes  (by  J.  Assezat),  I,  15. 

44  "  Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson,"  New  York,  1883,  p.  162. 
^5  Monatshefte  der  Comenius-Gesellschaft,  XVII,  141  ff. 

46 "  Geschichte  des  englischen  Deismus,"  Stuttgart  and  Tiibingen,  1841, 
p.  460. 


32 

he  was  strongly  opposed  to  theological  subtleties,  he  never 
declared  open  war  against  religion. 

Believing  as  he  did  that  virtue  has  its  own  peculiar  force, 
Shaftesbury  also  maintained  that  man  "  is  not  only  born  to 
virtue,  friendship  and  honesty,  but  also  to  religion,  piety, 
adoration  and  a  generous  surrender  of  his  mind  to  whatever 
happens  from  that  supreme  cause,  which  he  acknowledges 
entirely  just  and  perfect."^^  The  conception  of  God,  he  says, 
as  the  best  model  of  excellence  leads  to  a  stronger  affection  for 
virtue;  belief  in  the  constant  guidance  and  omnipresence  of 
God  increases  the  shame  of  a  wrong  act  and  enhances  the  glory 
of  a  good  act.  The  hope  for  future  reward  and  fear  of  future 
punishment  have  their  advantages.  By  starting  out  to  prac- 
tice virtue  for  the  sake  of  reward  one  may  finally  come  to  the 
point  of  practicing  virtue  for  its  own  sake.  We  cannot  have 
a  powerful  feeling  of  virtue,  unless  we  are  aware  of  the  pres- 
ence of  goodness  and  beauty  in  the  world ;  if,  like  the  atheist, 
we  consider  the  universe  a  pattern  of  disorder,  we  cannot 
believe  virtue  to  be  naturally  good  and  advantageous.  "  And 
thus  the  perfection  and  height  of  virtue  must  be  owing  to  the 
behef  of  a  God."^« 

But  if  virtue  is  strengthened  by  religion  it  is  by  no  means 
the  product  of  religion.  Virtue,  Shaftesbury  asserts,  is  inde- 
pendent of  and  prior  to  religion.  Our  natural  sense  of  right 
and  wrong,  which  we  have  a  long  time  before  acquiring  a 
religious  belief,  cannot  be  affected  either  by  theism,  or  atheism, 
or  polytheism,  or  demonism.***  Any  one  doing  good  out  of  the 
hope  for  reward  or  fear  of  punishment  is  not  virtuous,  but 
merely  goes  through  a  servile  obedience.  Theologians  have 
often  injured  the  cause  of  religion  by  making  future  reward 

47  "  Characteristics,"  III,  224. 

^&  Ibid.,  II,  76.  Spinoza  expresses  a  similar  thought:  True  belief  in  God 
increases  the  inclination  to  virtue,  etc.     See  "  Ethics,"  Part  IV,  XXVIII. 

49  Shaftesbury  defines  these  four  terms  as  follows :  To  believe  that  every- 
thing is  governed  for  the  best  by  a  good  and  permanent  mind,  is  to  be  a 
theist.  To  believe  that  everything  is  governed  by  chance  and  not  by  design, 
is  to  be  an  atheist.  To  believe  in  several  superior  minds  is  to  be  a  poly- 
theist.  To  believe  that  the  governing  mind  or  minds  are  not  necessarily 
good  but  can  also  act  from  mere  fancy,  is  to  be  a  demonist.  "  Character- 
istics," II,  II. 


33 

and  punishment  an  essential  element  thereof.  Before  arriving 
at  the  conception  of  supreme  goodness,  which  is  in  God,  a  clear 
idea  must  first  be  obtained  concerning  goodness  itself ;  before 
coming  to  the  idea  of  the  reward  of  virtue  we  must  first  have  a 
clear  notion  of  the  merit  of  virtue.  "  We  begin  surely  at  the 
wrong  end  when  we  would  prove  merit  by  favor  and  order  by 
a  deity."^'*  First  of  all  it  must  be  shown  that  "  virtue  is  really 
something  in  itself  and  in  the  nature  of  things :  not  arbitrary 
nor  constituted  from  without,  or  dependent  on  custom,  fancy 
or  will,  not  even  on  the  supreme  will  itself,  which  can  no  way 
govern  it :  but  being  necessarily  good,  is  governed  by  it  and  is 
ever  uniform  with  it."^^  Man  should  not  be  referred  all  the 
time  to  the  hereafter.  Belief  in  a  future  state  must  come  as  a 
result  of  satisfaction  with  the  present  state.  It  is  in  such  a 
process  that  men  must  be  won  to  the  belief  in  God  and  here- 
after. "  Being  thus  far  become  proselytes,  they  might  be  pre- 
pared for  that  divine  love  which  our  religion  would  teach 
them,  when  once  they  should  embrace  its  precepts  and  form 
themselves  to  its  sacred  character."^^ 

There  is  certainly  nothing  in  all  this  that  savors  of  atheism.^^ 
Nevertheless,  Shaftesbury's  refusal  to  base  religion  upon  the 
idea  of  future  rewards  and  punishments^*  has  been  misinter- 
preted by  his  opponents  as  a  denial  of  the  hereafter.^^  His 
deduction  of  the  belief  in  God  from  the  strength  of  virtue  and 
the  harmony  of  the  universe  has  been  taken  as  an  attack  on 
Christianity.^®     Among  the  divines  of  the  i8th  century  there 

50  Ibid.,  II,  267. 

51  Ibid.,  II,  267. 

52  Ibid.,  II,  279. 

53  Herder  defends  Shaftesbury  against  the  accusations  of  atheism.  See 
letter  to  Merck,  Sept.  12,  1770.     "Herders  Lebensbild,"  IIIi,  no— 11. 

54  Some  of  the  leading  passages  in  which  Shaftesbury  speaks  of  future 
rewards  and  punishments  are:  I,  97,  127;  II,  55,  57,  60,  63-66,  120,  175—76, 
272,  279. 

55  John  Leland  defends  the  doctrine  of  future  reward  and  punishment 
and  claims  that  Shaftesbury's  ideas  on  the  subject  tend  to  have  a  dangerous 
influence.  See  Leland's  "  View  of  the  principal  Deistical  Writers "  (in 
several  letters  to  a  friend),  3d  edition,  London,  1757,  Letter  V,  49-52, 
54-S  ;  VI,  66-70. 

56  In  his  "  Dedication  to  the  free-thinkers  "  Warburton  attacks  Shaftes- 
bury as  a  free-thinker  and  speaks  of  his  "  hatred  of  Christianity."     Mande- 

4 


34 

was  a  tendency,  caused  probably  by  fear  of  deism,  to  consider 
as  irreligious  any  moral  system  which  appealed  to  other  sanc- 
tions than  those  of  the  opinions  of  society  or  future  rewards 
and  punishments.  W.  Paley  even  defines  virtue  as  "  the  doing 
of  good  to  mankind,  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  and  for 
the  sake  of  everlasting  happiness. "°'^  Likewise  Berkeley  em- 
phasizes the  necessity  of  the  belief  in  future  rewards  and 
punishments  on  the  basis  that  the  mere  beauty  of  virtue  is 
insufficient  to  induce  ordinary  men  to  practice  virtue.^^ 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  man  is  by  nature  social  and  virtuous, 
although  virtue  has  its  own  peculiar  source  and  is  independent 
even  of  religion,  nevertheless  Shaftesbury  emphasizes  again 
and  again  the  necessity  of  culture  and  learning  as  a  means  of 
advancing  the  cause  of  morality.  It  cannot  be  denied,  he  says, 
that  the  perfection  of  grace  and  comeliness  in  action  can  be 
found  mainly  among  people  of  a  liberal  education.  Art, 
science,  and  learning  in  general  should  have  the  development 
of  character  as  their  chief  aim.  Our  studies  and  exercises  are 
useless  unless  their  object  is  our  duty  to  mankind  or  obedience 
to  our  Creator.^^ 

This  and  nothing  else  is  Shaftesbury's  criterion  of  good 
learning.'''*^  This  explains  why  his  philosophical  activity  was 
confined  to  ethics,  esthetics  and  religion,  and  why  he  had  no 
taste  for  metaphysics,  logic  or  even  for  psychology,  except 

ville  also  attacks  Shaftesbury  as  an  enemy  of  Christianity.  "  Shaftes- 
bury," we  are  told,  "  attacked  the  bible  itself,  and  by  ridiculing  many 
passages  of  Holy  Writ  he  seems  to  have  endeavored  to  sap  the  foundation 
of  all  revealed  religion  with  design  of  establishing  Heathen  virtue  on  the 
ruins  of  Christianity."  In  the  sth  edition  (1729)  of  the  "Fable  of  the 
Bees,"  n,  6th  dialogue  between  Horatio  and  Cleomenes,  p.  432. 

57  "  Principles  of  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy,"  I,  43. 

58  In  his  "  Alciphron  "  Berkeley  severely  attacks  Shaftesbury  as  an  unbe- 
liever. He  also  declares  that  Shaftesbury  considered  Providence,  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  and  future  rewards  and  punishments  as  fraudulent  impo- 
sitions. 3d  dialogue,  p.  120  ff.,  140  ff.  In  all  these  statements,  however, 
Shaftesbury  is  grossly   misrepresented   by   Berkeley. 

59  "  Letters  to  a  young  man  at  the  University,"  Letter  I. 

60  Shaftesbury's  influence  appears  in  Gellert's  lecture  "von  dem  Ein- 
flusze  der  schonen  Wissenschaften  auf  das  Herz  und  die  Sitten,"  V,  63  if., 
in  Sammtliche  Schriften,  1867,  and  in  Herder's  essay  "  Uber  den  Einflusz 
der  schonen  in  die  hoheren  Wissenschaften,"  Suphan  edition,  IX,  289  ff. 
Both  argue  that  the  object  of  learning  is  the  development  of  character. 


35 


in  so  far  as  it  affords  a  basis  for  ethics.  He  speaks  with  bitter 
contempt  of  metaphysics  and  advocates  the  study  of  it  only 
for  the  purpose  of  discovering  that  no  wisdom  is  to  be  learned 
from  it.  The  metaphysicians  he  considers  as  "  moon-blind 
wits  who  may  be  said  to  renounce  daylight  and  extinguish  the 
bright  visible  outward  world  by  allowing  us  to  know  nothing 
beside  what  we  can  prove  by  strict  and  formal  demonstra- 
tion."^^ Philosophy  is  to  him  a  problem  of  daily  life  and  is 
defined  by  him  as  the  "  study  of  inward  numbers  and  propor- 
tions," exhibiting  in  life  the  beauty  of  virtue  and  "  symmetry  " 
of  morals.*'^  Philosophy  is  "  the  study  of  happiness  "  ;  hence, 
every  man  philosophizes  in  some  manner  or  other.  "  Every 
deliberation  concerning  our  interest,  every  correction  of  our 
taste,"  every  choice  of  the  good  and  the  proper, — all  this  be- 
longs to  the  province  of  philosophy.  To  philosophize  is  but 
to  elevate  good  breeding  or  manners  of  life.  "  The  sum  of 
philosophy  is  to  learn  what  is  just  in  society  and  beautiful  in 
nature.  The  taste  of  beauty  and  the  relish  of  what  is  decent, 
just  and  amiable  perfects  the  character  of  the  gentleman  and 
the  philosopher,  and  the  study  of  such  a  taste  or  relish  will  be 
ever  the  great  employment  and  concern  of  him  who  covets  as 
well  to  be  wise  and  good  as  agreeable  and  polite."''^  The  pre- 
tender to  philosophy  who  cannot  determine  this  affair  "  remains 
in  respect  to  philosophy  what  a  clown  or  coxcomb  is  in  respect 
to  breeding  and  behaviour."*^* 

And  so  Shaftesbury  laments  the  fact  that  nowadays  phi- 
losophy is  not  active  in  the  world.     In  ancient  times,  he  says, 
reason  and  wit  were  studied  not  merely  in  schools  but  in  the 
world.     Philosophy  was  then  a  subject  of  discussion  in  public 
affairs  as  well  as  in  private  conversations.     Nowadays,  how- 
ever, philosophy  has  been  confined  to  places  of  learning,  and 
only  empirics  and  pedantic  sophists  are  her   pupils.     Mere 
scholastics  are  concerned  with  moral  inquiries,  and  it  is  con- 
si "  Characteristics,"  III,  2I0-II. 
e2lbid..  Ill,  184. 
G^Ibid.,  II,  438  and  III,  161-2. 

^i  Ibid.,  Ill,  162.  Herder  was  very  much  impressed  by  Shaftesbury  in 
his  capacity  as  a  reconciler  of  philosophy  with  humanity.  See  "  Herders 
Lebensbild,"  is,  211. 


36 

sidered  improper  to  bring  such  discussion  into  ordinary  con- 
versations. Shaftesbury  speaks  contemptuously  of  pedantry^^ 
and  laments  the  failure  of  university  learning  to  meet  the 
demands  of  real  culture.  Our  modern  education,  he  says,  is 
far  from  being  a  liberal  education,  because  it  does  not  "  unite 
the  scholar-part  with  that  of  the  real  gentleman  and  man  of 
breeding."  Exercises  necessary  for  the  development  of  a 
liberal  character  are  neglected,  and  letters  are  "  confined  to  the 
commerce  and  mean  fellowship  of  bearded  boys."*"'  Conse- 
quently "  to  be  a  virtuoso  is  a  higher  step  towards  the  becom- 
ing of  a  man  of  virtue  and  good  sense  than  the  being  what  in 
this  age  we  call  a  scholar."^'' 

5,    Eudemonism.     Virtuoso 

Shaftesbury  always  set  up  the  intrinsic  worth  of  virtue  as 
the  only  reason  for  embracing  it,  its  natural  grace  and  invited- 
ness  as  the  only  proper  cause  for  practicing  it.  A  virtuous  act 
should  be  the  result  not  of  a  conquest  of  an  evil  passion  but 
rather  of  the  absence  of  that  passion.  A  man  overcoming 
temptations  and  evil  propensities  is  undoubtedly  virtuous;  his 
virtue,  however,  is  all  the  greater  if  he  is  entirely  free  from 
these  propensities.  A  man  may  subdue  here  and  there  his  evil 
desires,  but  the  presence  of  an  appetite  for  evil  will  certainly 
influence  his  conduct.  "  A  good  creature  is  such  a  one  as  by 
the  natural  temper  or  bent  of  his  affections  is  carried  primarily 
and  immediately  to  good  and  against  ill."*'^  The  height  of 
morality  is  to  be  carried  to  virtue  as  to  something  sweet  and 
pleasant,  to  conceive  of  virtue  as  the  greatest  happiness,  to 
constitute  its  practice  not  as  a  matter  of  stern  duty  or  self- 
denial,  but  as  a  real  pleasure. 

65  Bruno  also  attacks  pedants  and  ascetics,  points  out  the  absurdity  of 
their  systems  and  speaks  sarcastically  of  their  vain  and  pretentious  aspira- 
tions.    "  Heroic  Enthusiasts,"  Part  II,  p.  58. 

66  In  the  sth  dialogue  of  his  "  Alciphron  "  Berkeley  resents  Shaftesbury's 
attitude  to  university  learning.  He  exaggerates  Shaftesbury's  view  by 
letting  Alciphron-Shaftesbury  condemn  the  universities  as  seats  of  corrup- 
tion and  prejudice.  He  also  mentions,  through  the  mouth  of  Crito,  that 
Shaftesbury  considered  the  "  learned  professors "  as  bearded  boys.  See 
pp.  222  and  227. 

67  "  Characteristics,"  I,  333. 

68  Ibid.,  II,  26. 


37 

This  doctrine  was  attacked  by  Mandeville  and  Schleier- 
macher.  The  former  characterizes  it  as  a  doctrine  opening 
the  way  to  hypocrisy j*^^  the  latter  refers  to  it  as  a  "  Lust- 
philosophie.""*^  The  most  powerful  and  most  systematic  pro- 
test against  Shaftesburian  eudemonism  is  found  in  Kant's 
categorical  imperative,  which  makes  morality  a  matter  of  stern 
duty  and  sets  up  self-denial  as  the  essence  of  virtue.'^  Schil- 
ler, although  a  disciple  of  Kant,  recognizes  the  rigorism  of  the 
categorical  imperative.''^  The  practice  of  virtue  out  of  pure 
inclination  becomes  Schiller's  moral  ideal,  and  under  Shaftes- 
bury's influence  he  develops  some  of  the  leading  doctrines  of 
his  philosophical  essays/^  Schiller  finally  arrives  at  his  ideal 
of  the  completely  developed  and  esthetically-moral  man,  the 
"  schone  Seele,"  which  he  defines  as  follows :  "  In  einer  schonen 
Seele  ist  es  also,  wo  Sinnlichkeit  und  Vernunft,  Pflicht  und 
Neigung  harmonieren,  und  Grazie  ist  ihr  Ausdruck  in  der 
Erscheinung."'*  This  "  schone  Seele  "  establishes  a  close  alli- 
ance between  Schiller  and  Shaftesbury,  for  the  former's  ideal 
corresponds  in  general  to  the  latter's  "  virtuoso." 

Shaftesbury's  virtuoso-ideal  may  fairly  be  considered  the 
culmination  of  his  moral-esthetic  philosophy.  In  Miscellany 
III,  Chap.  I,  we  have  the  following  definition  of  the  virtuosi. 
"  The  virtuosi  are  the  real  fine  gentlemen,  the  lovers  of  art  and 

69  Mandeville's :  "  Search  into  the  nature  of  society,"  in  the  5th  edition 
of  the  "  Fable  of  the  Bees,"  I,  380. 

70  "  So  erscheint  die  anglicanische  Schule  des  Shaftesbury,  wieviel  auch 
dort  immer  von  der  Tugend  die  Rede  ist,  dennoch  als  ganzlich  der  Lust 
ergeben."  See  "  Grundlinien  einer  Kritik  der  bisherigen  Sittenlehre,"  in 
the  edition  of  his  works,  Berlin,   1846,  XXIV,  41. 

71  Kant's  Categorical  Imperative  is  discussed  briefly  in  "  Kritik  der  reinen 
Vernunft"  (edition  of  Kehrbach),  pp.  613-15,  "Kritik  der  Urteilskraft  " 
(Kehrbach  ed.),  338,  346.  An  elaborate  treatment  of  the  doctrine  is  found 
in  "Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft"  (4th  edition,  Riga,  1797).  See 
especially  pp.  36-8,  40—5,  49—57,  64-7,  105,  112,  128,  130,  135,  142-8, 
150-1,  166-7. 

72  Letter  to  Goethe,  Aug.  17,  1795:  "  Schillers  Briefe,"  edited  by  F. 
Jonas,  IV,  236. 

73  The  essays,  where  Shaftesbury  is  especially  in  evidence,  are :  "  Uber 
den  moralischen  Nutzen  aesthetischer  Sitten,"  "  Uber  Anmut  und  Wiirde," 
"  Uber  das  Erhabene,"  "  Briefe  iiber  die  aesthetische  Erziehung  des 
Menschengeschlechts." 

74 "Uber  Anmut  und  Wiirde,"  Goedeke  edition,  X,  104. 


38 

ingenuity;  such  as  have  seen  the  world  and  informed  them- 
selves of  the  manners  and  customs  of  the  several  nations  of 
Europe,  searched  into  their  antiquities  and  records ;  considered 
their  police,  laws  and  constitutions ;  observed  the  situation, 
strength  and  ornaments  of  their  cities,  their  principal  arts, 
studies,  architecture,  sculpture,  painting,  music,  and  their  taste 
in  poetry,  learning,  language  and  conversation."''^  Shaftes- 
bury's virtuoso,  however,  stands  for  a  much  broader  concept 
than  the  one  conveyed  by  this  definition.  The  "virtuoso"  is 
not  merely  the  lover  of  art  and  culture  but  the  one  who  through 
his  culture  and  love  of  art  has  become  a  life-artist.  If,  Shaftes- 
bury asks,  we  strive  to  attain  proficiency  in  other  arts,  why 
should  we  not  work  for  the  same  end  in  the  highest  of  arts, 
namely,  life?  The  "virtuoso"  lives  out  to  the  very  fullest 
extent  his  whole  personality,  develops  all  his  faculties,  prac- 
tices virtue  out  of  pure  natural  instinct.  He  is  the  har- 
monious and  esthetically-developed  man,  the  good  and  beauti- 
ful individual. 

Shaftesbury's  virtuosoship  corresponds  in  general  to  the 
Greek  kalokagathia  especially  developed  by  Socrates  ;'"^  to 
Bruno's  "  heroic  enthusiasm,"  which  consists  of  a  passionate 
love  for  truth  and  of  "  a  natural  fervor  excited  by  the  love  of 
the  divine  "^'  and  to  Goethe's  ideal  of  the  totality  of  moral  and 
esthetic  education.''^ 

6.     Soliloquy.     Wit  and  Humor.    Enthusiasm.     Raillery 

While  Shaftesbury  was  a  great  advocate  of  social  inter- 
course, he  attached  great  importance  to  what  he  calls  "  solilo- 
quy." By  means  of  "  soliloquy  "  or  self-investigation,  he  says, 
we  practice  upon  ourselves  the  art  of  advising  and  thinking. 
By  virtue  of  "  soliloquy  "  man  becomes  two  distinct  persons : 

75  "  Characteristics,"  III,  156. 

76  To  be  discussed  later  in  connection  with  Wieland's  "  Virtuoso." 

77  "  Heroic  Enthusiasts,"  Part  I,  70  and  130. 

78  This  similarity  between  Shaftesbury  and  Goethe  is  pointed  out  by  O. 
Walzel  in  his  introduction  to  Schiller's  philosophical  writings  ("  Sakular- 
Ausgabe  "  of  Schiller's  Works,  Vol.  XI),  p.  x,  and  by  E.  A.  Boucke  in  his 
"  Goethes  Weltanschaung  auf  historischer  Grundlage "  (Stuttgart,  1907). 
See  especially  pp.  423,  427,  430. 


39 

he  becomes  a  preceptor  and  pupil,  teaching  and  learning  at  the 
same  time.  All  great  minds  have  used  this  practice;  all  great 
poets,  philosophers  and  orators  are  frequenters  of  woods  and 
river-banks,  where  they  let  their  "  fancies  evaporate."'^^  "  It 
is  the  hardest  thing  in  the  world  to  be  a  good  thinker  without 
being  a  strong  self-examiner  and  thorough  paced  dialogist  in 
this  solitary  way."*°  According  to  the  old  doctrine  each  man 
had  within  himself  a  demon  or  guardian-spirit  as  a  constant 
companion.  This  old  demon-conception  meant  nothing  else 
than  this :  "  that  we  had  each  of  us  a  patient  in  ourself ,  that 
we  were  properly  our  own  subjects  of  practice,  and  that  we 
then  became  true  practitioners,  when  by  virtue  of  an  intimate 
recess  we  could  discover  a  certain  duplicity  of  soul  and  divide 
ourselves  into  tzvo  parties. "^'^  One  of  these  two  parties  is  the 
governor  and  inspector  of  our  fancies  and  opinions,  while  the 
other  has  nothing  else  to  do  but  to  render  obedience  to  this 
counselor  and  inspector.  It  must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind 
that  "  soliloquy "  or  self-discourse  "  is  wholly  impracticable 
without  a  previous  commerce  with  the  world;  and  the  larger 
the  commerce  is,  the  more  practicable  and  improving  the  other 
is  likely  to  prove."^^  It  is  for  this  reason  that  a  mystic,  or  a 
recluse  religionist,  or  a  hermit,  can  never  truly  be  by  himself. 
None  of  these  is  capable  of  soliloquizing,  because  he  is  without 
social  intercourse. 

"  Soliloquy  "^^  attains  the  desired  end  because  man  has  real 
reverence  for  himself.  When  he  is  in  the  company  of  his 
inspector,  or  guardian-spirit,  when  he  appears  before  his  close 
companion,  he  cannot  endure  to  be  a  rascal.  In  company  a 
man  frequently  uses  a  certain  tone  of  pleasantry,  and  some- 
times he  even  defends  vice ;  but  he  never  dares  do  this  when  he 

79  "  Characteristics,"  I,  i6i. 

so  Ibid.,  I,  1 68. 

61- Ibid.,  I,  169. 

S2lbid.,  Ill,  155. 

83  In  his  "  Alciphron "  Berkeley  ridicules  Shaftesbury's  "  soliloquy." 
"  Shaftesbury,"  we  are  told,  "  hath  found  out  that  a  man  may  argue  with 
himself:  and  not  only  with  himself  but  also  with  notions,  sentiments,  and 
vices,  which,  by  a  marvellous  prosopopoeia,  he  converts  into  so  many 
ladies ;  and  so  converted,  he  confutes  and  confounds  them  in  a  divine 
strain."     5th  dialogue,  pp.  225-6. 


40 

is  by  himself.  The  moment  he  begins  to  question  himself, 
his  better  nature  triumphs.  He  asks  himself  whether  he  is 
really  honest  or  only  a  mere  pretender;  whether  he  is  justified 
in  promoting  his  own  interest  at  the  expense  of  others,  pro- 
vided he  can  do  it  with  impunity.  This  question  is  answered 
by  another  question :  "  What  reason  has  the  greatest  rogue  in 
nature  for  not  doing  thus?  Am  I  not  then  at  the  bottom,  the 
same  as  he?"  And  then  comes  the  conclusion:  "If  interest 
points  me  out  this  road,  whither  would  humanity  lead  me? 
Quite  contrary."^* 

And  just  as  "  soHloquy  "  is  not  inconsistent  with  social  life 
so  is  "  freedom  of  wit  and  humor  "  not  only  consistent  with, 
but  even  essential  to  the  cause  of  good  government,  religion 
and  morality,  Shaftesbury  is  essentially  a  cheerful  philoso- 
pher, and  in  all  phases  of  life  he  fights  against  the  harsh,  stern, 
gloomy  and  melancholy.  The  interference  of  government  with 
religion,  he  says,  has  been  detrimental  to  the  cause  of  religion, 
and  if  government  should  meddle  with  science  and  philosophy 
they  would  become  just  as  bad  as  our  present  theology.  Also 
in  government  itself  severity  defeats  its  own  end.  The  magis- 
trate should  have  a  gentler  hand  and  instead  of  "incisions 
and  amputations "  he  should  use  the  "  softest  balms."  He 
should  sympathize  with  the  people's  passion  and  endeavor  to 
cure  it  by  cheerful  means. 

Good  humor  is  the  best  foundation  of  piety  and  religion. 
Ill-humor  is  the  cause  of  atheism,  for  it  leads  to  ill  thoughts  of 
the  Supreme  Being.  Of  God  we  must  think  with  good  humor. 
There  was  a  time  when  martyrdom  was  considered  the  highest 
manifestation  of  religion,  but  we  have  now  come  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  spirit  of  love  and  humanity  is  far  above  that  of 
martyrdom,  which  makes  religion  a  melancholy  afifair.  Now- 
adays one  would  hardly  be  considered  a  good  Christian,  who 
when  living  among  the  Turks  should  disturb  in  any  way  their 
worship.  A  Protestant  who  would  interrupt  a  Catholic  service 
would  now  be  considered  a  rank  enthusiast  or  a  fanatic. 
Treated  in  such  a  melancholy  way,  religion  becomes  a  panic 
and  a  real  tragedy.     Because  we  have  been  taught  religion  in 

84  "  Characteristics,"  I,  172-3. 


41 

a  gloomy  manner,  we  give  our  attention  to  it  only  when  we  are 
in  adversity.  In  such  a  condition  we  cannot  look  calmly  into 
ourselves,  much  less  into  a  Being  who  is  far  above  us.  In 
such  a  melancholy  mood  we  are  likely  to  find  nothing  but 
anger  and  terror  in  God.  Even  the  question  of  the  existence 
of  God  should  be  a  matter  of  free  inquiry  and  familiar  treat- 
ment. The  acceptance  of  Providence  on  weak  grounds  is 
merely  flattering  God.  The  denial  of  reason  and  affectation 
of  belief  are  the  results  of  the  stern  and  gloomy  treatment  of 
religion ;  such  belief  makes  mere  "  Sycophants  in  religion," 
mere  "parasites  of  devotion." 

It  is  mere  bigotry  to  suppose  that  important  matters,  such  as 
religion  and  morality,  cannot  be  treated  with  frankness  and 
good  humor.  Recognizing  the  natural  power  of  "  wit  and 
humor,"  the  founders  of  religion  have  employed  "  wit  and 
humor  "  as  proper  means  of  advancing  true  faith.  For  this 
reason  the  book  of  Psalms,  Job,  Proverbs,  etc.,  contain  many 
humorous  images  and  much  jocular  wit.  Some  of  the  old 
heathen  priests  were  melancholy  and  approached  the  divine 
service  with  mean  grimaces  and  crouchings,  but  thereby  they 
displayed  their  base  thoughts  of  divinity.  Even  in  those  older 
times  this  kind  of  "  sycophantic "  service  was  despised  and 
suspected  as  "  knavish."  Morals,  grave  as  they  are  of  their 
own  nature,  should  be  presented  with  an  air  of  pleasantry.  It 
is  for  that  reason  that  the  first  morals  were  delivered  to  the 
world  in  parables,  tales  and  fables;  and  the  most  consummate 
teachers  of  morals  were  "great  tale-tellers  and  retainers  to 
honest  Aesop." 

On  the  basis  of  this  contrast  between  the  melancholy  and  the 
cheerful,  between  the  gloomy  and  good-humored,  Shaftesbury 
distinguishes  two  kinds  of  enthusiasm,  a  false  or  melancholy 
and  a  true  or  good-humored  enthusiasm.  The  passions  they 
raise  are  much  alike,  for  in  a  state  of  excitement  the  mind 
fixes  itself  upon  any  real  object  or  mere  spectre  of  divinity. 
But  the  former  is  the  cause  of  all  horror,  religious  persecution 
and  superstition;  the  latter  is  at  the  basis  of  all  the  great  and 
noble  performances  of  heroes,  statesmen,  poets,  orators,  musi- 
cians and  philosophers.     The  former  is  mere  fanaticism,  the 


42 

latter  is  real  divine  inspiration.^^  Virtue  itself  consists  of  this 
noble  enthusiasm  for  everything  great  and  beautiful. 

Closely  connected  with  his  "  freedom  of  wit  and  humor  "  is 
Shaftesbury's  doctrine  of  the  use  of  raillery  as  a  test  of  truth. 
Just  as  Descartes  recommends  the  test  of  doubt  for  the  recog- 
nition of  truth,  so  Shaftesbury  urges  the  test  of  ridicule  as  a 
means  of  ascertaining  the  essentially  earnest.  Freedom  of  wit, 
he  claims,  must  always  be  connected  with  freedom  of  raillery, 
which  is  the  best  remedy  for  all  extravagances  and  "  splenetic 
humors."  Anything  that  can  be  shown  only  in  a  certain  light 
is  questionable ;  but  "  truth  can  bear  all  lights."  The  common 
opinion  is  that  grave  matters  must  be  treated  only  in  a  solemn 
way ;  but  we  must  first  discover  whether  a  thing  is  really  grave. 
Very  often  gravity  is  nothing  but  imposture;  very  frequently 
modes,  fashions  and  opinions,  ridiculous  as  they  are,  are  never- 
theless kept  up  by  gravity  and  solemnity.  The  only  means  of 
distinguishing  true  gravity  from  the  false,  the  truly  serious 
from  the  ridiculous,  is  to  apply  the  test  of  ridicule  and  see 
whether  the  test  will  be  borne.  We  are  mere  "  cowards  in 
reasoning"  if  we  fear  to  submit  ourselves  to  the  test  of  ridi- 
cule. If  we  fear  to  apply  this  test  to  any  thing,  we  have  no 
security  against  the  imposture  of  false  gravity  in  all  things. 

It  must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  raillery  does  not 
imply  vulgar  jest  or  mere  buffoonery.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  a 
gross  and  offensive  kind  of  raillery ;  but  the  difference  betv/een 
this  and  true  raillery  is  as  great  as  the  difference  "  between 
hypocrisy  and  fair  dealings,  or  between  the  most  scurrilous 
buffoonery  and  the  genteelest  wit."®"  True  raillery  does  not 
consist  of  mere  mockery,  of  laughing  at  everything.  "  There 
is  a  great  difference  between  seeking  how  to  raise  a  laugh  from 
everything  and  seeking  in  everything  what  justly  may  be 
laughed  at.  For  nothing  is  ridiculous  except  what  is  de- 
formed; nor  is  anything  proof  against  raillery  except  what  is 
handsome  and  just.  And  therefore  'tis  the  hardest  thing  in 
the  world  to  deny  fair  honesty  the  use  of  this  weapon,  which 

85  Bruno  also  distinguishes  two  kinds  of  enthusiasm.  Some,  he  says, 
display  mere  blindness  and  irrational  impetuosity,  others  are  divinely 
inspired.     "  Heroic  Enthusiasts,"  Part  I,  p.  70. 

86  "  Characteristics,"  I,  63. 


43 

can  never  bear  an  edge  against  herself,  and  bears  against 
everything  contrary."^'^ 

7.     Optimism 

Shaftesbury  was  above  all  an  optimist  and  he  persistently 
maintained  that  there  is  no  positive  sin  or  evil  in  the  world. 
The  inner  kernel  of  our  nature,  he  claims,  is  good.  No  man 
is  entirely  vicious;  even  the  rascal  refusing,  out  of  a  sense  of 
honor,  to  betray  his  companions  has  some  principles  of  virtue. 
"As  it  seems  hard  to  pronounce  of  any  man  that  he  is  abso- 
lutely an  atheist,  so  it  appears  altogether  as  hard  to  pronounce 
of  any  man  that  he  is  absolutely  corrupt  and  vicious. "^^ 

Nature  never  errs  even  when  she  seems  to  be  perverse. 
" 'Tis  good  which  is  predominant;  and  every  corruptible  and 
mortal  nature  by  its  mortality  and  corruption  yields  only  to 
some  better,  and  all  in  common  to  that  best  and  highest  nature, 
which  is  incorruptible  and  immortal."^''  Every  creature  is 
related  to  every  other  of  its  kind,  it  is  a  part  of  a  species,  the 
species  a  part  of  a  larger  system,  every  system  a  part  of  a 
whole  universe.  No  creature  can  be  considered  wholly  good 
or  wholly  ill  except  with  reference  to  its  relation  to  the  entire 
system.  Every  individual  imperfection  disappears  in  the  per- 
fection of  the  universe;  every  individual  discord  vanishes  in 
the  harmony  and  order  of  the  world. 

That  there  is  such  harmony  and  order  in  the  world  any  man 
with  a  clear  vision  can  readily  see.  On  examining  every  part 
and  organ  both  in  plants  and  animals  and  on  clearly  seeing  the 

^'^  Ibid.,  I,  128.  Shaftesbury's  opponents  have  utterly  failed  to  take  cog- 
nizance of  his  just-mentioned  point  of  view.  They  misinterpreted  and 
exaggerated  his  doctrine  and  attacked  him  as  a  mere  scoffer  and  rail- 
leur.  See,  for  instance,  Berkeley's  "  Alciphron,"  3d  dialogue,  pp.  145-6; 
Mandeville's  "  Dialogues  between  Horatio  and  Cleomenes,"  5th  edition  of 
the  "Fable  of  the  Bees,"  II,  ist  dialogue,  p.  32;  Leland's  "View  of  the 
principal  Deistical  Writers,"  Letter  V,  pp.  59-64 ;  Warburton's  "  Dedication 
to  the  Free-thinkers,"  pp.  xii-xxiii.  But  we  also  have  a  defense  of  Shaftes- 
bury's "  raillery "  and  his  general  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  wit  and 
humor.  This  defense  comes  from  Herder,  Shaftesbury's  excellent  inter- 
preter and  exponent,  and  is  found  in  the  "  Adrastea " :  Suphan  edition, 
XXIII,  143  ff.,  153  ff. 

88  "  Characteristics,"  II,  39. 

89/Wc?.,  II,  216. 


44 

relation  of  the  parts  to  the  whole,  one  must  also  perceive  uni- 
formity  in  the  whole  universe.  It  would  certainly  be  very 
strange  that  products  of  nature  should  have  order  and  perfec- 
tion, which  nature  herself  lacks.  The  individual  systems  are 
all  united  into  one  system  according  to  one  consistent  and 
uniform  design.  All  things  in  the  world  are  united :  the  branch 
with  the  tree ;  the  tree  with  the  earth,  air  and  water ;  these  ele- 
ments are  united  with  the  various  animals,  by  means  of  wings 
for  the  air,  fins  for  the  water,  feet  for  the  earth.  The  earth 
in  its  turn  is  united  with  the  other  planets  and  the  sun.  And 
thus  a  coherent  and  harmonious  universal  system  must  be 
acknowledged."*' 

The  only  objection  that  on  the  face  of  the  matter  may  be 
raised  against  the  recognition  of  such  a  harmonious  universal 
system  is  man's  apparently  unfavorable  condition  as  compared 
with  the  lower  animals.  Man  is  subject  to  more  diseases  and 
does  not  live  as  long  as  some  of  the  wild  animals.  The  latter 
are  protected  by  nature  against  the  injury  of  weather,  are 
relieved  of  labor,  are  more  vigorous  in  old  age,  more  protected 
in  infancy  than  man.  But  is  this  a  defect?  Is  man  any 
worse  for  it?  It  is  owing  to  his  physical  weakness  that  man 
has  to  depend  on  society  for  help.  Conjugal  affection,  love  of 
parents,  duty  to  magistrates,  love  of  community  and  country 
are  the  results  of  this  so-called  defect.  The  excellence  of  man 
is  different  from  that  of  the  brute,  and  he  must  strive  to  attain 
manly  qualities.  He  has  been  endowed  with  powers  suitable 
enough  for  the  exercise  of  his  reason  but  inadequate  for  other 
purposes.  It  seems  that  by  design  man  is  hindered  from 
aspiring  to  what  is  misbecoming  his  character.  "  Such  is  the 
admirable  distribution  of  nature,  her  adapting  and  adjusting 
not  only  matter  to  shape  and  form  but  shape  and  form  to  the 
circumstance,  place  or  element:  all  managed  for  the  best  with 
perfect  frugality  and  just  reserve,  profuse  to  none  but  bounti- 

90  Plotinus  was  also  filled  with  enthusiasm  for  the  harmony  of  the  uni- 
verse. He  must  be  exceedingly  dull,  says  Plotinus,  "  who,  on  seeing  all 
the  beautiful  objects  in  the  sensible  world,  all  this  symmetry  and  great 
arrangement  of  things,  is  not  from  this  view  mentally  agitated,  and  does 
not  venerate  them  as  admirable  productions  of  still  more  admirable 
causes."     Select  works  of  Plotinus   (T.  Taylor,  p.  74). 


45 

ful  to  all,  never  employing  in  one  thing  more  than  enough  but 
with  exact  economy  retrenching  the  superfluous  and  adding 
force  to  what  is  principal  in  every  thing."^^ 

There  is  a  great  resemblance  between  this  optimism  of 
Shaftesbury  and  that  of  Leibniz.  The  latter  maintained  that 
owing  to  the  power  and  wisdom  of  God  this  is  the  best  possible 
universe,  that  there  is  no  absolute  evil  in  the  world,  and  that 
whatever  evil  exists  is  a  concomitant  of  larger  and  greater 
good.**^  The  optimistic  systems,  however,  found  respectively 
in  Shaftesbury's  "  Moralists  "  and  Leibniz'  "  Theodicee,"  were 
developed  independently  of  each  other.  But  Shaftesbury's 
"  Moralists  "  or  "  Philosophical  Rhapsody  "  preceded  Leibniz' 
"  Theodicee "  by  a  whole  year.  This  fact  is  very  strongly 
emphasized  by  Lessing.''^  Leibniz  himself  expressed  his  ad- 
miration for  Shaftesbury's  philosophy,  found  in  it  many  of  his 
own  doctrines ;  but  above  all  he  was  impressed  by  the  "  Philo- 
sophical Rhapsody,"  in  which  he  "  found  almost  all  his 
Theodicee."^'^ 

Spinoza  was  also  an  optimist  of  the  type  of  Shaftesbury  and 
Leibniz.  He  claims  that  sin  and  evil  have  no  positive  exist- 
ence, that  perfection  is  absolute  and  grounded  in  the  very 
nature  of  God,  hence,  in  the  nature  of  all  things,  inasmuch  as 
they  proceed  from  God.^^ 

91 "  Characteristics,"  II,  306. 

92  "  Essais  de  Theodicee  sur  la  bonte  de  Dieu,  la  liberte  de  rhomme  et 
I'origine  du  mal "  (Nouvelle  edition,  par  M.  le  Chevalier  de  Jacourt, 
Amsterdam,  1747).  See  especially:  Part  I,  79,  84  ff.,  96,  105  ff.,  131; 
Part  II,  12  ff.,  24  ff.,  29,  51  ;  Part  III,  144,  152,  239. 

93  Shaftesbury's  "Rhapsody,"  says  Lessing,  was  issued  in  1709  and 
Leibniz'  "Theodicee"  appeared  at  the  end  of  1710.  Then  he  adds:  "  Ein 
englischer  Philosoph,  welcher  Dinge  gedacht  hat,  die  Leibniz  erst  ein 
ganzes  Jahr  nachher  gedacht  zu  haben  zeigt,  sollte  Dieser  von  dem  Letz- 
teren  nicht  ein  wenig  sein  gepliindert  worden  "  ?  See  "  Pope  ein  Meta- 
physiker  "  in  Lachmann-Muncker  edition  of  Lessings  Works,  VI,  442, 

94  Letter  to  T.  Burnett,  Aug.  23,  1713:  "Die  philosophischen  Schriften 
von  Leibniz,"  edited  by  C.  J.  Gerhardt,  Berlin,  1877,  III,  381  ;  letter  to 
Grimarest,  June  4,  1712:  "  Leibnitii  opera  omnia,"  Dutens  edition,  Geneva, 
1768,  V,  67;  letter  to  Coste,  May  30,  1712:  Gerhardt  edition.  III,  421, 
Leibniz'  remarks  on  Shaftesbury's  philosophy  are  found  in  the  same 
volume,  pp.  423—31. 

95  Letter  to  Blyenbergh,  Jan.  5,  1665,  in  "Chief  Works  of  Spinoza" 
(translated  by  Elwes),  II,  332;  "Ethics,"  Part  I,  Propos.  XXXIII  and 
Schol.  I  and  II. 


46 

8.     The  Doctrine  of  a  Supreme  Being 

Shaftesbury's  proof  for  the  existence  of  the  Supreme  Being 
is  known  as  the  teleological  proof.  Since,  he  argues,  this  is  a 
coherent  and  harmonious  universe,  there  must  be  a  designing 
mind.  The  existence  of  such  a  mind  can  be  denied  only  on  the 
supposition  of  disorder  in  the  world.  The  tree,  for  instance, 
has  all  its  parts  interrelated  and  sympathizing,  so  to  speak, 
with  one  another ;  all  these  parts  serve  to  one  purpose,  namely, 
the  preservation  of  the  whole  mechanism.  This  substance, 
which  has  the  form  of  a  tree,  has  a  peculiar  nature,  a  soul,  by 
virtue  of  which  it  lives  and  flourishes.  In  man  we  also  find 
various  parts  cooperating  for  a  common  end ;  and  so  man  also 
has  a  peculiar  "  genius  "  or  a  soul,  by  virtue  of  which  he  is  a 
man.  How,  then,  can  we  fail  to  recognize  a  universal  and 
sovereign  genius  in  view  of  the  existence  of  a  human  genius? 
Does  each  man  think  for  himself,  while  the  world  has  no  such 
power?  Is  nature  never  the  wiser  for  all  the  art  and  wisdom 
it  breeds  ? 

Man  is  related  to  the  whole  of  nature,  and  this  clearly  shows 
that  there  is  a  uniting  principle  in  nature.  "  If  so,  how  are 
you  then  a  self  and  nature  not  so?  How  have  you  something 
to  understand  and  act  for  you,  and  nature  who  gave  you  this 
understanding  nothing  at  all  to  understand  for  her  and  advise 
her?  Has  the  world  such  ill-fortune  in  the  main?  Are  there 
so  many  particular  understandings  and  active  principles  every- 
where? And  is  there  nothing  at  last  which  thinks,  acts  and 
understands  for  all?  Nothing  which  administers  or  looks 
after  all?"^®  The  more  we  are  convinced  of  the  existence  of 
our  own  self,  the  more  it  follows  that  our  own  self  is  derived 
from  a  principal  and  original  self.  This  "original  self,"  this 
"  designing  principle,"  this  "  governing  mind,"  or  "  sovereign 
beauty,"  or  "  universal  genius,"  or  "  World-soul,"  is  God. 

Kant  rejects  the  teleological  proof  and  substitutes  the  onto- 
logical  proof,  which  is  a  pure  "  Vernunftsbegriff."  With  Kant 
the  existence  of  God  and  immortality  are  postulates  of  pure 
reason."     Descartes  starts  with  the  reality  of  thought,  with 

96  "  Characteristics,"  II,  357- 

97"Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft "  (Kehrbach  ed.),  pp.  468,  615;  and 
"Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft"  (4th  ed.  1797).  PP-  219.  220,  224,  226. 


47 

his  cogito  ergo  sum,  as  the  foundation  for  the  proof  of  God 
and  the  material  world.  He  has  a  notion  of  two  substances, 
thought  and  extension,  radically  different  from  and  independ- 
ent of  each  other.^^  Leibnitz  opposes  Descartes'  dualism ;  he 
considers  force  as  the  essential  factor  in  the  world,  thinks  of  it 
as  divided  into  a  great  number  of  monads  or  living  self-active 
forces  in  various  degrees  of  development,  and  conceives  of 
God  as  the  original  monad,  of  which  all  the  others  are  pro- 
ductions.^'' And  Spinoza  conceives  of  God  as  the  immanent 
cause  of  the  world,  as  the  only  infinite  and  indivisible  sub- 
stance, of  which  all  finite  existences  are  modes  or  limitations.^''^ 

9.     Shaftesbury' s  School 

A  discussion  of  Shaftesbury's  philosophy  would  be  incom- 
plete without  an  account  of  the  Shaftesburian  School,  the  most 
prominent  adherents  of  which  were  the  Scotch  moral  philoso- 
phers, Reid,  Ferguson  and  Hutcheson.  They  were  all  inspired 
by  Shaftesbury  and  served  as  a  medium  for  the  spread  of  his 
philosophy.  Like  Shaftesbury,  Reid  considers  man  as  an 
essentially  social  creature.  The  wise  author  of  nature,  he  says, 
intended  us  to  be  social  creatures;  for  this  purpose  he  im- 
planted in  us  the  disposition  to  trust  others  and  a  proclivity  to 
speak  the  truth.  Truth  is  the  natural  issue  of  the  mind,  while 
lying  does  violence  to  our  natures,  "  Speaking  truth  is  like 
using  our  natural  food,  but  lying  is  like  taking  physic,  which 
is  nauseous  to  the  taste  and  which  no  man  takes  but  for  some 
end  which  he  cannot  otherwise  attain. "^°^ 

But  that  which  above  all  links  Reid  with  Shaftesbury  is  the 
former's  emphasis  of  the  "  common  sense,"  which  he  construes 
as  the  immutable  judgment  of  the  good,  the  expression  of  the 

98  Descartes  "  Meditations "  (translated  by  J.  Veitch  from  Latin  to 
English,  Chicago,  1901),  Medit.  VI,  p.  91  ;  III,  61;  IV,  64;  VI,  93. 

99  For  Leibniz'  monad-doctrine  I  consulted  his :  "  La  Monadologie," 
edited  by  Henri  Lachelier,/  Paris,    1909. 

100  See  "  Ethics,"  Definitions  III,  IV,  V,  VI ;  letter  to  Oldenburg  (Elwes 
ed.)  II,  277;  "Ethics,"  Part  I,  Propositions  V,  XIII,  XIV,  XV,  XVIII, 
XXV  and  Corollary,  XVII  and  Corollaries  I  and  II;  Part  V,  Prop.  XXIV; 
letter  to  Oldenburg  (Elwes  ed.),  II,  301. 

101  Thomas  Reid :  "  An  inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind  on  the  Principles 
of  Common   Sense,"  6th  edition,    1810,  p.  420. 


48 

inner  voice  of  reason.  A  fine  taste,  he  claims,  is  implanted  in 
our  natures.  Even  the  savage  has  in  himself  the  seeds  of 
logic,  good  breeding  and  virtue ;  these  seeds,  however,  must  be 
developed  by  culture.  Philosophy  has  no  other  root  than  the 
principles  of  "  common  sense."  The  common  concerns  of  life 
and  the  general  conduct  of  men  are  governed  by  certain  com- 
mon principles,  and  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  some  philoso- 
phers to  reject  these  principles  is  as  futile  as  the  attempt  of  the 
giants  to  dethrone  Jove.  Hobbes,  for  instance,  says  Reid, 
endeavored  to  demonstrate  that  there  is  no  difference  between 
right  and  wrong.  Such  a  philosophy,  however,  appears  ridic- 
ulous even  to  those  who  cannot  point  out  its  fallacy.  "  Com- 
mon sense  and  reason  have  both  one  author;  that  almighty 
author  in  all  whose  other  works  we  observe  a  consistency,  uni- 
formity and  beauty,  which  charm  and  delight  the  understand- 
ing: there  must,  therefore,  be  some  order  and  consistency  in 
the  human  faculties  as  well  as  in  other  parts  of  His  workman- 
ship.""- 

Ferguson  also  advocates  Shaftesburian  doctrines,  i.  e.,  that 
virtue  is  the  advantage  of  the  individual  and  the  public,  that 
man  has  a  moral  sense,  that  he  is  essentially  a  social  creature. 
Beauty,  he  claims,  is  an  indication  of  wisdom  and  goodness. 
On  the  other  hand,  folly  and  malice  are  deformities  of  the 
mind.  "  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  beauty  when  real  may 
be  resolved  into  excellence  and  that  deformity  may  be  resolved 
into  defect.""^  Virtue  is  the  best  state  of  which  an  intelligent 
being  is  capable.  Wisdom,  goodness,  temperance,  fortitude 
constitute  the  excellence  of  human  nature ;  while  its  deformity 
and  misery  consist  of  folly,  malice,  debauchery  and  cowardice. 

It  is  improper  to  consider  virtue  as  consisting  of  external 
performances  enjoined  under  the  sanction  of  rewards  and 
punishments.  If  the  virtuous  are  destined  to  be  happy  in  the 
future,  they  are  certainly  happy  in  the  present  state  through 
the  practice  of  virtue;  "and  it  were  absurd  to  conceive  that  a 
person  must  not  prefer  the  good  which  he  may  now  enjoy  but 

^o^ibid.^  p.  132. 

103  Adam  Ferguson :  "  Principles  of  Moral  and  Political  Science,"  Edin- 
burgh, 1792,  II,  30. 


49 

for  the  sake  of  a  good  which  he  is  to  enjoy  hereafter."^"*  It 
is  unfortunate  to  suppose  that  anything  else  can  amuse  us 
better  than  the  performance  of  duty.  "  It  is  unhappy  to  con- 
ceive beneficence  as  an  effect  of  self-denial  or  to  conceive  that 
we  lay  our  fellow-creatures  under  great  obligations,  by  the  kind- 
ness we  do  them."^°^  If  I  have  done  a  kindness  to  my  fellow- 
men,  he  says,  it  is  also  my  benefit.  Some  people  remind  you  of 
the  service  they  rendered  you ;  others,  although  not  reminding 
you  of  it,  keep  it  in  their  minds;  still  others  do  not  seem  to 
know  what  they  have  done.  The  latter  are  like  the  vine  which 
produces  its  grapes  and  has  done,  when  it  has  yielded  its 
proper  fruit. 

Virtue,  says  Ferguson,  is  universally  approved  regardless  of 
its  outward  utility.  A  person  dying  in  the  mere  attempt  to 
save  a  friend  or  to  preserve  his  country  is  just  as  much  an 
object  of  moral  approbation  as  the  most  successful  adventurer 
in  either  cause.  The  power  by  which  man  distinguishes  be- 
tween right  and  wrong  is  what  we  call  the  moral  sense.  As  in 
the  case  of  different  animals  nature  has  superadded  to  the 
other  principles  of  sensitive  life  some  peculiar  faculty  for  see- 
ing, smell  or  touch,  as  in  the  lynx's  eye,  the  hound's  nostril,  or 
the  spider's  touch;  so  to  the  mind  of  man,  in  addition  to  his 
other  powers,  the  Creator  has  given  a  faculty  of  judging  con- 
cerning the  merit  or  demerit  of  character.  "  Hunger  and  thirst 
or  any  other  incitement  to  self-preservation  is  not  more  essen- 
tial to  the  animal  frame  than  the  preference  of  what  is  perfect 
to  what  is  imperfect  is  to  the  constitution  of  the  mind."^°*^  Mr. 
Hobbes,  Ferguson  continues,  denies  the  existence  of  any  right 
prior  to  convention,  but  Hobbes'  opinion  is  unjust  to  human 
nature.  There  is  certainly  a  clear  perception  of  right  and 
wrong  prior  to  convention.  Man  is  formed  for  society,  and  he 
is  happy  only  in  so  far  as  he  has  the  qualifications  of  an  asso- 
ciate and  friend.  "  He  is  excellent  in  the  degree  in  which  he 
loves  his  fellow-creatures ;  he  is  defective  in  the  degree  in 
which  he  hates  them  or  is  indifferent  to  their  welfare. "^"^ 

^oilbtd.,  p.  92. 

105  Ibid.,  p.  90. 

106  Ibid.,  p.  130. 

107  Ibid.,  p.  41. 
5 


50 

But  of  the  entire  school  Hutcheson  is  the  one  who  stands  in 
closest  connection  with  Shaftesbury.  He  systematizes  Shaftes- 
bury's leading  doctrines  into  a  comprehensive  system.  Accord- 
ing to  H.  Ritter,"^  Hutcheson  has  the  same  relation  to  Shaftes- 
bury as  Wolff  to  Leibniz.  The  analogy  between  beauty  and 
virtue,  the  function  of  the  moral  sense,  benevolence  as  an 
original  part  of  our  nature, — these  are  the  fundamental  points 
of  resemblance  between  the  two  philosophers.  Hutcheson's^'^^ 
main  difference  from  Shaftesbury  consists  of  his  distinguishing 
between  an  esthetic  and  moral  sense,  while  Shaftesbury  in- 
cludes the  perception  of  beauty  and  morality  under  the  same 
sense. 

The  superior  faculty  of  perceiving  beauty,  says  Hutcheson, 
may  properly  be  termed  a  sense,  because  the  perception  of 
beauty^^"  comes  to  us  immediately  without  any  former  resolu- 
tion on  our  part;  and  uniformity  amidst  variety  is  the  most 
essential  principle  of  beauty.  Such  a  condition  we  find  in 
nature,  not  a  single  part  of  which  could  have  been  produced  by 
chance.  The  more  complex  the  comibinations  of  nature  are, 
the  more  we  must  ascribe  them  to  design.^^^  The  sense  of 
beauty  is  universal.  The  followers  of  Mr.  Locke,  says  Hutche- 
son, while  considering  the  external  senses  natural  and  ante- 
cedent to  custom  and  education,  deny  naturalness  to  the  esthetic 
sense  and  make  it  depend  upon  prospect  of  advantage,  custom 
or  education.     And  yet,  Hutcheson  continues,  the  esthetic  or 

108  "  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,"  Hamburg,  XII  (1855),  291. 

109  Francis  Hutcheson's  chief  work  is:  "Inquiry  into  the  Original  of 
our  Ideas  of  Beauty  and  Virtue,"  1720.  The  edition  of  Glasgow,  1772 
(printed  from  the  4th  edition  of  1738),  was  consulted.  The  work  was 
translated  into  German  by  J.  H.  Merck,  Frankfurt,   1762. 

110  Hutcheson  distinguishes  between  original  or  absolute  and  compara- 
tive or  relative  beauty.  By  the  former  he  means  the  beauty  of  the  works 
of  nature;  by  the  latter  he  means  the  beauty  of  such  objects  as  are  imita- 
tions of  other  objects.     "  Inquiry,"  etc.,  pp.    13-14- 

111  Hutcheson  considers  miracles  as  contrary  to  design,  and  his  view  on 
miracles  is  the  same  as  Shaftesbury's :  "  However  miracles  may  prove  the 
superintendency  of  a  voluntary  agent,  yet  that  mind  must  be  weak  and 
inadvertent  which  needs  them  to  confirm  the  belief  of  a  wise  and  good 
Deity ;  since  the  deviation  from  general  laws  must  be  a  presumption  of 
inconstancy  and  weakness,  rather  than  of  steady  wisdom  and  power,  and 
must  weaken  the  best  arguments  we  can  have  for  the  sagacity  and  power 
of  the  universal  mind."     Ibid.,  p.  62. 


51 

internal  sense  is  just  as  real  and  natural  as  any  of  the  external 
or  physical  senses.  "  The  internal  sense  is  a  passive  power  of 
receiving  ideas  of  beauty  from  all  objects  in  which  there  is  uni- 
formity amidst  variety.  Nor  does  there  seem  anything  more 
difficult  in  the  matter  than  that  the  mind  should  receive  the  idea 
of  sweet  when  a  sweet  form  enters  the  tongue  or  to  have  the 
idea  of  sound  upon  a  quick  vibration  in  the  air."^^-  The  sense 
of  beauty  is  antecedent  to  custom,  education  and  example. 
None  of  these  can  be  of  any  avail,  unless  we  first  have  a  nat- 
ural faculty  of  perceiving  beauty  and  harmony. 

Nature,  Hutcheson  continues,  has  also  given  us  a  moral 
sense^^^  and  has  endowed  us  with  affections  that  are  the  springs 
of  virtuous  acts.  The  moral  sense  is  free  from  all  notions  of 
personal  advantage.  If  this  were  not  so,  we  should  have  the 
same  love  for  a  fruitful  field  as  for  a  generous  friend  in  as  far 
as  both  are  of  equal  advantage  to  us ;  nor  should  we  admire  the 
virtuous  act  of  a  person  of  a  distant  land  and  of  a  former  age, 
provided  his  influence  does  not  reach  us,  any  more  than  the 
mountains  of  Peru,  when  we  are  not  interested  in  the  Spanish 
trade.  But  "  we  have  a  distinct  perception  of  beauty  or  excel- 
lence in  the  kind  of  affections  of  rational  agents;  whence  we 
are  determined  to  admire  and  love  such  characters  and  persons. 
Were  there  no  moral  sense  or  had  we  no  other  idea  of  actions 
but  as  advantageous  or  hurtful,  I  see  no  reason  why  we  should 
be  delighted  with  honor  or  subjected  to  the  uneasiness  of  shame ; 
or  how  it  could  ever  happen  that  a  man  who  is  secure  from 
punishment  for  any  action  should  ever  be  uneasy  at  its  being 
known  to  all  the  world.""*  The  moral  sense,  he  claims,  is  uni- 
versal and  antecedent  to  religion,  custom  and  instruction. 

Summary 

We  found  the  identification  of  the  good  with  the  beautiful 
as  the  starting  point  of  Shaftesbury's  philosophy.  Striving 
after  beauty,  he  claims,  leads  to  virtue ;  in  fact,  beauty  itself  is 

112  Ibid.,  p.  72. 

113  Gerhard  Keussler  considers  the  origin  of  the  "  Popularaesthetik  "  as 
consisting  of  Shaftesbury's  and  Hutcheson's  "  inner  sense  "  and  of  Reid's 
"common  sense."     See  "Die  Grenzen  der  Aesthetik,"  Leipzig,  1902,  p.  121. 

114  Hutcheson's  "Inquiry,"  etc.,  pp.  loi,  205. 


52 

nothing  else  than  an  expression  of  inner  spiritual  harmony. 
Out  of  this  Shaftesbury  develops  his  "moral  grace"  and  the 
three  orders  of  beauty:  material,  spiritual,  and  divine.  The 
notions  of  beauty  and  morality,  he  asserts,  are  grounded  in 
human  nature.  Man  has  both  an  esthetic  and  a  moral  faculty. 
Man  is  essentially  a  social  creature,  and  society  is  his  natural 
state.  Virtue  is  the  advantage  and  vice  the  disadvantage  of 
everybody ;  public  welfare  and  private  interest  are  inseparable. 
Virtue  has  its  own  peculiar  source  and,  although  it  may  be 
strengthened  'by  religion,  it  is  independent  of  the  latter  and 
prior  to  it.  The  notion  of  future  rewards  and  punishments  is 
not,  as  theologians  claim,  essential  to  the  advancement  of  the 
cause  of  morality.  The  cause  of  morality,  however,  is  ad- 
vanced by  culture,  and  the  development  of  character  is,  accord- 
ing to  Shaftesbury,  the  chief  aim  of  all  learning.  He  attacks 
pedants  and  scholastics,  speaks  contemptuously  of  metaphysics 
and  condemns  an  education  which  fails  to  "  unite  the  scholar 
part  with  that  of  the  real  gentleman  and  man  of  breeding." 
Philosophy  is  to  him  a  problem  of  daily  life;  it  consists  of 
"  elevating  good  breeding  or  manner  of  life."  The  height  of 
morality  consists  of  conceiving  virtue  as  the  greatest  happiness 
and  of  making  its  practice  not  a  matter  of  stern  duty  or  self- 
denial  but  a  real  pleasure,  which  is  in  thorough  accord  with  the 
natural  propensities.  The  "  virtuoso "  is  the  esthetically  de- 
veloped individual,  who  through  his  broad  culture  becomes  the 
artist  of  his  life. 

Shaftesbury  advocates  self-investigation  or  "  soliloquy  "  as 
a  means  of  becoming  a  good  thinker  and  an  honest  man.  But 
since  he  is  an  opponent  of  solitary  life  he  emphasizes  the  im- 
practicability of  "  soliloquy "  without  "  commerce  with  the 
world."  He  is  a  cheerful  philosopher,  opposes  the  gloomy  and 
melancholy  in  all  phases  of  life  and  emphasizes  the  freedom  of 
"wit  and  humor  "  as  essential  to  the  cause  of  good  government, 
religion  and  morality.  On  the  basis  of  the  contrast  between 
the  gloomy  and  cheerful  he  distinguishes  between  a  false  and  a 
true  enthusiasm,  between  mere  fanaticism  and  real  divine  inspi- 
ration. In  connection  with  the  freedom  of  "  wit  and  humor  " 
he  develops  the  doctrine  of  the  use  of  raillery  as  a  test  of  truth. 


53 

"  Truth  can  bear  all  lights."  The  application  of  the  test  of 
ridicule  is  the  best  means  of  distinguishing  the  truly  serious 
from  the  ridiculous.  But  the  application  of  raillery,  we  are 
told,  does  not  imply  vulgar  jest  or  mere  buffoonery.  Shaftes- 
bury is  above  all  an  optimist.  He  claims  that  there  is  no  posi- 
tive sin  or  evil  in  the  world  and  is  filled  with  enthusiasm  for 
the  order  and  beauty  of  the  universe.  Of  God  he  conceives  as 
the  genius  of  nature  or  the  world-soul.^^^ 

115  This  exposition  does  not  include  Shaftesbury's  more  technical  con- 
tributions to  art-criticism  as  contained  in  the  "  Notion  of  the  Tablature  of 
the  Judgment  of  Hercules  "  and  in  the  "  Letter  concerning  Design."  The 
former  to  a  certain  extent  influenced  Lessing's  "  Laokoon."  Hugo  Bliim- 
ner  in  his  book  on  Lessing's  "  Laokoon  "  discusses  briefly  the  relation  be- 
tween Lessing's  work  and  Shaftesbury's  "  Judgment  of  Hercules."  See 
Bliimner :  "  Lessings  Laokoon,"  introduction,  p.  24  ff.  G.  Spicker  in  his 
"  Philosophic  des  Grafen  von  Shaftesbury "  (Freiburg,  1872)  analyzes 
Shaftesbury's  "  Judgment  of  Hercules  "  and  quotes  corresponding  passages 
from  Lessing's  "  Laokoon."     See  pp.  207  ff. 


CHAPTER   III 

Shaftesbury's  Moral-Esthetic  Philosophy  in  Wieland 

I.     The  Good  and  the  Beautiful.    Spiritual  Beauty  and  Moral 

Charm 

If  we  were  to  look  for  one  comprehensive  term  which  should 
convey  the  concept  for  which  Shaftesbury's  moral-esthetic  phi- 
losophy stands  we  could  hardly  find  a  more  fitting  term  than 
Shaftesbury's  "  Moral  Grace  "  or  "  Moral  Venus."  That  Wie- 
land's  moral-esthetic  philosophy  came  from  Shaftesbury  ap- 
pears from  his  frequent  allusions,  always  commendatory,  to  the 
Shaftesburian  "Moral  Grace,"  "Moral  Graces"  or  "Moral 
Venus."  In  the  aforementioned  document  directed  against  Uz 
in  January,  1758,  he  declares  that  a  poet  is  not  expected  to  be 
morose  and  gloomy;^  that  virtue  lies  between  the  two  ex- 
tremes, frivolity  and  gloom ;  that  Uz  should  be  familiar  with 
"  the  moral  Venus  and  the  moral  Graces  about  which  Shaftes- 
bury speaks  " ;  that  "  had  he  known  these  Graces  he  would  have 
been  an  amiable  author."-  His  appeal  to  Shaftesbury's  "  Moral 
Venus "  in  "  Cyrus "  and  the  professed  use  of  the  same 
"  Venus "  in  the  character  of  Cyrus  have  already  been  dis- 
cussed.^ 

In  a  letter  to  F.  J.  Riedel,  Oct.  26,  1768,  he  praises  Jacobi's 
poems  "  Vestale  "  and  "  Venus  im  Bade,"  because  these  poems 

1  This  is  a  rejoinder  to  verses  37-40  of  Uz'  epistle  "  Schreiben  des  Ver- 
fassers  der  lyrischen  Gedichte  an  einen  Freund,"  which  was  issued  in  1757 
in  reply  to  Wieland's  previous  attack.  The  epistle  is  found  on  pp.  377—84 
in  Sauer's  edition  of  Uz'  poetical  works  {Deutsche  Liter aturdenkmale, 
33-8).     The  verses  in  question  read  as  follows: 

Welch  schwacher  Geist  hort'  ich  die  Muse  sagen, 

Will  von  Parnasz  die  Grazien  verjagen? 

1st  niemand  weis  als  wer  nur  immer  weint, 

Ein  finstrer  Kopf,  dem  Schwermut  Tugend  scheint  ? 

2  See  Seufferts :  "  Mitteilungen  aus  Wielands  Jiinglingsalter,"  Euphorion, 
XIV,  235. 

3  Cf.  Chapter  I,  pp.  13-14,  notes  36  and  37. 

54 


55 

"  reach  the  highest  ideal  which  a  poet  inspired  by  the  sight  of 
the  Shaftesburian  Venus  is  capable  of  thinking,  feeling  and 
contemplating."^  In  June,  1769,  he  appeals  to  Jacobi  to  remain 
a  favorite  of  the  Graces,  a  painter  of  ideal  beauties  and  a  cheer- 
ful poet;  and  he  assures  him  that  by  producing  that  kind  of 
work  he  will  deserve  well  of  all  those  "  whom  nature  has  given 
a  fine  feeling  for  that  which  Shaftesbury  calls  the  'moral 
Venus '  and  the  '  moral  Graces.'  "^ 

At  the  beginning  of  the  next  year  he  identifies  the  Graces 
that  deck  the  goddess  of  'beauty  and  dance  with  the  Muses  on 
the  summit  of  Parnassus  with  the  "  moral  Graces"  of  Shaftes- 
bury.'^  Feb.  22,  1770,  he  praises  a  certain  play  of  Jacobi  as 
having  beautiful  simplicity,  the  beautiful  ideal  of  moral  senti- 
ments, in  brief  "  the  moral  Graces  of  Shaftesbury."^  In  Jan- 
uary, 1775,  he  denotes  the  ideal  of  moral  beauty  as  that  "  which 
Shaftesbury  calls  the  moral  Venus."*  August  26,  lyg^,  he 
identifies  the  "  holy  Virgin-mother  of  the  Graces "  with  the 
"  moral  Grace  "  of  Shaftesbury.^  In  1802  he  finds  in  the  rela- 
tion between  Lykon  and  his  son,  in  Xenophon's  "  Symposium," 
a  "  gentle  and  lovely  blossom-fragrance,"  or  something  "  which 
the  noble  Shaftesbury  understands  by  his  moral  Graces."^'^ 
And  in  1803  he  praises  the  exceptional  beauty  of  the  scene  in 
which  Euripides  introduces  the  character  of  Ion,  and  finds  the 
character  so  admirable  that  the  idea  of  further  beautifying  it 
would  not  occur  to  any  one  "whom  heaven  endowed  with  a 
feeling  for  genuine  beautiful  nature  and  for  Shaftesbury's 
moral  Venus  and  moral  Graces."^^ 

The  Shaftesburian  ideas  of  spiritual  beauty  and  moral  charm 

4  "  Auswahl  denkwurdiger  Briefe,"  I,  225. 

5  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  letter  to  Jacobi,  II,  318. 

6 "  Auswahl  denkwiirdiger  Briefe,"  I,  144,  to  Sophie  La  Roche.  The 
letter  is  undated,  but  it  belongs  probably  to  the  end  of  1769  or  the  be- 
ginning of  1770. 

7  To  Jacobi,  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  II,  349. 

8  January  number  of  the  Merkur,  1775,  p.  92,  footnote. 

»To  Sophie  Reinhold,  in  "  Reinhold  und  Wieland,"  by  Robert  Keil 
(Leipzig  and  Berlin,   1885),  p.   199. 

10 "  Versuch  uber  das  Xenofontische  Gastmahl,"  in  Attisches  Museum, 
IV2,  116. 

11  Note  6  in  "  Erlauterungen  "  to  Euripides'  "  Ion,"  Attisches  Museum, 
IV3,   144. 


66 

are  constantly  reflected  in  Wieland's  works.  Thus  he  asserts 
that  virtue  appeals  largely  through  the  charm  bestowed  upon 
it  by  love.  Much  more  beautiful  than  rosy  cheeks  and  lily- 
white  skin  is  a  soul  adorned  by  the  splendor  of  innocence. 
True  beauty  will  seldom  deceive  us,  for  it  is  reflected  in  the 
eyes,  just  as  in  a  mirror;  only  the  beauty  of  the  soul  wins 
lovers.^-  A  great  thought  of  an  immortal  mind  is  more  beauti- 
ful than  all  the  glitter  of  lifeless  matter.  The  most  beautiful 
marble  Venus  is  nothing  compared  with  the  soul,  the  daughter 
of  heaven,  which  keeps  on  blooming  even  after  all  the  stars  and 
all  the  beauty  of  the  sky  fade  away.  Wisdom  is  essential  to 
real  beauty.^^  Nothing  else  can  inspire  love  as  much  as  virtue 
veiled  in  beauty.  It  has  always  been  the  function  of  wisdom 
to  adorn  beauty  with  spirit  and  to  provide  it  with  graces  which 
do  not  fade  with  the  cheeks.  Man  is  an  image  of  divinity,  an 
angel  in  animal  form  which  is  beautiful  by  the  indwelling 
spirit."  The  charms  of  the  body  are  bestowed  upon  it  by  the 
soul;  for  this  reason,  while  the  man  with  an  ignoble  mind  is 
swayed  by  mere  sensual  passion,  the  noble  man  beholds  much 
higher  beauties  looking  forth  from  under  the  splendid  veil  (the 
body)  of  a  girl's  soul.^^ 

For  the  same  reason,  Cefise,  Timoclea's  friend,  is  not  as 
beautiful  as  she  might  be,  for  instead  of  giving  a  wise  answer 
she  merely  laughs  and  displays  her  pearly  teeth;  and  upon 
hearing  of  a  virtuous  act  she  remains  as  indifferent  as  a  statue. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  lovely  Pasithea  pleases  all  who  see  her, 
and  every  wise  man  is  bound  to  love  her.  When  she  speaks, 
her  words  are  as  harmonious  as  her  voice,  her  sentiments  up- 
right and  innocent  as  her  looks,  her  manners  comely.  "  If 
the  Graces  accompanying  virtue  should  wish  to  assume  human 

12  "  Anti-Ovid  "  (1752),  lines  91  ff.  Gruber,  II,  21;  lines  311  fif.,  ibid., 
II,  30;  "  Moralische  Briefe "  (1752),  9  Brief,  lines  89  ff.,  Gruber,  I,  298. 

13 "  Briefe  von  Verstorbenen  an  hinterlassene  Freunde "  (1753),  iter 
Brief,  lines  109-10  (Gruber,  II,  190);  2ter  Brief,  lines  74  ff. ;  150-1  (pp. 
208  and  213). 

14 "  Erinnerungen  an  eine  Freundin "  (1753),  Goschen,  XXVI,  283  and 
281.  "  Platonische  Betrachtungen  iiber  den  Menschen "  (1754),  Goschen, 
XXIX,  no. 

15  "  Sympathien  "  (1755),  Goschen,  XXIX,  9  and  "  Prosaische  Schriften," 
I,    112. 


67 

form  they  would  assume  thine,  O  Pasithea!  "  No  girl  is  justi- 
fied in  considering  herself  beautiful  unless  she  resembles  this 
Pasithea.  The  art  of  becoming  beautiful  has  for  its  prime 
essential  a  good  heart.  By  leading  an  irregular  and  corrupt 
life  a  person  will  lose  the  beauty  which  he  may  have  formerly 
possessed.  Physical  beauty  is  closely  connected  with  physical 
health,  and  the  latter  depends  immediately  upon  spiritual  health, 
which  consists  of  virtue.  Complete  beauty,  therefore,  requires 
both  the  soul,  the  noblest  part,  and  the  body  to  be  each  in  its 
natural  condition  of  health.  To  be  sure,  a  treacherous  soul 
may  sometimes  dwell  in  a  strong  and  beautiful  body,  but  vice 
so  disguised  will  ultimately  have  its  fatal  effect.  The  effect  of 
a  beautiful  soul  is  especially  manifested  in  a  charming  per- 
sonality ;  hence  the  person  with  a  good  upright  character  never 
fails  to  possess  charm.^^ 

The  Graces  painted  by  Theages  suggest  so  much  spiritual 
beauty  as  to  deserve  the  name  of  moral  Graces  and  to  be  de- 
scribed as  the  reflection  of  the  inner  goodness  of  a  human  soul; 
without  them  beauty  is  incomplete  and  lifeless;  through  them 
even  a  withered  face  becomes  lovely.^'^  Wisdom,  virtue  and 
moral  Venus  are  used  as  identical  terms  ;^®  and  on  another 
occasion  beauty  is  described  as  the  body  of  virtue,  charm  as  its 
visible  reflection.^^ 

The  notions  of  inner  beauty,  spiritual  grace  and  moral  charm, 
which  are  very  common,  as  we  have  just  seen,  in  Wieland's 
works  of  the  first  period  of  his  literary  career,  occur  also  in  his 
works  after  1760.  We  read,  for  instance,  that  virtue,  under- 
standing and  other  such  gifts  are  more  charming  in  a  beautiful 
form,  but  that  even  a  homely  maiden  will  attract  our  love  if 
she  only  possesses  spiritual  beauty.^*^  In  the  course  of  the 
general  corruption  which  comes  upon  Scheschian  during  the 
reign  of  Isfandiar  the  women  loose  their  bashfulness  and  inno- 

18 "  Timoklea.  Ein  Gesprach  iiber  scheinbare  und  wahre  Schonheit " 
(1755),  Goschen,  XXXIII,  205-6,  209  ff.,  212  ff. 

17  "  Theages :  Uber  Schonheit  und  Liebe,"  Goschen,  XXXIII,  234. 

18  Letter  to  Zimmermann  (1759),  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe/'  II,  105. 
i9"Araspes  und  Panthea  "  (1760),  Goschen,  XXVII,  11. 

20"Der  neue  Amadis "  (1771),  i8th  Canto,  first  two  stanzas,  Goschen, 
XV,  269. 


68 

cence  and  all  other  qualities  which  enhance  physical  beauty  and 
make  up  for  the  lack  of  it.-^  Refined  persons  who  are  not 
ruled  by  mere  passion  find  beauty  only  in  souls ;  even  a  Medusa, 
provided  she  possesses  a  beautiful  soul,  would  to  such  persons 
become  a  Venus.--  And  Democritus  of  Abdera  understands 
by  beautiful  eyes  such  as  reflect  a  beautiful  soul.^^ 

Wieland  praises  Jacob  Heinrich  Meister's  work-*  and  finds 
it  so  charming  and  attractive  especially  on  account  of  the 
author's  moral  grace,  which  'breathes  in  all  his  sentiments  and 
is  conveyed  to  his  composition.-^  As  the  beautiful  Danae  is 
impersonating  Daphne  in  a  dance,  Agathon  is  so  enchanted  by 
her  that  he  imagines  he  really  sees  before  him  the  moral  Venus 
with  all  her  spiritual  Graces.-"  And  speaking  of  a  certain  im- 
propriety on  the  part  of  Aristophanes,  Wieland  characterizes 
it  as  a  transgression  against  the  moral  Graces.^^  Inasmuch  as 
the  soul  has  an  immediate  influence  upon  the  body  Menander 
is  assured  that  his  beloved  maiden  will  never  lose  her  physical 
beauty  as  long  as  the  beauty  of  her  soul  remains  the  same.^^ 
The  face  of  Psyche,  Agathon's  first  lover,  reflects  the  beauty  of 
her  soul.  Melanippe  claims  that  there  is  also  a  spiritual  beauty 
which  inspires  a  much  purer  and  much  more  constant  love  than 
the  beauty  which  only  attracts  the  physical  eye.  And  Hip- 
parchia  loves  Krates  on  account  of  the  beauty  of  his  soul,  the 
worth  of  his  character  and  the  graces  of  his  social  bearing  and 
conduct.-^ 

Aside  from  his  spiritual  beauty  Shaftesbury  develops  his 
other  well-known  doctrine  of  divine,   or  prime,   or  original 

21  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel"  (1772),  Goschen,  VIII,  57. 

22  "  Psyche  unter  den  Grazien,"  Teutscher  Merkur,  May,  1774,  pp.  121—2. 

23  "Die  Abderiten"  (1781),  Goschen,  XIII,  35. 

24  "  Von  der  natiirlichen  Moral,"  German  translation  by  Schulthesz  from 
the  French  original  of  Meister.  Edited  by  Wieland.  I  did  not  see  the 
book  in  question. 

25  "Moral  der  Natur  "  (1789),  Hempel,  XXXII,  153. 

26  "  Agathon,"  Goschen,  IV,  163. 

27 "  Erlauterungen "  to  Aristophanes'  "  Wolken "  (1798),  Attisches 
Musetim,  III3,  104. 

28 "  Sympathien,"  Goschen,  XXIX,  213.  "Menander  und  Glycerion " 
(1803),  Letter  X,  Hempel,  X,  23. 

29  "  Agathon,"  Goschen,  V,  27.  "Krates  und  Hipparchia  "  (1804),  Let- 
ters IX  and  XXIX.     Hempel,  X,  pp.  94  and  144. 


59 

beauty,  which  is  the  source  of  every  other  beauty.  This  notion 
is  also  very  prominent  in  Wieland's  vv^orks.  God  is  to  him  th^ 
"  first  beauty,"  near  and  visible  to  everybody.  Divinity  is 
described  as  the  "  substance  of  all  beauty,"  the  "  eternal 
beauty,"  the  "  everlasting  prototype  of  the  beautiful. "^°  NotTi- 
ing  else  can  be  considered  more  beautiful  than  divinity.  So  he 
calls  upon  beautiful  nature  to  point  out  to  him  the  divine 
beauty. ^^  God  alone  is  beauty,  every  joy  proceeds  from  this 
fountain-head,  from  it  flows  every  beauty  which  is  admired  by 
angels  and  by  which  men  are  charmed.^-  Everything  that  we 
love  and  admire,  this  splendor  of  nature,  this  harmony  of 
things,  whatever  we  call  noble  and  great  and  comely  in  human 
manner  and  actions — all  this  is  just  an  emanation  of  a  pure 
original  source  of  perfection,  order  and  beauty,  which  in  other 
words  we  call  the  supreme  divinity.^^ 

Everything  that  we  see  is  only  a  vain  shadow  of  the  "  first 
essential  beauty,"  of  that  which  is  divine  and  ideally-beautiful.^* 
Whatever  enjoyment  man  has,  he  still  feels  that  he  cannot 
attain  the  perfect  happiness  for  which  he  longs;  and  so  he  looks 
up  to  an  intransitory  good,  to  that  which  is  the  prototype  and 
source  of  all  that  is  good  and  beautiful,  to  God."^^  "  Perfect 
beauty  is  the  divinest  thing  in  nature. "^^  Peregrinus  Proteus 
aspires  to  live  the  life  of  a  spirit,  which  consists  of  rising  from 
one  stage  of  beauty  to  the  other  and  of  finally  attaining  the 
contemplation  and  enjoyment  of  that  "  highest  original  beauty, 
that  heavenly  Venus,  which  is  the  source  and  essence  of  all 
other  beauty  and  perfection."^'^  And  Agathon,  while  contem- 
plating in  the  moonlight  the  beauty  of  slumbering  nature,  comes 
to  consider  how  happy  must  be  the  state  of  the  spirits  who 

30 "  Hymne  auf  Gott "  (1753),  Hempel,  VI,  75.  "  Briefe  von  Ver- 
storbenen  an  hinterlassene  Freunde  "  (Gruber,  Vol.  II)  :  4  Brief,  lines  34-5  ; 
6  Brief,  line  220;  8  Brief,  line  108. 

31 "  Gesicht  des  Mirza,"  (1754),  Goschen,  XXIX,  j2.  "  Empfindungen 
eines  Christen"  (1755),  Goschen,  XXVI,  221. 

32  "  Empfindungen  eines  Christen,"  ibid.,  pp.  223,  249. 

33"Araspes  und  Panthea  "  (1760),  Goschen,  XXVII,  54. 

34"Musarion"  (1768),  lines  824  ff.  Prohle  edition  I,  39  (Vol.  LI  of  the 
"  Deutsche  National-Literatur  "). 

35  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VIII,  93. 

36"Aristipp"  (1800-2),  Goschen,  XXII,  137. 

37 "  Peregrinus  Proteus"  (1791),  Hempel,  XXI,  61. 


60 

spend  milleniums  "  in  the  contemplation  of  the  essential  beauty, 
the  intransitory,  eternal  and  divine."^*  Also  Hipparchia  feels 
on  one  occasion  irradiated  by  the  "  divine  archetypes  of  all  the 
beautiful  and  good."^° 

Throughout  his  entire  literary  career  Wieland  emphasizes 
the  identification  of  the  good  or  the  moral  with  the  beautiful. 
Virtue  is  beautiful,  the  moral  world  is  the  most  beautiful  part 
of  creation,  the  noblest  part  to  which  everything  else  is  sub- 
servient.*" Virtue  is  a  real  divinity,  the  moral  order  is  an  invi's- 
ible  veiled  beauty.*^  When  virtue  appears  in  its  beauty  every- 
body is  bound  to  love  it.  It  is  the  superior  beauty  which  makes 
man  the  supreme  creature;  if  innocence,  truth  and  virtue  were 
to  rule  the  world  it  would  acquire  thereby  a  more  beautiful 
appearance.  Morality  is  the  beauty  of  mankind :  what,  there- 
fore, can  be  more  beautiful  than  the  virtuous  man?*-  The 
kind  of  paintings  which  Aspasia,  one  of  the  characters'  of 
"  Theages,"  has  in  her  gallery  confers  a  great  honor  upon  her, 
for,  judging  by  these  paintings,  "she  considers  the  beautiful 
and  the  good  as  inseparable."*^ 

Moral  beauty  is  used  as  a  synonym  for  goodness  and  inno- 
cence. Tigranes  is  filled  with  admiration  for  the  character  of 
Cyrus,  since  he  is  "  mightily  aroused  by  the  beauty  of  virtue  " ; 
and  Araspes  tells  Panthea  that  her  husband  might  suspect  that 
she  has  fallen  into  the  hands  of  a  barbarian  who  is  "  without 
feeling  for  the  higher  beauty  of  virtue."**  Aglaia,  one  of  the 
Graces,  while  commending  the  dance  of  the  daughters  of 
Arcadia,  orders  that  only  the  best  one  among  them  should 
receive  the  prize  of  beauty.  Addressing  his  people,  the  wise 
lawgiver,  Psammis,  tells  them  that  love  and  sympathy  make 

38"Agathon,"  Goschen,  IV,  63. 

39"Krates  und  Hipparchia,"  Letter  XXXII,  Hempel,  X,  149. 

40  "  Briefe  von  Verstorbenen,"  i  Brief,  line  119;  6  Brief,  lines  122-3. 

41  "  Gesicht  des  Mirza  "  (1754),  Goschen,  XXIX,  yz.  "  Gesicht  von  einer 
Welt  unschuldiger  Menschen  "  (1754),  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  I,  247. 

42 "  Die  Priifung  Abrahams"  (1753),  Gruber,  III,  34,  lines  409-11. 
"Timoklea,"  Goschen,  XXXIII,  216,  217-8.  "  Sympathien,"  Ibid.,  XXIX, 
22.     "  Betrachtungen  iiber  den  Menschen,"  Ibid.,  p.  108. 

43  "Theages,"   Goschen,  XXXIII,  229. 

44  "  Sympathien,"  Ibid.,  XXIX,  4 ;  "  Cyrus,"  3d  canto,  lines  363-4,  Gruber, 
IV,  86;  "Araspes  und  Panthea,"  Goschen,  XXVII,  61. 


61 

for  beauty ;  that  every  irregular  passion  or  malevolent  thought 
disfigures  our  features,  poisons  our  looks  and  degrades  the 
beautiful  human  figure  into  similarity  with  the  lower  animals; 
that  as  long  as  their  hearts  shall  remain  good  they  will  be  the 
most  beautiful  among  the  children  of  men.*^ 

On  another  occasion  virtue  is  called  the  "  goddess  of  beauti- 
ful souls. "*^  On  leaving  Smyrna  Agathon  is  determined  to  take 
up  an  activity  having  the  real  general  welfare  as  its  aim,  for 
more  than  ever  he  is  now  "  convinced  of  the  beauty  of  virtue."*'^ 
Aristippus,  whom  Agathon  meets  in  Syracuse,  loves  pleasure 
because  he  is  a  lover  of  the  beautiful,  and  for  the  same  reason 
he  also  loves  the  good.*^  And  in  Tarentum  Agathon  becomes 
so  wise  as  to  devote  himself  entirely  to  "  the  highest  beauty, 
to  virtue."*^  Lais  reports  to  Aristippus  that  she  has  learned 
the  following  truths :  that  without  virtue  beauty  and  love  can- 
not attain  either  duration  or  perfection,  that  the  beautiful  and 
the  good  are  one  and  the  same  thing  and  that  virtue  is  nothing 
else  than  a  love  of  the  beautiful  and  the  good,  a  love  which  like 
a  flame  strives  ever  upwards,  is  not  satisfied  with  anything 
imperfect  and  does  not  rest  until  it  rises  by  degrees  to  the 
enjoyment  of  the  highest  beauty.  Aristippus  himself  is  a  young 
man  with  excellent  qualities,  for  as  a  lover  of  beauty  he  also 
loves  virtue.^" 

Not  only  the  good  but  also  the  true  is  beautiful  and  charm- 
ing. This  Shaftesburian  doctrine  is  also  represented  in  Wie- 
land.  Truth,  says  Wieland,  in  its  first  source  is  charmingly 
beautiful  and  pure.  Aristippus  loves  the  beautiful  and  good 
and  in  both  the  true.     Truth  is  the  "  heavenly  goddess  of 

45 "  Die  Grazien "  (1770),  Goschen,  III,  114;  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel," 
Goschen,  VII,  74. 

46  "  Vorbericht  zum  Anti-Cato,"  Teutscher  Merktir,  Aug.,   1773,  p.  108. 

47  "  Agathon,"  Part  II,  Goschen,  V,   174-5. 

48 "  Agathon,"  Part  III,  Goschen,  VI,  15.  In  a  letter  to  Sophie  and 
Reinhold  (his  daughter  and  son-in-law)  Wieland  mentions  that  his  estate 
in  Oszmanstatt  has  been  "  improved  and — inasmuch  as  the  good  may  also 
be  called  beautiful — beautified."  Cf .  Robert  Keil :  "  Wieland  und  Rein- 
hold,"  p.  243.     (The  letter  is  undated  but  Keil  puts  it  as  belonging  to  1798.) 

49  "Agathon,"  Part  III,  Goschen,  VI,  271. 

50 "  Aristipp,"  Part  I,  Goschen,  XXII,   189-90,   194. 


62 

beauty.""  On  the  12th  of  Sept.,  1756,  Wieland  calls  Zimmer- 
mann's  attention  to  the  Shaf tesburian  doctrine :  "  Hatte  euch 
Shaftesbury  nicht  lehren  sollen,  dasz  nur  das  Wahre,  the  true, 
schon  ist?"'^- 

Shaftesbury's  identification  of  the  good  and  true  and  beauti- 
ful encountered  very  strenuous  opposition  on  the  part  of  Kant, 
and  Wieland's  sympathy  with  Shaftesbury's  doctrine  is  further 
illustrated  by  his  objection  to  this  particular  part  of  Kantian 
philosophy.  Kant  very  clearly  and  emphatically  separates  the 
realms  of  morality,  logic  and  esthetics.  The  beautiful,  he 
claims,  represents  an  object  merely  in  relation  to  the  senses,  but 
in  order  to  be  called  good  the  object  must  pass  through  the 
conception  of  some  purpose  and  be  subjected  to  the  principles 
of  reason.  The  good  always  refers  an  object  to  a  definite 
purpose,  and  is  independent  of  the  idea  of  the  beautiful,  inas- 
much as  esthetic  judgment  is  based  upon  mere  formal  adapta- 
tion of  means  to  end  (formale  Zweckmdsdgkeit) .  Perfection 
wins  nothing  from  beauty  and  vice  versa.  The  beautiful  is  a 
matter  of  taste,  while  the  good  is  a  matter  of  reason;  hence,  it 
is  wrong  to  identify  the  one  with  the  other.  Some  philosophers, 
Kant  continues,  consider  an  interest  in  beauty  as  a  sign  of  a 
good  moral  character.  This  doctrine,  however,  he  says,  has 
very  properly  been  refuted  by  others  who  show  from  experi- 
ence that  virtuosi  of  taste  are  usually  given  over  to  destructive 
passions.^^ 

All  this,  as  we  see,  is  a  direct  contrast  to  Shaftesbury's  doc- 
trine. Wieland's  attitude  to  the  Kantian  doctrine  is  best  seen 
frc  his  criticism  of  Herder's  "  Kalligone,"  which  is  directed 
against  Kant's  "  Kritik  der  Urteilskraft,"  the  very  work  in 
which  Kant  draws  his  sharp  distinction  between  the  good  and 
the  beautiful.  In  this  criticism,  which  appeared  in  August,  1800, 
in  the  Neiier  Teutscher  Merkur,  Wieland  praises  Herder's  work 

51 "  Natur  der  Dinge "  (1751),  Book  VI,  lines  33-4,  Gruber,  I,  i68. 
"  Aristipp,"  Part  I,  Goschen,  XXII,  41.  "  Brief e  von  Verstorbenen,"  4 
Brief,  line  3,  Gruber,  II,  247. 

52  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  218. 

53  Kant's  "Kritik  der  Urteilskraft"  (1790),  edited  by  Karl  Kehrbach 
(text  of  the  edition  A  of  1790).  Cf.  especially  pp.  44-5,  47-9,  51,  7Z,  75i 
78,  124,  163. 


63 

strongly  and  recommends  that  it  be  read  and  reread  by  every- 
body "  that  has  at  heart  the  truly  beautiful  and  good,"  adding 
that  his  own  views  on  Herder's  book  are  contained  in  the  book 
itself.^*  Instead  of  giving  his  own  views,  Wieland  then  quotes 
passages  from  the  "  Kalligone,"  and  the  following  passage, 
which  is  given  here  in  substance,  is  of  special  significance,  since 
it  clearly  states  Wieland's  attitude  with  regard  to  the  separa- 
tion of  esthetics  from  morality.  The  good  men  of  all  times, 
says  Herder-Wieland,  endeavored  to  present  the  beautiful  as 
the  good  and  true,  but  we  are  coldly  and  deliberately  trying  to 
separate  that  which  nature  has  gently  intertwined  in  us,  and  we 
rejoice  over  the  doctrine  that  "the  beautiful  must  be  neither 
true  nor  good"  (these  are,  of  course,  Kant's  words).  "If," 
he  adds,  "this  is  not  desecration  of  the  noblest  part  of 
humanity,  of  the  arts,  of  feeling,  of  reason,  I  do  not  know  of 
any."^^ 

2.     Esthetic  and  Moral  Sense.     Morality  and  Nature 

Like  Shaftesbury,  Wieland  also  argues  for  an  esthetic  and 
moral  sense.  In  1759  he  compliments  his  friend  Zimmermann 
on  his  "  sensus  veri,  pulcJiri  et  boni,  or  that  zvhich  Shaftesbury 
calls  the  sensus  communis."^^  The  doctrine  occurs  in  Wieland's 
works  as  early  as  1752  and  as  late  as  1812.  "  Deep  within  the 
sanctuary  of  our  soul  lies  the  fountain  of  love,  the  bent  towards 
the  good  and  beautiful."  The  feeling  of  the  beautiful  is  a 
peculiar  characteristic  of  man.  Even  the  most  barbarous 
people  always  seek  to  improve  and  to  beautify  their  condition. 
It  may  go  slowly  at  the  beginning,  but  the  "  bent  for  the  more 
beautiful  and  the  better"  {der  Tricb  sum  Schonern  und  Bessern) 
gradually  increases.  The  human  race  is  provided  by  nature 
with  everything  that  is  necessary  to  notice,  to  observe,  to  com- 
pare and  to  distinguish  things.  With  satisfactory  certainty  we 
always  know  what  is  beautiful  or  ugly,  right  or  wrong.  There 
is  no  folly  or  vice  the  incongruity  or  injuriousness  of  which 
cannot  at  once  be  detected.    There  is  "  in  our  breast  the  voice 

5*  See  p.  260. 

55  Ibid.,  p.  268. 

56  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  II,  6. 


64 

of  God,  which  gives  its  approval  when  we  act  justly  and 
nobly."" 

This  moral  sense,  or  sensus  communis,  or  good  taste,  is  a 
"  tester  "  (Priifer)  of  the  beautiful  and  noble.  It  is  a  readiness 
to  perceive  the  beauty  of  nature  and  art,  but  especially  the 
beauty  and  nobility  of  sentiments,  actions,  manners  and  char- 
acters. This  least  of  all  deceivable  feeling  for  the  true  and  the 
good,  this  inner  consciousness  of  the  just,  this  feeling  granted 
by  nature  to  all  men,  can  best  tell  us  how  to  act.^®  The  tender 
feeling  for  the  beautiful  and  perfect  is  the  foundation  of  every- 
thing great  and  admirable  that  man  can  do,  the  genuine  mother 
of  heroism  and  virtue.  As  a  result  of  luxury  there  ensues  a 
weakening  of  the  soul  or  a  "  dulness  of  the  inner  sense  for  true 
greatness."^® 

The  soul  which  has  developed  its  sense  for  the  true,  great 
and  beautiful  is  not  confined  to  the  pleasure  coming  merely 
from  indispensable  things;  it  also  enjoys,  for  instance,  the 
pleasure  of  knowledge  for  its  own  sake  and  other  noble  senti- 
ments. A  wise  and  virtuous  man  has  among  other  qualities  a 
spirit  that  is  sensitive  to  the  beautiful.  It  is  the  love  of  beauty 
on  the  part  of  his  people  that  forms  a  good  foundation  for  the 
wise  lawgiver,  Psammis,to  give  the  people  wise  laws  and  to  make 
them  happy  thereby.*'"  A  man  with  an  esthetic  sense  is  bound 
to  be  amiable;  such  a  man  is  Hermotimus,  the  friend  of  Leon- 
tion  and  Glycera.  And  so  Athens  is  the  foremost  city  in  the 
world,  because  it  is  the  chief  seat  of  the  arts  and  the  Muses  and 
possesses  the  "  finest  sense  for  all  that  is  beautiful  and  great."^^ 
The  Greeks  were  able  to  attain  such  a  high  stage  of  culture,  be- 
cause they  realized  how  closely  sound  reason,  regularity  of 

57"  Anti-Ovid,"  2d  Canto,  lines  1-2,  Gruber,  II,  18.  "  Aristipp,"  Part  I, 
Goschen,  XXII,  394.     "  Danischmend  "  (1775),  Goschen,  IX,  60-1,  239. 

58 "  Cyrus "  (1759),  3d  Canto,  line  73,  Gruber,  IV,  67.  "Plan  einer 
Akademie,"  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,  140.  "  Agathon,"  Part  III, 
Goschen,  VI,  169. 

59  "  Araspes  und  Panthea,"  Goschen,  XXVII,  51.  "  Uber  die  vorgebliche 
Abnahme  des  menschlichen   Geschlechts  "    (1777),   Goschen,  XXIX,   327. 

60"Uber  weibliche  Bildung "  (1785),  Hempel,  XXXV,  235.  "  Ausge- 
wahlte  Briefe,"  I,  296,  to  Zimmermann,  Oct.  18,  1758.  "  Der  goldne 
Spiegel,"  Part  I,  Goschen,  VII,  66. 

61 "  Menander  und  Glycerion,"  Hempel,  X,  65-6.  "  Aristipp,"  Part  II, 
Goschen,  XXIII,  362. 


65 

temper  and  politeness  of  manners  were  connected  with  good 
taste,  or  that  fine  capacity  to  perceive  by  an  inner  sense  the 
harmonious  and  beautiful.  Before  young  people  are  taught 
any  system  of  morality  their  moral  sense  should  be  developed 
and  sharpened.  It  is  necessary  that  the  teacher  himself  should 
possess  the  "moral-sense"  (Wieland  employs  this  Enghsh 
term)  in  a  high  degree. ^^ 

And  so  this  esthetic  and  moral  sense  comes  to  stand  for 
everything  that  is  noble  and  uplifting,  while  that  which  is  in- 
human and  unrefined  is  described  as  a  transgression  against 
this  sense.  Herder's  "  Adrastea,"  we  read,  is  such  an  admir- 
able book  that  it  should  be  in  the  hands  of  all  those  that  have 
the  "sense  for  the  true  and  beautifully-good"  (das  Schon- 
Giite).  The  treachery  committed  by  Helena  against  the  King 
of  Faros  is  described  as  an  act  offensive  to  our  moral-esthetic 
sense  (der  moralische  Schonheitssinn) .  The  priest  Strobylus 
of  Abdera  is  represented  as  a  shallow  and  uncouth  man,  in 
brief,  as  a  man  without  an  esthetic  sense.  And  the  emperor 
Domitian  is  cruel  and  inhuman,  since  he  has  a  "Stumpfsinn  fiir 
alles  Schone  und  Gute."*'^ 

And  now  we  can  readily  understand  why  Wieland  empha- 
sizes more  or  less  the  esthetic-moral  sense  in  several  of  his 
characters.  Isaac  describes  his  friend  Abiasaf  as  being  his 
equal  as  far  as  the  taste  for  beauty  is  concerned.®*  Cyrus  has 
a  natural  propensity  for  the  good  and  beautiful,  an  inborn 

62  "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,  111-12,  141-2. 

^3  Neuer  Teutscher  Merkiir,  April,  1802,  p.  zyy.  Neues  Attisches  Mu- 
seum, 112,  74.  "Abderiten"  (1781),  Goschen,  XIV,  33.  "  Agathodamon  " 
(1799),  Hempel,  XXIII,   147. 

64  "Die  Priifung  Abrahams"  (1753),  2d  Canto,  lines  210-2,  Gruber,  III, 
SO.  One  of  the  most  important  qualities  of  Madame  de  Stael  appears  to 
Wieland  under  the  form  of  susceptibility  to  the  true  and  beautiful  (letter 
to  his  daughter,  Sophie  Reinhold,  Jan.  16,  1804;  see  "Wieland  und  Rein- 
hold,"  by  R.  Keil,  p.  267).  March  12,  1772,  he  compliments  his  friend  Ring 
on  his  love  of  the  good  and  the  beautiful.  (Heinrich  Funck:  "  Beitrage 
zur  Wieland-Biographie,  aus  ungedruckten  Papieren,"  Freiburg  and  Tiibin- 
gen,  1882,  p.  16.)  Still  earlier,  Dec.  12,  1753,  he  writes  to  Sophie  that  her 
new  union  (with  La  Roche)  will  not  take  away  the  gentle  sympathy  exist- 
ing between  their  souls,  the  sympathy  which  is  grounded  in  the  true  love 
of  the  good  and  beautiful.  (Gruber,  "  Wieland's  Leben,"  Gruber  edition, 
L,  170). 

6 


66 

feeling  of  what  is  right  and  noble.  The  image  of  beauty  and 
order  which  nature  has  impressed  upon  his  soul,  is  the  only  law 
to  which  he  subjects  himself. "^"^  Peregrinus  Proteus'  love  of 
beauty  is  as  characteristic  of  his  nature  as  breathing  is  of  his 
lungs.  Menander's  comedies  surpass  those  of  his  contem- 
poraries on  account  of  his  innate  love  of  beauty,  which  is  trans- 
mitted to  his  work.  When  Narcissus  and  Narcissa  are  brought 
together,  the  latter  'becomes  aware  of  her  sense  of  beauty  and 
goodness,  the  sense  which  has  hitherto  slumbered  or  was 
blunted  by  vanity  and  selfishness.""  We  have  it  emphasized 
again  and  again  that  Cicero  had  a  fine  esthetic-moral  sense 
{Sinn  fiir  das  SittUchschdne) ,  and  we  are  told  that  Socrates 
had  an  esthetic  sense  because  his  wisdom  was  of  the  highest 
kind.""  Eros,  Aristippus'  friend,  is  swayed  by  an  irresistible 
impulse  toward  the  good  and  the  beautiful,  and  he  finds  no  rest' 
until,  united  with  the  good  and  beautiful,  he  produces  noble 
sentiments  and  deeds.  Aristippus  himself  possesses  such  an 
esthetic-moral  sense."^  Dion,  with  whom  Agathon  comes  in 
contact  in  Syracuse,  has  a  character  that  delights  the  moral 
sense.  Agathon,  Wieland's  chief  hero,  is  a  man  with  a  fine 
moral  sense.  Sensitive  as  his  eyes  are,  they  are  not  more  so 
than  his  moral  sense,  and  an  object  which  offends  the  latter 
cannot  impress  the  former  favorably.  There  are  many  things 
in  Hippias'  home  that  offend  his  moral  sense.  He  belongs 
to  the  class  of  lovers  who  'by  the  fineness  of  their  feeling  are 
capable  of  judging  of  the  physical  pleasures  of  love  and  by 
their  inner  esthetic-moral  sense  {inner e  Sinn  fiir  das  sittliche 
Schone)  are  competent  to  judge  of  the  moral  pleasures  of  love,"^ 
In  Shaftesbury's  manner  Wieland  then  elaborates  the  bene- 
ficial effect  of  the  love  of  beauty.    The  lover  of  beauty  is  him- 

65  "Agathon,"  Part  III,  Goschen,  VI,  263.  "  Araspes  und  Panthea," 
Ibid.,  XXVII,   112. 

66  "  Peregrinus  Proteus,"  Hempel,  XXI,  48.  "  Menander  und  Glycerion," 
ibid.,  X,  24.     "Das   Hexameron  von   Rosenhain "   (1805),   ibid.,   XIII,   35. 

6'^ "  Ciceros  sammtliche  Briefe,  iibersetzt  und  erlautert  von  Wieland " 
(in  7  volumes;  the  last  two  volumes  by  Grater),  IV,  (1811),  introduction, 
p.  xxii;  V  (1812),  530  and  533.  "Versuch  iiber  das  Xenofontische  Gast- 
mahl,"  Attisches  Museum,  IV2,    117. 

68  "  Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXIII,  273  and  6. 

69  "  Agathon,"  Goschen,  V,  195;  IV,  79,  60,  204. 


67 

self  beautiful,  for  the  object  of  his  love  transmits  its  splendor  to 
him.  When  your  soul  is  filled  with  ideals  of  beauty  and  per- 
fection, you  look  down  with  inner  rest  and  freedom  upon 
human  evil  passions ;  and  while  others  try  to  satisfy  their  in- 
satiable hunger  by  animal  indulgence,  you  feed  on  the  pure 
ambrosia  of  the  gods,  on  beauty,  harmony  and  perfection.  A 
man  with  a  natural  disposition  for  the  noble  and  beautiful  is 
easily  convinced  that  the  entire  universe  is  to  be  considered  as 
a  single  state,  and  the  whole  human  race  as  one  large  family 
in  this  City  of  God,  which  is  ruled  by  the  eternal  laws  of  nature 
and  reason;  that  in  accordance  with  this  order  grounded  in  the 
nature  of  things  men  cannot  enjoy  any  welfare,  unless  they  are 
governed  by  the  same  natural  and  rational  laws  which  keep  the 
entire  universe  in  eternal  order.'^*'  It  is  by  virtue  of  the  love  of 
beauty  that  man  is  able  to  be  what  he  actually  is.  Without  the 
love  of  beauty,  without  the  sympathetic  afifections,  man  would 
have  nothing  else  to  do  but  to  eat  and  sleep  and  propagate  his 
species,  like  every  other  animal.  He  would  be  nothing  else 
but  the  king  of  the  apes,  and  even  this  privilege  would  be  dis- 
puted by  a  stronger  and  more  courageous  animal."^^ 

Owing,  however,  to  the  superiority  of  human  nature  to  that 
of  the  lower  animals,  man  is  endowed  with  a  taste  for  harmony, 
beauty  and  charm;  hence  the  greater  his  love  of  beauty,  the 
more  perfect  man  is,  the  more  like  himself.  Man  enjoys  pure 
pleasure  in  the  contemplation  of  beauty,  which  in  this  respect 
is  like  unto  the  contemplation  of  virtue;  both  are  just  as  much 
a  necessity  for  man's  spiritual  nature  as  food  for  his  animal 
part.  Through  the  power  of  detecting  the  rule  of  the  beautiful 
and  pleasant  man  is  enabled  to  extend  almost  to  the  infinite  the 
bounds  of  his  pleasure.  All  arts  and  sciences  owe  their  growth 
and  development  to  man's  innate  love  of  beauty  and  perfection, 
which  makes  him  the  master  over  the  lower  animals,  subjects 
to  him  the  earth  and  sea,  and  finally  enables  him  to  transform 
nature  and  to  create  a  new  world  for  himself.  He  ennobles 
his  physical  needs  and  impulses,  which  he  has  in  common  with 

70 "  Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXIII,  281;  "  Peregrinus  Proteus,"  Hempel, 
XXI,  62.     "  Agathodamon  "  (1799),  ibid.,  XXII,  142. 

7i"Koxkox  und  Kikequetzel  "   (1770),  ibid.,  XXXI,  47-8. 


68 

the  lower  animals.  He  invents  art  after  art,  which  contribute 
to  the  security  and  enjoyment  of  his  existence;  and  thus  he 
rises  incessantly  from  the  indispensable  to  the  comfortable,  and 
from  the  comfortable  to  the  beautiful.  After  attending  to  his 
first  needs  he  strives  to  beautify  his  condition,  and  thus  villages 
are  changed  to  large  cities,  places  of  art  and  commerce,  inter- 
national centers  and  the  like.  In  the  same  proportion  as  he 
improves  and  beautifies  his  outward  condition  he  also  develops 
his  feeling  for  moral  beauty,  submits  to  laws  of  justice  and 
equity,  checks  his  shortcomings,  controls  his  passions  and 
shows  his  better  side.  "  Through  all  these  he  finally  rises  to 
the  highest  possible  perfection  of  his  spirit,  to  the  great  con- 
ception (Begriff)  of  the  whole  of  which  he  is  a  part,  to  the 
ideal  of  the  good  and  beautiful,  to  wisdom  and  virtue,  and  to 
the  worship  of  the  inscrutable  primitive  power  of  nature,  the 
common  father  of  spirits,  the  recognition  and  observance  of 
whose  laws  is  at  once  their  greatest  prerogative,  foremost  duty 
and  purest  pleasure. "'^^ 

Closely  connected  with  all  this  is  the  ideal  of  esthetic  culture 
advocated  both  by  Shaftesbury  and  Wieland.  A  beautiful 
dbject,  says  Aristippus- Wieland,  bestows  its  beauty  upon  the 
contemplator  and  lover  of  it.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  that 
everything  seen  and  heard  by  us  from  our  childhood  on  should 
be  beautiful.  We  should  accustom  our  eyes  to  the  beauty  of 
nature  and  out  of  her  manifold  beautiful  forms  fill  our  mind 
(Phantasie)  with  ideas  of  beauty.  The  ear  should  be  accus- 
tomed to  gentle  melodies,  such  as  breathe  beautiful  feelings, 
gently  agitate  the  heart  and  rock  the  slumbering  soul  into  sweet 
dreams.''^ 

The  close  connection  between  virtue  and  art,  to  which 
Shaftesbury  so  frequently  calls  attention,  is  again  and  again 
emphasized  by  Wieland.  The  fine  arts,  he  says,  should  be  the 
"  playmates  and  handmaids  of  truth  and  virtue."    They  encour- 

■^2 "  Platonische  Betrachtungen  iiber  den  Menschen "  (1754),  Goschen, 
XXIX,  105.  "  Uber  das  Verhaltnis  des  Angenehmen  und  Schonen  zum 
Niitzlichen  "   (1775),  Hempel,  XXXII,  36-9. 

T3 "  Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXIII,  281.  "  Abderiten,"  Goschen,  XIII,  14. 
"  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VII,  74  and  75. 


69 

age  virtue  and  beautify  life  and  manners.^*  In  consequence  of 
the  great  artistic  activity  during  the  reign  of  one  of  the  kings 
of  Scheschian,  the  feelings  and  morals  of  the  people  are  refined. 
The  people  become  gentler  and  more  sociable,  learn  to  enjoy 
contact  with  one  another,  to  participate  in  common  joys  and  to 
feel  all  the  happier,  the  greater  the  number  of  happy  folk  they 
see  round  about  them.  During  the  reign  of  Tifan  the  works 
of  the  Scheschian  artists  surpass  those  of  other  lands,  because 
in  their  artistic  work  they  unite  beauty  with  goodness. '^^  Art 
prevents  men  from  becoming  rough,  for  through  it  they  become 
acquainted  with  gentler,  finer  and  nobler  pleasures.  And  so 
the  Greeks  looked  upon  the  fine  arts  as  sources  of  decent  and 
modest  enjoyments  and  as  the  best  means  of  rendering  the 
mind  and  heart  tender  and  tractable ;  so  a  man  who  was  not  a 
favorite  or  connoisseur  of  the  muses  was  considered  by  them 
rough  and  uncouth.'^®  Agathon's  early  experience  in  Delphi 
impresses  upon  him  the  idea  how  greatly  the  fine  arts  con- 
tribute to  the  development  of  the  moral  man  and  how  wise  the 
priests  were  to  have  deified  the  Muses  and  Graces,  whose 
favorites  have  rendered  the  Greeks  such  great  services.  Also, 
later  on,  after  a  long  experience  in  life,  Agathon  is  convinced 
that,  when  directed  by  wisdom,  the  arts  beautify,  cultivate  and 
ennoble  man ;  that  art  is  half  of  human  nature,  and  that  without 
it  man  is  the  most  wretched  of  animals.'^'^ 

The  poet  is  also  called  upon  to  work  in  the  same  direction, 
and  Wieland  makes  of  him  exactly  the  same  demands  as 
Shaftesbury.  The  muses,  we  are  told,  are  never  more  beauti- 
ful than  when  they  are  in  the  service  of  virtue.  The  purpose 
of  poetry  is  to  portray  virtue  in  all  its  beauty;  to  relate  divine 
deeds;  to  inspire  man  with  a  taste  for  the  noble,  great  and 
sublime;  to  lure  the  spirit  away  from  sensual  things  and  to 
accustom  it  to  heavenly  things.'^®    The  poet  himself  should  have 

74  "  Theages,"  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  I,  163.  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel," 
Goschen,  VIII,  215.  "Cyrus,"  4th  Canto,  lines  74-5,  Gruber,  IV,  99. 
"Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXIII,  340. 

75  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VII,  44  and  VIII,  190. 

76  "  Danischmend  "  (1775),  Goschen,  IX,  loi.  "Plan  einer  Akademie," 
in  "Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,   iii. 

77  "  Agathon,"  Goschen,  V,  5  and  VI,  329. 

78 "  Sympathien,"   Goschen,  XXIX,  26.     "  Theages,"  ibid.,  XXXIII,  222. 


70 

a  love  of  the  beautiful  and  sublime,  abhor  every  evil  act, 
admire  every  noble  deed,  possess  a  sociable  attitude  and  a 
"  zartlichste  Lebhaftigkeit  der  sympathetischen  Neigungen." 
Instead  of  pleasing  the  reader  for  just  a  short  time  the  poet 
must  captivate  the  reader's  whole  soul,  set  into  play  all  his  feel- 
ings, enchant  his  imagination  and  "  furnish  his  heart  with  the 
sweet  enjoyment  of  his  best  sentiments,  of  his  moral  sense,  his 
feeling  for  the  joys  and  sorrows  of  others  and  his  admiration 
for  everything  that  is  noble,  beautiful  and  great  in  humanity."^^ 

And  life  in  general  is  conceived  as  an  art  both  by  Shaftes- 
bury and  Wieland.  Wieland  regrets  that  there  are  so  few  who 
apply  their  talent  to  the  art  of  living^  the  art,  which  he  de- 
scribes as  "  the  first,  the  most  necessary,  the  most  beautiful  of 
all  arts."^°  "  The  wise  man,  he  writes  to  Zimmermann,  culti- 
vates all  his  inner  and  outer  senses,  exercises  all  his  faculties, 
enjoys  the  whole  of  nature;  he  alone  knows  truly  the  art  of 
living."^'^  And  his  Aristippus  strives  to  make  great  progress 
"  in  der  Kunst  zu  leben."^- 

Aside  from  the  innate  love  of  beauty  and  its  beneficial  effect, 
Wieland  also  develops  the  other  well-known  Shaftesburian 
doctrine,  /'.  e.,  that  virtue  is  natural  and  universal,  and  that  man 
is  by  nature  a  social  creature.  Since  God  made  our  souls 
susceptible  to  the  beautiful  and  sublime,  since  the  love  not  only 
of  material  but  also  of  moral  beauty  is  essential  to  our  nature, 
so  uprightness,  innocence,  faithfulness,  gratitude,  magnanimity, 
patience,  courage,  and  other  virtues  inspire  us  with  esteem  and 
love,  wherever,  whenever  and  in  whomsoever  they  are  ob- 
served, regardless  of  all  utility  they  have  or  might  have  for  us. 
Our  own  ego  comes  so  little  into  consideration,  that  if  we  were 
told  of  a  virtuous  deed  performed  ten  thousand  years  ago  by  a 
man  in  the  moon,  the  idea  of  that  deed  would  impress  us  just 
as  much  as  if  it  had  been  performed  in  our  midst  only  a  few 
days  ago.     And  so  Agathon,  as  a  result  of  his  extensive  travels, 

79  "  Sendschreiben  an  einen  jungen  Dichter  "  (1782),  Goschen,  XXXIII, 
270,  289. 

80  " Sympathien,"  ibid.,  XXIX,  57;  "Die  Ziiricher  Abschiedsrede"  (1759)  ; 
Vierteljahrschrift  fiir  Literaturgeschichte,   1889,  II,  587. 

81  Letter  of  March  12,  1758:  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  260. 
82"Aristipp,"  Part  I,  Goschen,  XXII,  276. 


71 

comes  to  the  conclusion  that  virtue  is  honored  by  all  peoples, 
the  wildest  barbarians  as  well  as  the  cultured  and  refined 
Greeks,  and  that  no  community,  were  it  even  a  group  of  Arabian 
robbers,  can  exist  without  some  degree  of  virtue.^^ 

We  have  it  emphasized,  therefore,  that  man  is  by  nature 
social.  It  is  wrong,  Wieland  claims  with  Shaftesbury,  to  base 
the  social  order  upon  the  notion  of  a  contract,  for  the  social 
order  is  a  law  which  is  grounded  in  human  nature  and  condi- 
tions man's  whole  progress  and  development.  Since  sociability 
is  instinctive  in  man,  there  is  no  truth  in  Rousseau's  doctrine 
that  the  present  state  of  society  is  a  state  into  which  men  have 
passed  from  an  opposite  state,  i.  e.,  the  state  of  nature.  Even 
in  the  state  of  nature  man  is  a  social  creature,  and  so  our 
modern  society  is  not  the  result  of  a  transition  from  one  state 
to  its  opposite,  but  a  mere  continuance  of  the  same  state.^* 
Only  as  a  member  of  society  man  is  in  his  natural  position; 
without  society  he  is  out  of  place.  Agathon,  therefore,  on 
fleeing  from  Athens,  decides  to  seek  only  a  place  where  a 
virtuous  man  should  enjoy  the  happiness  belonging  to  him, 
while  staying  in  the  midst  of  society.  Alcestis,  who  on  account 
of  his  disgust  with  mankind  decides  to  retire  into  seclusion,  is 
ridiculed  and  warned  that  in  so  far  as  he  will  have  nobody  to 
whom  he  may  communicate  his  observations,  nobody  to  ap- 
prove of  his  actions  or  to  love  him,  he  will  soon  grow  weary 
of  his  hermit-life.  And  Brother  Lutz,  the  hermit,  loses  very 
much  in  consequence  of  his  hermit-life.  The  high-steward 
{Seneschal),  in  the  very  midst  of  society,  lives  a  much  more 
virtuous  life  than  the  hermit  in  his  seclusion;  such  is  the  fatal 
effect  of  withdrawing  from  society.^^  This  entire  doctrine  of 
the  naturalness  of  man's  virtue  and  sociability  can  best  be  sum- 
marized in  the  following  words  of  Wieland:  From  our  general 
experience,  from  incontestable  evidence,  from  all  ends  of  the 

83 "  Sympathien,"  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  I,  105.  "  Aristipp," 
Goschen,  XXIII,  286,  loi.     "Agathon,"  Goschen,  VI,  327. 

84 "  Lustreise  ins  Elysium"  (1787),  Hempel,  XXXIII,  263.  "  Beitrage 
zur  geheimen  Geschichte  des  menschlichen  Verstandes  und  Herzens " 
(1770),  Leipzig  edition,  1770,  II,  42. 

85 "  Agathon,"  Goschen,  IV,  40.  "Sympathien,"  ibid.,  XXIX,  13-14. 
"Die  Wasserkufe  "  (1795),  ibid.,  XII,  99-100,  124-5. 


72 

earth,  we  have  the  truth  "  that  man  is  made  for  sociableness ; 
that  the  united  forces  of  superstition,  bart)arism  and  oppression 
have  ever  been  unable  to  destroy  this  costly  jewel  of  social 
virtue,  this  sympathy  which,  with  a  sweet  authority,  compels 
man  to  love  himself  in  other  men."^® 

3.     The  Inherent  Worth  of  Virtue 

Wieland  upholds  most  emphatically  the  well-known  Shaftes- 
burian  doctrine  that  virtue  has  its  own  peculiar  source ;  that  it 
has  an  inherent  worth  which  makes  it  independent  of  custom, 
vogue  and  even  religion.  Virtue,  says  Wieland,  may  some- 
times be  hindered,  it  may  become  dormant,  but  it  will  ultimately 
have  its  proper  course.  A  beautiful  soul  endowed  by  nature 
with  the  gentlest  sense  of  the  good  and  beautiful,  and  with  an 
innate  ease  in  the  practice  of  every  social  virtue,  may  by  un- 
favorable circumstances  be  hindered  in  its  development,  but  it 
can  never  cease  to  be  a  beautiful  soul.  Just  as  soon  as  the 
mist  is  dispelled  the  beautiful  soul  once  more  recognizes  the 
divinity  of  virtue.  The  love  of  virtue,  the  desire  to  model 
itself  after  the  divine  ideal  of  moral  beauty,  takes  possession 
of  all  its  proclivities  and  becomes  a  passion.®^ 

Shaftesbury  frequently  defends  his  doctrine  against  such 
philosophers  as  Hobbes  and  Locke  by  first  stating  their  point 
of  view  and  then  attacking  it.  Wieland  uses  the  same  method, 
for  he  also  condemns  or  refers  sarcastically  to  the  opposite 
doctrine.  Whence,  he  exclaims,  comes  this  reluctance  to  be- 
lieve that  one  can  do  good  for  its  own  sake;  that  friends  can 
love  each  other  without  being  influenced  by  any  other  consid- 
erations than  their  love  of  the  good  and  beautifulf^^  And  so 
the  wise  Kador  stands  up  for  the  cause  of  virtue  in  the  face  of 
the  opposition  from  those  who  assert  that  only  a  fool  believes 
in  virtue  as  such ;  that  virtue  has  no  intrinsic  worth ;  that  what 
people  call  virtue  consists  of  a  number  of  arbitrary  signs  which 
differ  in  the  various  lands;  that  inasmuch  as  each  land  puts  a 

86  Beitrage  zur  geheimen  Geschichte  des  menschlichen  Verstandes  und 
Herzens,"  I,  228. 

87"Agathon,"   Goschen,   VI,    188-9. 

88"Gedanken  tiber  eine  alte  Aufschrift "    (1772),   Herapel,  XXXII,   57, 


73 

different  stamp  upon  notions  of  virtue,  just  as  upon  its  coins, 
there  is  little  real  difference  betwen  the  pliant  European,  the 
haughty  Persian,  the  pious  Armenian  and  the  rude  Kamcha- 
dale.®^  Further  on  Danischmend''°  condemns  Eblis'  system  of 
philosophy.  Eblis  asserts  that  truth  varies  according  to  various 
views;  that  beauty  and  deformity  depend  upon  our  special 
temper,  mood  or  point  of  view ;  that  virtue  is  merely  an  arbi- 
trary agreement  on  the  part  of  some  pedantic  heads  to  inspire 
the  crowd  with  respect  and  confidence  by  means  of  some  arbi- 
trary semblance  of  justice  and  mangnanimity ;  that  there  always 
have  been  fools  who  endeavored  to  practice  the  virtue  preached 
by  those  pedants ;  that  he  must  be  a  threefold  fool  who  at  his 
own  expense  wishes  to  make  a  friend  happy  or  to  live  for 
others,  when  he  can  compel  others  to  live  for  him.  All  this  is  con- 
demned by  Danischmend  as  an  "  abscheuliche  Moral."''^  These 
protests  may  be  regarded  as  a  reflection  of  Shaftesbury's  oppo- 
sition to  Hobbes  and  Locke. 

Wieland's  adherence  to  Shaftesbury  is  in  this  connection 
funther  shown  by  his  opposition  to  Mandeville.  Mandeville's 
purpose  is,  as  he  himself  states,^-  to  set  himself  into  direct 
opposition  to  Shaftesbury.  His  philosophy,  therefore,  which 
from  beginning  to  end  is  grounded  in  pure  materialism  and 
drenched  in  outrageous  cynicism,  is  a  direct  attack  on  Shaftes- 
bury's doctrine.  Shaftesbury's  views,  Mandeville  declares, 
are  a  high  compliment  to  mankind;  but  they  are  inconsistent 
with  daily  experience,  for  man  is  by  nature  neither  social  nor 
virtuous.     Whatever  virtue  man  practices  originates  entirely 

S9"Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VIII,   16-18. 

90  Danischmend  is  the  adviser  of  Schach-Gebal  in  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel " 
and  the  hero  of  the  work:  "  Geschichte  des  weisen  Danischmende."  Just 
before  Wieland  came  to  Weimar  at  the  call  of  Duchess  Amalie  the  young 
prince,  Carl  August,  wrote  to  Wieland  (July  23,  1772)  expressing  his  joy 
that  the  latter  has  consented  to  come  to  the  ducal  home  as  philosopher  and 
"leib  Danischmende"  {Vierteljahrschrift  fi'ir  Literaturgesc  hie  hte,  edited  by 
B.  Seuffert,  1890,  III,  611.)  Also  among  his  friends  Wieland  was  called 
Danischmend  (M.  Koch :  "  Chr.  M.  Wieland  "  in  Allgemeine  Deutsche  Bio- 
graphie,  XLII,  415).  This  can  be  accounted  for  by  Wieland's  resemblance 
to  his  hero. 

91 "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VIII,  20-21. 

92  Mandeville :  "  Search  into  the  Nature  of  Society  "  (in  the  5th  edition, 
1729,  of  the  "  Fable  of  the  Bees  "),  I,  372. 


74 

from  self-interest  and  his  fondness  for  praise  and  flattery. 
Man  loves  company  for  his  own  sake  and  not  out  of  natural 
affection  for  mankind.  "  The  sociableness  of  man  arises  from 
the  multiplicity  of  his  desires  and  the  continual  opposition  he 
meets  with  in  his  endeavors  to  gratify  them."  Man  cannot 
always  detect  the  pulchrum  and  honestum  in  morality  and  na- 
ture, because  great  uncertainty  exists  in  the  works  of  nature 
and  in  the  moral  world.  Man  loves  and  hates  for  himself. 
"Every  individual  is  a  little  world  by  itself,"  and  his  own  hap- 
piness seems  to  be  the  whole  purpose  of  his  life."^ 

From  the  very  beginning,  Mandeville  claims,  we  are  taught 
to  be  hypocrites,  for  if  our  thoughts  were  laid  open  to  others 
we  should  be  unable  to  endure  one  another.  "  There  is  no 
difference  between  will  and  pleasure  in  one  sense,  and  every- 
where motion  made  in  spite  of  them  must  be  unnatural  and 
convulsive.  Since  then  action  is  so  confined  and  we  are  always 
forced  to  do  what  we  please,  and  at  the  same  time  our  thoughts 
are  free  and  uncontrolled,  it  is  impossible  we  could  be  sociable 
creatures  without  hypocrisy."^*  It  is  a  mistake,  he  asserts,  to 
consider  the  social  and  praiseworthy  qualities  of  man  as  bene- 
ficial to  the  public.  For  instance,  the  fewer  desires  a  man  has 
the  more  loved  he  is,  and  yet  the  lack  of  many  appetites  on  the 
part  of  the  individual  cannot  promote  the  wealth,  power,  and 
glory  of  a  nation.  We  need  the  "  sensual  courtier,"  the 
"  haughty  duchess,"  the  "  lavish  heir,"  and  the  "  covetous  vil- 
lain," in  order  to  have  the  great  variety  of  labor  and  to  pro- 
cure a  livelihood  for  the  vast  multiude  of  the  working  poor. 
Envy  and  avarice  keep  the  members  of  society  at  work;  pride, 
sensuality  and  sloth  promote  art  and  science.  Vice,  he  argues, 
is  necessary  for  the  prosperity  of  a  state,  and  only  fools  can 
believe  in  the  possibility  of  enjoying  the  charms  of  the  earth 
and  being  at  the  same  time  virtuous. ^^ 

Wieland's  attitude  to  this  greatest  opponent  of  Shaftesbury 
is  one  of  disapprobation.     He  refers  to  Mandeville  as  a  depre- 
ss Mandeville :  "Search  into  the  Nature  of  Society,"  I,  372  ff.,  376  ff., 
390  ff.,  396 ;  "  Inquiry  into  the  Origin  of  Moral  Virtue,"  I.  27  ff.     Also  4th 
dialogue  between  Horatio  and  Cleomenes,  II,  196. 

94  "  Search  into  the  Nature  of  Society,"  I,  401  ff. 

95  Ibid.,  409  ff.,  424  ff.     Also  "  Fable  of  the  Bees,"  I,  23-4. 


75 

ciator  of  mankind  and  speaks  of  him  as  one  who  certainly  has 
not  rendered  the  best  service  to  virtue  by  preaching  its  false- 
ness.^*^ The  conversion  of  everybody  to  genuine  Christianity 
viTould  according  to  Mandeville  be  detrimental  to  society;  for 
then  no  wars  would  be  waged,  manufacture  would  be  ruined, 
the  ship  industry  and  commerce  in  general  would  sufifer  very 
much.''"  Here  we  have  Wieland's  direct  attack  upon  the  main 
theme  of  the  "  Fable  of  the  Bees." 

To  a  certain  extent  Wieland  also  maintains  Shaftesbury's 
doctrine  concerning  virtue's  independence  of  religion,  but  like 
Shaftesbury  he  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  religion.^^  Even 
the  best  and  happiest  man  can  through  religious  belief  become 
still  better  and  happier.  Religion  promotes  morality,  but  it 
loses  its  effect  the  moment  manners  become  corrupt;  and  so 
'Agathon,  after  a  long  experience  in  life  and  as  a  result  of  ex- 
tensive travels,  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  individuals  as  well 
as  whole  peoples  may  sometimes  have  religion  without  virtue, 
but  that  when  they  are  already  virtuous  they  become  all  the 
better  through  religion.®^  According  to  this,  therefore,  virtue 
is  prior  to  religion,  and  the  latter  exerts  its  beneficial  influence 
only  when  the  former  is  already  on  hand. 

On  the  whole,  however,  Wieland  urges,  religion  grounded  in 
reason  is  a  moral  necessity  of  mankind.  It  is  so  deeply  rooted 
in  human  nature  that,  in  order  to  uproot  it,  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  uproot  human  nature  itself.  Such  religious  belief  is  not 
only  beneficial  but  to  a  certain  extent  indispensable,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  free  from  superstition  or  demonism  ;^°°  and  that  by  demon- 

96  "  An  Psyche,"  Teutscher  Merkur,  April,  1774,  p.  32.  "  Vorbericht  zum 
Anti-Cato,"  ibid.,  Aug.,   1773,  p.   119. 

9' "  Anna  Maria  von  Schurmann  "   (1777),  Hempel,  XXXV,  348-9. 

98  Unlike  Herder,  Lessing  considers  Shaftesbury  as  an  enemy  of  Chris- 
tianity and  objects  to  Wieland's  frequent  praise  of  the  Englishman.  He 
hopes  that  Wieland's  frequent  praise  of  Shaftesbury  will  be  taken  into 
consideration  by  the  theologians  before  they  become  interested  in  Wie- 
land's poetry.  Shaftesbury,  Lessing  adds,  is  the  "  most  dangerous  enemy  of 
Christianity,  because  he  is  the  finest."  See :  "  Briefe  die  neueste  Literatur 
betreffend."     12  Brief.     Lachmann-Muncker  edition,  VHI,  27. 

99  "  Gebrauch  der  Vernunft  in  Glaubenssachen  "  (1788),  Hempel,  XXXII, 
282.  "Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VIII,  215.  "Agathon,"  Goschen, 
VI,  328. 

100  "  Gebrauch  der  Vernunft  in  Glaubenssachen,"  p.  314. 


76 

ism  Wieland  means  exactly  the  same  as  Shaftesbury  Wieland 
himself  elsewhere  states.  The  idolatry,  he  says,  which  has 
affected  the  majority  of  the  human  race,  consists  of  what 
Shaftesbury  calls  demonism,  namely,  idolatrous  worship  of  a 
number  of  infernal  deities,  protective  spirits,  good  and  bad 
demons,  and  of  the  superstition  connected  with  the  images  of 
these  gods.^''^ 

In  connection  with  the  inherent  worth  of  virtue,  Shaftesbury 
advances  the  doctrine  that  virtue  should  be  conceived  as  a  real 
pleasure  and  not  as  a  matter  of  stern  duty  or  self-denial.  The 
practice  of  virtue  out  of  pure  natural  propensity  is  with 
Shaftesbury  the  height  of  morality ;  and  so  it  is  with  Wieland. 
Virtue,  he  says,  would  be  ever  so  much  more  lovable  if  instead 
of  being  forced  upon  us  as  a  matter  of  duty  it  were  to  be  prac- 
ticed out  of  voluntary  inclination.  It  is  very  important,  there- 
fore, that  one  should  easily  dispense  with  that  which  is  for- 
bidden by  duty.^^^  And  so  in  a  state  of  love,  when  we  have  a 
higher  sense  of  beauty,  a  loftier  stage  of  general  sympathy,  and 
more  than  a  usual  impulse  toward  the  sublime — in  such  a  state 
we  also  possess  a  stronger  impulse  to  practice  virtue. ^°^  The 
most  virtuous  man  has  not  only  a  fine  taste  for  beauty,  but  also 
a  noble  proclivity  to  virtue.  That  is  why  it  is  the  pleasure  of 
beautiful  souls  to  practice  virtue  joyfully,  "  aus  Neigung,  nicht 
aus  Pflicht."^°*  As  an  example  of  a  highly  desirable  class  of 
people  Danischmend  sets  up  those  that  have  no  temptations, 
that  are  incapable  of  doing  evil,  are  true  to  other  men  and  to 
nature,  feel  the  true  and  do  the  good  without  finding  any  diffi- 
culty in  all  this."^ 

Under  the  influence  of  Musarion,  Phanias  learns  the  "charm- 
ing philosophy"  which  dictates  the  practice  of  virtue  out  of 
natural  taste.    That  the  Scheschian  priests  under  the  reign  of 

101 "  Anmerkungen  iiber  A.  Dow's  Nachrichten  von  der  Religion  der 
B  ram  in  en  "  (1775),  Hempel,  XXXV,  50.  Shaftesbury's  conception  of  de- 
monism,  to  which  Wieland  alludes,  is  found  in  the  "  Characteristics,"  II,  11. 

102 "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VIII,  5.  "  Die  Wasserkufe," 
Goschen,  XII,    105. 

103  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"   Goschen,  VIII,  89. 

104  "  Betrachtungen  iiber  den  Menschen,"  ibid.,  XXIX,  118.  "  Traum  ein 
Leben  "  (1771),  ibid.,  Ill,  238. 

105  "  Danischmend,"  ibid.,  IX,  75. 


77 

Tifan  are  able  to  become  the  worthy  teachers  of  the  nation, 
patrons  of  good  manners  and  models  of  virtue,  is  due  among 
other  things  to  the  moral  charm  that  has  spread  itself  through 
their  lives  and  to  the  ease  and  readiness  with  which  they  ful- 
filled every  duty.^"®  Krates  has  a  very  noble  and  sublime 
character,  'because  it  is  his  earnest  purpose  to  bring  his  pro- 
pensities into  the  purest  harmony  with  duty.^*'^  Chariklea,  or 
the  former  Danae,  is  all  the  more  esteemed,  the  more  natural 
she  finds  virtue  and  the  fewer  the  sacrifices  she  seems  to  be 
bringing  to  it.  Aristippus,  with  whom  Agathon  comes  into 
contact  in  Syracuse,  is  a  lover  of  the  kind  of  virtue  the  prac- 
tice of  which  makes  him  happy  and  does  not  impose  upon  him 
any  stern  duties.  Archytas  recommends  very  highly  the 
Pythagorean  philosophy,  because  it  renders  every  virtue  easy 
and  natural.  And  Archytas  himself,  the  moment  he  perceives 
his  full  worth  as  a  human  being,  as  a  "  citizen  of  the  city  of 
God,"  finds  the  practice  of  every  virtue  easy.^°® 

4.     The  Relation  of  Beauty  and  Virtue  to  Harmony 

According  to  Shaftesbury  harmonious  coordination  of  parts 
into  one  whole  makes  for  beauty  in  the  outside  world,  while 
harmony  in  our  actions  and  sentiments  produces  that  inner 
beauty  for  which  morality  is  only  a  synonym.  This  doctrine 
is  also  reflected  in  Wieland.  Beauty,  he  says,  consists  of  the 
mutual  relation  of  the  various  parts  and  of  their  combination 
into  harmonious  unity  of  the  whole.  A  beautiful  object  pleases 
us  chiefly  because  of  the  harmony  of  all  its  parts  when  sur- 
veyed in  a  single  moment.  There  must  be  uniformity  amidst 
variety,  and  the  manifold  must  be  combined  through  harmony 
into  one  whole  by  the  total  impression  of  which  we  are  to  be 
pleased.  This  alone  produces  in  us  the  idea  of  beauty.  If, 
instead  of  seeing  but  fragments  of  a  boundless  whole,  we  could 
in  one  glance  survey  all  of  nature,  we  should  see  before  us  the 
true  archetype  of  all  beauty.     The  wonderful  and  the  divine 

106 "  Musarion "    (1768),    lines    1426-7,    1439-40,    Prohle    (in   "Deutsche 
National-Litteratur "),  I,  57.     "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VIII,   208. 
lOT  "  Krates  und  Hipparchia,"  Hempel,  X,  144. 
108 "  Agathon,"  Goschen,  VI,  325,   15,  321,  315-6. 


78 

in  nature,  that  by  which  she  is  so  far  superior  to  human  art, 
consists  of  the  fact  that  each  one  of  her  smallest  parts  contains 
a  world  full  of  harmonious  variety,  and  that  all  these  various 
parts  are  most  intimately  connected  into  a  single  uniform 
body.^°» 

Wieland  especially  emphasizes  the  close  connection  between 
virtue  and  harmony.  Without  virtue,  we  are  told,  there  is  no 
true  harmony;  even  the  love  of  God  is  nothing  else  than  the 
love  of  order.  In  his  vision  Mirza  sees  virtue  in  her  heavenly 
form  accompanied  by  a  most  beautiful  nymph  who,  as  his 
guide  tells  him,  is  none  other  than  Harmony,  the  sister  of 
Virtue.^^**  The  most  virtuous  men  are,  therefore,  endowed 
with  an  harmonious  disiposition,  and  this  harmony  must  be 
manifested  in  the  total  nature  of  man.^^^  Body  and  soul,  he 
claims,  must  always  be  in  perfect  harmony.  The  suppression 
of  the  physical  side  of  man  is  inconsistent  with  human  nature.^^^ 
So  Dioclea  points  out  to  Peregrinus  Proteus  how  unnecessary 
and  unnatural  this  suppression  is.  The  senses,  she  emphasizes, 
are  not  to  be  destroyed  but  ennobled,  refined  and  harmonized 
with  the  spiritual  nature  of  man.^^^  If,  instead  of  living  in 
mutual  harmony,  body  and  soul  ever  come  to  be  treated  as  two 
distinct  forces  of  different  interests,  fatal  results  are  bound  to 
ensue.  Man  is  then  no  longer  the  noble  creature  which  he  is 
intended  to  be,  for  he  then  separates  that  which  God  has  joined 
together,  and  there  arises  in  him  an  unnatural  conflict  between 
animal  and  spirit,  each  one  asserting  its  right  at  the  expense  of 
the  other.^^*  Archytas  describes  the  establishing  of  a  com- 
plete harmony  between  these  two  natures  as  the  highest  per- 
fection of  humanity.^^^ 

The  same  harmony  should  also  exist  between  the  moral  and 
intellectual  natures.     The  dissonance  between  the  heart  and 

109  «  Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXIII,  79,  97-100. 

110  "  Sympathien,"  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  I,  7,  109.  "  Gesicht  des 
Mirza,"  Goschen,  XXIX,  72-3. 

Ill "  Betrachtungen  iiber  den  Menschen,"  ibid.,  XXIX,   118. 

112  "  Timoklea,"  ibid.,  XXXIII,  214.     "  Theages,"  ibid.,  p.  249. 

113  "  Peregrinus  Proteus,"  Hempel,  XXI,  83. 

114  "  Philosophie  als  Kunst  zu  leben  und  Heilkunst  der  Seele  betrachtet " 
(1754),  Hempel,  XXXII,  31-2. 

115  "  Agathon,"  Goschen,  VI,  307-8. 


79 

head,  Wieland  claims,  becomes  greater  and  more  dangerous 
the  longer  we  fail  to  examine  carefully  our  moral  notions  with 
the  view  of  establishing  harmony  between  the  parts  and  the 
whole.  First  of  all,  therefore,  Archytas  undertakes  to  bring 
Agathon's  head  into  permanent  accord  with  his  heart."*  A 
human  character,  asserts  Aristippus,  is  to  be  called  beautiful 
only  in  so  far  as  it  presents  a  completed  whole  in  harmony  with 
itself.  "  Das  Schonste  in  dieser  Art  ware  also  unstreitig  ein 
ganzes  Leben,  welches,  aus  lauter  schonen  Gesinnungen  und 
Thaten  zusammengesetzt,  uns  das  Anschauen  der  reinsten 
Harmonie  aller  Triebe  und  Fahigkeiten  eines  Menschen  zu 
Verfolgung  des  groszen  Zwecks  der  moglichsten  Selbestvered- 
lung  und  der  ausgebreitetsten  Mitteilung  gewahren  wiirde."^^^ 
Such  a  character  is  Archytas,  for  he  possesses  that  happy 
serene  temperament,  that  complete  harmony  of  all  human  facul- 
ties and  movements,  that  harmony  wherein  wisdom  and  virtue 
flow  together.^^^  Such  a  character  is  Musarion,  for  she  also  pos- 
sesses that  remarkable  equilibrium  between  the  spirit  and  the 
senses  and  holds  the  happy  medium  between  Platonism  and 
cynicism.  She  cautions  Phanias  against  mere  sensual  love  and 
declares  that  she  loves  him 

mit  diesem  sanften  Triebe, 
Der,  Zephyrn  gleich,  das  Herz  in  leichte  Wellen  setzt, 
Nie  Sturm  erregt,  nie  peinigt,  stets  ergotzt.^^^ 

Such  a  character  Agathon  strives  to  be.  At  first  he  lacks 
that  inner  harmony,  that  equilibrium,  for  he  cannot  attain  it  so 
long  as  he  leads  the  life  of  a  recluse  in  Delphi  and  is  sur- 
rounded by  a  mystic  and  Platonic  atmosphere.  Neither  can 
he  become  at  one  with  himself  in  consequence  of  his  contact 
with  Hippias'  materialistic  and  cynical  doctrines,  which  are 

ii6/&{cf.,  V,   174  and  VI,  284. 

117  "  Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXIII,   102. 

118  "Agathon,"  Goschen,  VI,  147.  To  a  certain  extent  Clarisse,  one  of 
the  heroines  in  "  das  Hexameron  von  Rosenhain,"  meets  the  requirements 
of  such  a  character.  She  is  an  enemy  of  exaggeration  and  "  Unnatur." 
She  enjoys  an  indestructible  inner  rest,  her  entire  nature  is  calm,  moderate 
and  in  harmony  with  itself,  Hempel,  XIII,  102. 

119  "  Musarion,"  lines  1197  ff.  (Prohle,  I,  51),  lines  1152-4  (p.  49). 


80 

almost  an  exact  parallel  of  Mandeville's  philosophy.  He  finally 
realizes  that  neither  idealistic  Platonism  nor  materialistic 
Hippias-Mandevillism  is  worthy  of  becoming  a  permanent 
guide  in  life;  that  the  truth  must  lie  somewhere  between  the 
two  extremes.  He  finds  this  truth  in  the  happy  harmony  of 
the  character  of  Archytas,  and  under  the  latter's  influence  he 
begins  to  become  the  Agathon  that  he  ought  to  be. 

And  such  a  character  Wieland  actually  was.  He  went 
through  the  same  development  as  his  Agathon,  and  in  the 
career  of  his  hero  he  portrays,  as  he  himself  says,^^**  his  own 
career.  Wieland  attains  the  ideal  of  inner  equilibrium  and 
thus  he  becomes  a  living  example  of  the  Shaftesburian  doctrine 
he  preaches. 

To  this  effect  we  have  above  all  the  testimony  of  his  contem- 
porary and  friend,  Goethe.  Goethe  was  deeply  impressed  by 
Wieland's  "  schonstes  Naturell  "^-^  and  recognized  him  as  a 
genuine  type  of  that  equilibrium  and  harmony  which  Goethe 
himself  considered  essential  to  genuine  wisdom.  "  Equanimity 
and  activity,"  he  says  of  Wieland,  "  were  so  beautifully  counter- 
balanced in  him;  and  so  with  the  greatest  tranquility  he  has 
exerted  an  infinitely  great  influence  upon  the  intellectual  devel- 
opment of  our  nation.  I  have  recapitulated  to  myself  his 
activity;  it  is  highly  remarkable  and  the  only  one  of  its  kind 
in  Germany."^^^ 

Further  testimony  to  the  same  effect  we  have  again  from 
Goethe  in  his  "Maskenzug"  of  1818.  Here  he  puts  into  the 
mouth  of  Musarion  the  following  verses,  which  contain  the 
essence  of  Wieland's  philosophy  of  harmony: 

Warum  das  Leben,  das  Lebendige  hassen? 
Beschaue  nur  in  mildem  Licht 
Das  Menschenwesen,  wiege  zwischen  Kalte 
Und  Uberspannung  dich  im  Gleichgewicht.^^' 

120  Letter  to  Zimmermann,  Jan.  s,  1762,  where  he  speaks  concerning  the 
project  of  the  novel.     "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  II,   164. 

121  "  Dichtung  und  Wahrheit,"  Book  7,  Hempel  edition,  XXI,  54. 

12-2  Letter  to  C.  F.  V.  Reinhard,  Jan.  25,  1813,  Weimar  edition,  "Briefe," 
XXIII,  268. 

123  Goethe's  "  Maskenzug "  (1S18),  lines  270-3,  Weimar  edition,  XVI, 
266. 


81 

And  Wieland's  harmonious  life,  which  is  a  true  realization  of 
his  teaching,  is  summarized  by  Goethe  as  follows : 

Wieland  hiesz  er !     Selbst  durchdrungen 
Von  dera  Wort  das  er  gegeben, 
War  sein  wohlgefiihrtes  Leben 
Still,  ein  Kreis  von  Maszigungen. 

Geistreich  schaut'  er  und  beweglich 
Immerfort  auf  s  reine  Ziel, 
Und  bei  ihm  vernahm  man  taglich: 
Nicht  zu  wenig,  nicht  zu  viel.^24 

124:  Ibid.,  lines  237-44  (P-  264-5). 


CHAPTER   IV 
Virtue,  Happiness  and  Culture 

I.     Virtue  and  Happiness.     Vice  and  Misery 

The  well-known  Shaftesburian  doctrine  that  virtue  is  self- 
rewarding  ;  that  happiness  is  its  natural  consequence ;  that  vice, 
on  the  contrary,  is  immediately  connected  with  misery;  that  by 
working  for  the  welfare  of  others  one  is  really  promoting  his 
own  interest, — all  this  finds  the  most  emphatic,  clearest,  and 
most  systematic  expression  in  his  "  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue 
and  Merit."  This  main  theme  of  Shaftesbury's  "  Inquiry  "  is 
very  clearly  reflected  in  Wieland's  works.  As  early  as  1756 
Wieland  expresses  his  enthusiasm  for  the  "  Inquiry,"  for  he 
then  recommends  it  as  "  eines  der  besten  und  scharf sinnigsten 
Systeme  der  Sitten-Lehre."^ 

Virtue,  we  are  told,  is  the  source  of  happiness,  the  mother  of 
the  purest  pleasure.  Virtue  always  attains  the  bliss  destined 
for  it,  the  practice  of  it  grants  us  new  pleasures  of  which  we 
may  well  be  proud.  Virtue  divinely  rewards  its  lovers  and 
converts  earth  into  heaven.  Happy  is  the  man  whose  heart  has 
in  his  early  youth  perceived  the  charm  of  wisdom  and  the 
power  of  virtue.^  Perfection  is  the  source  of  delight,  and  by 
an  infallible  contrivance  of  nature  the  human  race  keeps  on 
approaching  the  ideal  of  perfection  and  the  happiness  arising 
therefrom.  The  enjoyment  of  our  existence  is  strengthened  by 
"  everything  which  appears  under  the  friendly  form  of  the 
good  and  beautiful."^  It  is  a  misfortune  if,  out  of  timidity  or 
sloth,  one  fails  to  seek  his  entire  honor  and  happiness  in  virtue, 

1  "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,   136. 

2  "  Briefe  von  Verstorbenen,"  i  Brief,  lines  119-20;  2  Brief,  lines  216-18, 
368-9;  3  Brief,  lines  91-2  (Gruber,  II).  "  Moralische  Briefe,"  9  Brief, 
lines  1-2  (Gruber,  I). 

3 "  Moralische  Briefe,"  4  Brief,  line  52.  "  Das  Geheimnis  des  Kosmo- 
politen-Ordens  "  (1788),  Goschen,  XXX,  420.  "  Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXIV, 
118. 

82 


83 

which  is  the  only  thing  that  constitutes  human  perfection. 
Only  then  would  our  earth  be  what  it  ought  to  be  if,  true  to 
the  dignity  of  his  soul,  man  would  seek  his  happiness  in  virtue.* 
Virtue  strews  roses  upon  our  pathway;  and  so  Tifan  declares 
that  "  without  virtue  and  morals  no  happiness  is  possible."^ 

Convinced  of  the  same  truth,  Timoclea  desires  to  become 
through  the  help  of  Socrates  "as  good  and  beautiful  as  is 
necessary  to  be  capable  of  genuine  happiness."  But  before 
virtue  can  constitute  man's  highest  happiness  under  all  circum- 
stances it  must  control  the  whole  life  of  man  and  claim  all  his 
aims  and  eflforts.  Just  as  a  deformed  body  cannot  be  beautiful, 
even  if  beautiful  traits  are  scattered  here  and  there,  so  separate 
pieces  of  virtue  scattered  here  and  there  in  a  human  life  are  just 
like  splendid  patches  in  a  ragged  coat.  To  deserve  its  noble 
name  virtue  must  be  complete.'^  In  the  same  way  Shaftesbury 
argues  for  the  insufficiency  of  a  virtue  which  is  not  thorough 
and  absolute.  Partial  affections,  says  he,  are  inconstant. 
Partial  virtue  is  of  necessity  variable,  depends  upon  caprice 
and  humor  and  passes  frequently  from  love  to  hatred,  from 
inclination  to  aversion.  An  inclination  which  is  only  casual 
cannot  be  trusted,  an  affection  which  is  merely  accidental  and 
changeable  cannot  be  depended  upon.  In  consequence  of  the 
least  compromise  of  virtue,  it  is  quite  possible  for  a  person  to 
be  drawn  into  all  kinds  of  villainy,  such  as  he  at  first  dreaded 
to  think  of.'^ 

Wieland  carries  through  Shaftesbury's  distinction  between 
"  natural  affections  "  and  "  self -affections."  Upon  analyzing 
the  good  and  the  bad,  he  says,  we  always  find  the  former 
resolving  itself  into  pleasure,  and  the  latter  into  pain.  The 
sensual  joys  attracting  the  deluded  man  are  so  transient  and 
vain  that  they  always  disappoint  his  expectations.  Such  joys 
tire  out  even  the  most  sensual  person  and  teach  him  that  his 
soul  is  not  intended  to  feed  upon  the  same  material  with  the 

4 "  Timoklea,"  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,  197,  and  Goschen,  XXXIII, 
217. 

5  "  Combabus  "  (1770),  Goschen,  X,  92.  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen, 
VIII,  135- 

6  "  Timoklea,"  Goschen,  XXXIII,  207,  209,  216-17. 

7  "  Characteristics,"  II,   no  ff. 


84 

lower  animals.*  Without  moderation  even  the  most  natural 
desires  become  sources  of  pain;  through  excess  the  purest  joy 
becomes  a  poison.  Moderation  is  wisdom,  and  the  wise  man 
enjoys  to  the  full  the  cup  of  pure  delight,  which  nature  pours 
for  everybody.  The  wise  man  will  often  renounce  a  present 
pleasure  because  through  proper  abstainment  his  enjoyment  is 
ultimately  increased."  Lust  and  luxury  are  injurious.  Can 
any  one  actually  believe  that  a  lustful  judge  can  perform  his 
duties  conscientiously,  or  that  a  luxurious  general  can  lead  a 
successful  campaign?  The  proud,  the  greedy  and  the  cruel 
are  loved  by  no  one,  and  therefore  they  are  the  most  wretched. 
There  is  no  safety  for  any  one  who  robs  others  to  get  it,  and 
no  one  can  be  happy  who  is  indifferent  to  the  happiness  or 
misery  of  others.^*'  Very  many  physical  ills  are  produced,  nour- 
ished and  aggravated  by  a  wounded  heart  or  an  affected  mind. 
Genuine  happiness  should,  therefore,  be  sought  not  in  the 
pursuit  of  artificial  joys,  but  in  preserving  in  an  incorrupt  state 
"  die  groszte  der  Wohlthaten  der  Natur,  die  Empfindung."^^ 

Like  Shaftesbury,  Wieland  also  advocates  exercise  and 
activity  in  order  to  preserve  the  health  both  of  the  body  and 
soul.  Activity,  he  says,  keeps  up  our  taste  for  the  delights  of 
nature  and  our  ability  to  enjoy  them.  Nature's  immutable  law 
is  that  work  and  activity  should  be  the  condition  of  our  happi- 
ness and  the  means  of  maintaining  and  sweetening  our 
existence.^^ 

While  advocating  the  need  and  benefit  of  public  or  "  natural 
affection,"  Shaftesbury  also  warns  against  carrying  it  to  an 
excess  and  even  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  "  self-affection " 
in  a  moderate  degree.  Neither  does  Wieland  fail  to  call  atten- 
tion to  the  same  point.  He  recommends,  for  instance,  meek- 
ness as  one  of  the  highest  virtues,  but  he  warns  against  carry- 
ing this  virtue  to  an  extreme.  When  carried  to  an  extreme 
meekness  becomes  a  lack  of  courage,  a  failure  to  know  your 

8  "  Nachlasz  des  Diogenes  "  (1769),  Hempel,  XXIV,  75.  "  Empfindungen 
eines  Christen"  (1755),  Goschen,  XXVI,  224. 

9  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VII,  72. 

10  Ibid.,  89.     "  Danischmend,"  ibid.,  IX,  90. 

11  "  Danischmend,"  p.   18.     "Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,   65. 
^2  Ibid.,  64,  72-3. 


85 

abilities.  Humility  must  not  exclude  the  consciousness  of  our 
power  or  the  endeavor  to  reach  a  higher  stage  of  excellence. 
Likewise  modesty,  when  carried  to  an  extreme,  becomes  a  non- 
virtue,  which  is  all  the  more  to  be  censured,  because  it  is  not 
only  injurious  to  ourselves  but  prevents  us  also  from  rendering 
service  to  others.^^ 

Besides  "  natural  affections  "  and  "  self-affections  "  Shaftes- 
bury also  speaks  of  "  unnatural  affections,"  or  "  such  as  are 
neither  of  any  advantage  to  the  species  in  general  or  the  creature 
in  particular  " ;  such,  for  instance,  as  a  delight  in  the  distress  of 
others,  treachery,  ingratitude,  envy,  and  the  like.  Such  vices 
are  likewise  described  by  Wieland  as  "  unnatural."  Whoever 
finds  joy  in  the  sorrows  of  others,  or  fails  to  enjoy  the  happi- 
ness of  others,  is  a  monster,  an  "  unnatural  miscreant."  Faults 
are  frequently  found  in  excellent  persons  for  no  other  reason 
than  that  these  censurers  are  anxious  to  find  faults  and  look 
upon  them  through  the  magnifying  glass  of  jealousy.  It  has 
long  been  observed,  he  adds,  that  the  inferior  classes  rejoice 
in  the  misfortunes  of  the  great.  The  joy  in  the  discovery  of 
faults  in  others  also  comes  from  the  same  source,  namely,  envy, 
which  is  "  one  of  the  most  unnatural  passions  "  ;  for  what  does 
any  one  gain  by  depreciating  the  merits  and  excellences  of 
others  ?^* 

The  greatest  stress,  however,  is  laid  upon  "natural  affec- 
tions "  and  the  happiness  they  bring.  Nature,  we  are  told,  has 
supplied  man  with  the  requisite  means  of  becoming  healthy  and 
happy,  and  it  demands  of  us  to  enjoy  life.  The  Supreme 
Being  wishes  us  to  be  happy,  and  makes  our  happiness  de- 
pend upon  the  harmony  and  moderation  of  our  various  natural 
bents.  Joy  is  the  supreme  wish  of  man  and  is  of  the  same  im- 
portance to  him  as  air  and  sunshine  to  plants.  It  must,  how- 
ever, be  borne  in  mind  that  the  richest  and  purest  sources 
of  joy  are  love  and  benevolence.  Through  multiplied  socia- 
bility the  sphere  of  man's  pleasures  is  enlarged  and  his  capacity 
to  enjoy  life  increased.    The  greatest  pleasure  is  the  conscious- 

13  "  Sympathien,"  Goschen,  XXIX,  46-7.  "  Reflexionen  "  (about  1800), 
Hempel,  XXXII,  570. 

14  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VII,  72.  "  Gedanken  iiber  eine  alte 
Aufschrift"  (1772),  Hempel,  XXXII,  56-7. 


86 

ness  of  a  well-employed  life.^°  Wholesome  in  mind  and  tem- 
perament, says  Diogenes  to  his  friend  Bacchides,  how  can  I 
fail  to  be  happy?  Is  not  all  nature  mine,  in  so  far  as  I  enjoy  it? 
What  a  source  of  enjoyment  lies  merely  in  the  "  sympathetic 
feelings !  "^° 

Love  is  the  soul  of  life  and  the  source  of  the  most  beautiful 
inspiration.  When  you  are  filled  with  love,  joy  and  innocence, 
each  one  of  your  movements,  the  tone  of  your  voice  and  your 
very  speech,  become  musical.  Love  establishes  a  sort  of  im- 
mediate connection  between  the  soul  and  everything  that  is 
divine."  God  has  combined  with  the  highest  pleasure  the  senti- 
ments which  further  the  great  end  of  man's  existence.  With 
the  extension  of  our  knowledge,  with  the  proper  use  of  our 
faculties  and  with  every  virtuous  deed,  He  has  combined  such 
a  sweet  and  lasting  joy  in  order  that  we  may  be  encouraged  in 
our  aspiration  to  perfection  and  be  brought  ever  nearer  to  it. 
Virtue  is  the  health  of  the  soul  and  to  such  an  extent  is  it  inter- 
woven with  our  happiness,  that  even  God  himself  is  unable  to 
render  anyone  happy  who  fails  to  subject  himself  to  the  divine 
laws.^^  In  reply  to  the  highly  materialistic  philosophy  of  Hip- 
pias,  Agathon  asserts  that  he  knows  pleasures  which  are 
superior  to  those  that  man  has  in  common  with  animals;  such 
pleasures  as  come,  for  instance,  from  promoting  the  welfare  of 
others.  So  also  at  the  close  of  his  career  Agathon  is  con- 
vinced that  the  more  wisdom  and  virtue  a  man  has,  the  happier 
he  is;  that  wisdom  and  virtue  are  always  the  right  measure 
both  of  public  and  private  happiness.^" 

Wieland  then  arrives  at  the  well-known  Shaftesburian  con- 
clusion, namely,  that  public  welfare  and  individual  interest  are 
identical.  The  two,  he  claims,  are  so  closely  interwoven  with 
each  other  that  it  is  impossible  to  separate  one  from  the  other 
without  destroying  both.     Love  is  the  admirable  instinct  ap- 

15  "Moral  der  Natur "  (1789),  Hempel,  XXXII,  151.  "  Der  goldne 
Spiegel,"  Goschen,  VII,  70,  45,  72- 

16  "  Nachlasz  des  Diogenes"  (1769),  Hempel,  XXIV,  63. 
IT  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,  75,  VIII,  89. 

i8"Koxkox  and  Kikequetzel  "  (1770),  Hempel,  XXXI,  22.     "  Timoklea," 
in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,  197  and  Goschen,  XXXIII,  217. 
19  "Agathon,"  Goschen,  IV,  127  and  VI,  329. 


87 

pointed  by  nature  as  the  moving-spring  of  private  and  general 
happiness.  Through  love  man  receives  the  noble  name  of 
husband  and  father ;  love  concentrates  his  sympathetic  inclina- 
tions upon  a  wife  and  children,  in  whom  his  own  Hfe  is  rejuve- 
nated and  multiplied.  No  man  can  ever  incur  any  injury  by 
helping  his  friend,  because  his  friend's  happiness  constitutes 
his  own  gain.  On  considering  the  wonderful  order,  in  which 
the  entire  universe  with  the  infinite  number  of  its  various  parts 
is  sustained,  we  come  to  the  conception  of  a  special  purpose  for 
every  particular  species,  and  of  a  general  purpose  for  the  entire 
system.  All  of  nature  unites  her  powers  to  sustain  the  exist- 
ence of  man,  but,  nevertheless,  man  must  force  nature's  serv- 
ices from  her.  Without  his  labor  and  diligence  the  earth  would 
soon  become  a  wilderness  to  him.  But  how  can  individual 
men  be  equal  to  such  a  task?  The  whole  species  must  be  united 
in  order  to  be  able  to  assert  its  mastery  over  the  earth ;  conse- 
quently, everybody  finds  his  individual  security  in  the  perfect 
and  happy  state  of  the  entire  species.-*'  Tlantlaquakapatli  de- 
clares a  similar  truth  when  he  says:  As  a  result  of  suppressing 
a  selfish  impulse,  in  consequence  of  drying  the  tears  of  an  un- 
fortunate person  or  restoring  joy  to  the  distressed  individual, 
I  feel  the  divine  flame  spreading  with  an  inexpressible  rapture 
through  my  entire  system,  and  I  am  convinced  that  no  other 
dehght  is  so  gratifying  as  the  delight  coming  from  the  per- 
formance of  a  noble  deed.-^ 

The  man  with  a  true  interest  in  his  fellow-men  naturally 
abhors  scenes  and  accounts  of  evil  and  corruption.  With 
eagerness  he  seeks  for  scenes  of  peace  and  innocence;  and  if 
he  does  not  find  them  in  the  historical  accounts  of  the  human 
race,  he  resorts  to  imaginative  worlds,  beautiful  ideals,  which, 
however,  are  real  to  him,  since  they  transport  him  into  a 
pleasant  dream  of  happiness.  And  he  is  inspired  with  the 
feeling  that,  whenever  it  is  a  question  of  how  long  we  have 
lived,  only  those  moments  are  to  be  taken  into  consideration 
during  which  we  have  been  wise  and  virtuous;  only  such 
moments  as  are  devoted  to  the  performance  of  noble  deeds,  to 

20"Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VIII,  87,  21,  91-2. 

21  "  Koxkox  und  Kikequetzel,"  Hempel,  XXXI,  22-23. 


88 

friendship,  love,  wise  enjoyment  of  pure  and  innocent  pleas- 
ures. So  Psammis,  the  wise  lawgiver,  urges  the  following  pre- 
cept upon  his  people :  "  Multiply  your  personality  by  accustom- 
ing yourself  to  love  in  every  man  the  image  of  your  own  nature. 
Relish  as  often  as  you  can  the  pure  divine  pleasure  of  making 
others  happy ;  and  thou,  unfortunate  one,  whose  heart  does  not 
begin  to  swell  at  the  mere  thought  of  this,  flee  thou  forever 
from  the  habitations  of  the  children  of  nature !  "^" 

As  usual,  Wieland  then  offers  several  specific  instances,  by 
which  the  doctrine  is  illustrated.  Thus  we  are  told  of  a  cer- 
tain troglodyte  race  nearly  all  of  which  perishes  on  account  of 
selfishness  and  base  disregard  for  each  other's  needs.  The  few 
that  remain  start  a  new  epoch  in  the  history  of  their  people, 
for  they  begin  to  realize  that  their  individual  happiness  be- 
comes all  the  greater  by  considering  the  good  fortune  of  others 
as  an  increase  of  their  own,  and  by  contributing  their  own  to 
the  common  welfare;  that  in  order  to  prosper,  love  and  benevo- 
lence must  be  the  dominating  impulses  of  their  souls,  and  that 
duty  must  at  the  same  time  be  the  source  of  their  happiness.-^ 
Perisadeh,  Danischmend's  wife,  feels  her  own  happiness  so 
closely  interwoven  with  that  of  her  husband  and  children,  that 
their  happiness  is  an  absolute  necessity  to  her.  And  the  happi- 
ness of  Danischmend  himself  depends  entirely  upon  the  purity 
of  morals  in  Jemal.  Danischmend  can  hate  no  man,  and  when- 
ever he  sees  anyone  committing  an  unworthy  act,  he  feels  just 
as  intense  a  pain  as  if  he  himself  committed  that  act.  It  is  to 
such  an  extent  that  he  identifies  the  welfare  of  others  with  his 
own  and  makes  the  cause  of  others  his  own  cause.^* 

2.     Culture  and  Character.    Philosophy  and  Life 

Although  man  is  endowed  with  a  moral  and  esthetic  nature, 
he  must,  nevertheless,  train  his  natural  abilities  and  develop 
the  faculties  granted  to  him  by  nature ;  culture,  therefore,  is  an 
absolute  necessity.  This  Shaftesburian  doctrine  is  also  empha- 
sized by  Wieland.     It  is  not  sufficient,  Wieland  argues,  to  have 

22  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,  204-5,  77- 

23  "  Geschichte  der  Troglodyten  "   (1790),  Hempel,  XXXV,  267. 
24 "  Danischmend,"  Goschen,  IX,  50,  14s,  186. 


89 

brought  with  us  to  the  world  the  necessary  instruments  by  which 
we  can  distinguish  between  the  beautiful  and  ugly,  the  right 
and  wrong.  These  instruments  must  be  polished  and  de- 
veloped.-^ The  esthetic  feeling  is  born  with  us,  but  it  remains 
dormant  until  it  is  gradually  awakened  by  science  and  knowl- 
edge. In  the  state  of  barbarism  a  people  lacks  the  enlighten- 
ment of  the  understanding  and  the  development  of  their  human 
faculties.-*^  Wieland  opposes  Rousseau's  attack  upon  culture 
and  his  advocacy  of  the  primitive  state.  Such  a  state,  Wieland 
declares,  is  very  undesirable,  because  it  can  never  give  rise  to 
great  men  such  as  Palladio,  Raphael,  Erasmus,  Galileo,  Cor- 
neille,  Metastasio,  Locke,  Montesquieu,  Newton,  Shaftesbury. 
And  who  is  so  ignorant  as  to  deny  the  great  advantages  brought 
by  these  men  to  whole  nations  and  in  the  course  of  time  to  the 
whole  world  ?^^ 

In  Shaftesbury's  manner  Wieland  then  declares  the  develop- 
ment of  human  character  to  be  the  only  criterion  of  true  cul- 
ture. Only  then  can  learning  be  considered  beneficial  when  it 
immediately  aims  to  render  us  wiser  and  more  virtuous.  This 
doctrine  comes  into  evidence  as  early  as  1753."^  We  boast 
nowadays,  he  says,  of  the  Newtons  and  Leibnizes,  and  yet  the 
benefit  brought  by  modern  science  is  very  insignificant.  Sciences 
should  enlighten  and  warm  the  soul,  and  their  failure  to  do  so 
is  due  to  our  present  school-methods  and  the  condition  of  our 
universities.  Ought  we  not  to  expect  our  youths  to  possess 
orderly  hearts,  fine  tastes  and  decent  manners?     We  should 

25  "  Gedanken  iiber  eine  alte  Aufschrift,"  Hempel,  XXXII,  51. 

26  Teutscher  Merkur,  Nov.,  1779,  p.  105;  April,  1774,  p.  104  (probably  by 
Wieland). 

27  "  Beitrage  zur  geheimen  Geschichte  des  menschlichen  Verstandes  und 
Herzens,"  II,  224. 

28  In  a  document  entitled :  "  Plan  einer  neuen  Art  von  Privat-Unter- 
weisung,"  printed  by  L.  Hirzel  in  Schnorrs  Archiv  fur  Literaturgeschichte, 
XI,  378-84.  The  document  is  here  dated  Feb.  12,  1754;  but  B.  Seuffert 
reports  of  an  older  separate  print  dating  from  the  year  1753.  After 
Haller's  return  to  Bern  (March,  1753),  the  first  print  was  sent  to  Haller 
and  others.  The  anonymity  which  Wieland  wished  to  keep  at  first  had  to 
be  given  up  in  April,  1753,  since  Heidegger,  the  burgomaster  of  Ziirich, 
had  then  divined  the  author  of  the  "  Plan."  See  Wieland's  letter  to 
Zimmermann,  Feb.  20,  1759:  "Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  337;  and  Schnorrs 
Archiv,  XI,  377,  384-5. 


90 

expect  our  youths  to  have  acquired  a  fine  taste  for  the  good  and 
beautiful,  which  to  the  great  discredit  of  our  present  morals  we 
miss  very  much.  Our  youths  should  have  a  predilection  for 
order  and  public  welfare.  The  notions  of  the  good  and  true 
are  perfectly  natural  to  man,  and  he  has  in  himself  the  seeds  of 
all  virtues.  These  seeds,  however,  are  to  be  developed  by  a 
wise  connoisseur  of  the  human  soul  by  means  of  questions, 
intercourse,  conversation  and  the  like.  "  In  the  case  of  every 
truth  taught,  I  shall  show  that  it  is  practical  or  of  moral  use." 
Among  the  best  subjects  to  be  taught  Wieland  considers  the 
science  of  harmony  and  fine  arts.  In  this  science  he  purposes 
to  teach  the  art  of  properly  harmonizing  the  lower  spiritual 
faculties  (untere  Seelenkrdfte),  the  art  of  bringing  the  imagi- 
nation into  order.  In  the  same  science  he  also  aims  to  develop 
the  sentiments  of  the  good  and  beautiful.  The  youths,  he  con- 
tinues, must  be  taught  to  feel  virtue  as  pleasant  and  vice  as 
unpleasant.  They  must  'be  taught  to  distinguish  properly  be- 
tween the  good  and  the  bad  by  means  of  the  mere  taste ;  and 
before  their  reason  reaches  its  maturity,  their  natural  pro- 
clivities must  be  placed  in  the  proper  relation  to  whatever 
things  are  to  be  loved  or  hated.  These  are  the  tasks  to  be 
accomplished  by  a  system  of  education;  in  fact,  this  is  the  only 
system  of  education  which  deserves  its  name  as  such.-'' 

Three  years  later  Wieland  emphasizes  the  same  thought  in 
his  "  Plan  einer  Akademie  zu  Bildung  des  Verstandes  und 
Herzens  junger  Leute."^"  Here  he  extols  the  Greek  system  of 
education  for  the  reason  that  it  meets  the  requisites  of  proper 
education.  The  object  of  the  Greeks,  says  Wieland,  was  to 
train  their  young  citizens  in  what  they  called  kalokagathia,  a 
word  by  which  they  understood  all  the  qualities  and  perfec- 
tions enabling  man  to  play  a  noble  part  in  life.  To  accomplish 
this  purpose,  which  is  alone  worthy  of  human  nature,  the 
Greek  youths  were  inspired  as  early  as  possible  with  the  taste 
for  the  good  and  beautiful.  It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that 
they  were  taught  Homer  and  the  other  poets  who  were  both 

29 "  Herrn  Wieland's  Plan  von  einer  neuen  Art  von  Privat-Unterwei- 
sung,"  Schnorrs  Archiv,  XI,  378  ff. 

30  The  genesis  of  the  work  is  discussed  at  length  by  Heinrich  Funck : 
"  Beitrage  zur  Wieland-Biographie,"  p.  5  ff. 


91 

the  teachers  and  philosophers  of  the  Greeks.  When  the  youths 
grew  older,  they  were  placed  in  company  and  under  guidance 
of  wise  men,  and  from  associating  with  these  men  they  learned 
what  is  noble  or  ignoble,  just  or  unjust,  wise  or  foolish,  what 
duties  are  required  of  us  by  religion,  human  society  and  the 
particular  state  in  which  we  live.  To  moral  and  social  phi- 
losophy the  fine  arts,  elocution  especially,  were  added.  In  brief 
the  Greeks  required  of  a  noble  and  well-bred  youth  to  become 
a  kalos  kai  agathos  or  "  a  virtuoso,  as  the  most  ingenious  and 
finest  of  all  modern  authors,  Shaftesbury,  expresses  it."  While 
a  great  general  or  speaker  was  not  common  even  among  the 
Greeks,  virtuosi  were  not  rare  among  them,  since  virtuosoship 
was  the  result  of  their  education.  Just  as  a  good  taste,  sensus 
commimiSj^^  noble  sentiments  and  fine  manners,  were  the 
natural  results  of  the  education  of  the  ancients,  so  pedantry, 
rusticity  and  "learned  stupidity"  are  the  regular  fruits  of  our 
present  system  of  education.  Whereas  the  Greek  system  was 
practical,  our  system  separates  the  head  from  the  heart.  It  is, 
therefore,  not  a  matter  of  surprise  that  a  Greek  youth  at  six- 
teen usually  excelled  in  dexterity  and  in  virtue,  while  among 
us  the  majority  of  students  are  at  sixteen  only  children  in 
understanding  and  barbarians  in  taste  and  manner  of  life.^- 

On  this  general  basis  Wieland  then  outlines  a  somewhat 
more  specific  plan,  which  from  beginning  to  end  reminds  us  of 
Shaftesbury.  It  is  above  all  necessary,  he  claims,  that  teachers 
should  not  be  pedants  and  that  the  youths  should  be  taught 
only  those  subjects  by  which  they  may  become  intelligent, 
ingenious,  noble-minded  and  virtuous.  It  should  be  empha- 
sized that  all  important  truths  were  given  to  us  in  order  to 
influence  our  lives  with  the  view  of  making  them  more  virtuous 
and  happier.  The  authors  especially  recommended  for  read- 
ing are  Euripides,  Homer,  Xenophon,  Isocrates,  Cicero,  Horace, 
Tacitus,  Demosthenes,  Caesar,  Virgil,  Pliny.  Among  the  books 
especially  recommended  for  study  is  "  Shaftesbury's  treatise  on 
virtue  as  one  of  the  best  and  most  clear-sighted  systems  of 
morality."     That  the  young  men  may  be  inspired  with  good 

31  Note  the  use  of  the   Shaftesburian  term. 

32  "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  102-4,  111-12, 


92 

taste,  their  attention  should  be  called  to  all  the  material  and 
spiritual  beauties  of  nature.  It  should  be  pointed  out  to  them 
that  every  creature  has  a  special  purpose  for  which  it  is  con- 
stituted in  a  certain  way;  that  the  beauty  and  perfection  of 
each  creature  arise  from  harmony  with  its  purpose,  and  that 
its  welfare  is  closely  connected  with  the  purpose  for  which  it  is 
intended;  that  everything  is  joined  to  everything  else;  that  for 
this  reason  there  is  admirable  order  in  the  universe.  In  such  a 
way  the  young  man  learns  the  basis  of  beauty  in  art  and 
acquires  a  philosophic  knowledge  of  nature.  Such  an  instruc- 
tion by  a  skillful  teacher  becomes  at  once  a  system  of  morality 
and  religion,  a  system  intended,  to  be  sure,  more  for  the  heart 
than  for  speculation,  but  for  this  very  reason  all  the  more 
profitable.  Fables,  accounts  of  virtuous  acts,  moral  pictures 
of  manners  and  characters,  are  best  fitted  to  develop  and  to 
sharpen  the  students'  moral  sense.  The  teacher  himself  should 
possess  a  well-developed  moral  sense.  He  must  refrain  from 
dry  treatises  and  abstract  investigations.  He  should  employ 
the  Aesopic  and  Socratic  systems,  which  procure  for  truth  the 
easiest  access  to  our  souls.^^ 

This  Shaftesburian  doctrine  is  further  elaborated  in  "  Der 
goldne  Spiegel"  (1772),  which  established  Wieland's  reputa- 
tion as  an  educator  and  was  also  the  occasion  of  his  call  to 
Weimar  as  tutor  of  the  princes.^^  Here,  for  instance,  the  edu- 
cation of  the  Scheschian  prince  Azor  is  directed  entirely  with  a 
view  of  cultivating  his  wit  and  refining  his  taste.  He  is,  there- 
fore, taught  only  those  arts  the  value  of  which  consists  of 
serving  as  ornaments  of  more  essential  perfections.  Educa- 
tion, Wieland  declares  further  on,  is  "die'wahre  Schopferin 
der  Sitten,"  for  its  purpose  is  to  develop  our  esthetic  feeling 
and  to  train  us  in  order  and  virtue.  Education  should  be  a 
matter  of  great  importance  to  the  state,  for  if  education  be 
brought  into  good  condition,  everything  else  will  take  care  of 
itself.  We  must  not,  to  be  sure,  despise  the  studies  which  have 
no  immediate  tendency  to  make  us  wiser  and  better,  but  of  such 

33 "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  III,  125,   128,   134-6,   140—2. 

34  Wieland's  call  to  Weimar  is  discussed  in  detail  by  B.  Seuffert  in  the 
Vierteljahrschrift  fiir  Literaturgeschichte  (edited  by  Seuffert),  1888,  I, 
342-435  :   "  Wielands  Berufung  nach  Weimar." 


93 

studies  very  little  should  be  taught.  Inasmuch  as  a  cultivated 
sense  of  beauty  and  goodness  is  an  essential  element  of  wisdom, 
special  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  development  of  a  fine 
taste.  The  school  must  have  a  close  connection  with  ordinary 
daily  life.  The  chief  aim  of  education  is  to  train  everybody 
in  the  virtues  of  social  and  political  life.^^ 

And  from  exactly  the  same  point  of  view  Wieland  treats 
philosophy.  As  to  Shaftesbury,  so  to  him,  philosophy  is  worth- 
less unless  applied  to  practical  life.  In  fact,  philosophy  is 
referred  to  as  the  "  Kunst  zu  leben."^^  Like  Shaftesbury,  he 
also  opposes  pedantry  and  scholasticism.  No  man,  he  declares, 
is  wise  unless  he  fulfills  the  purpose  for  which  he  is  intended. 
Men,  however,  frequently  miss  their  purpose.  Thus  a  poetic 
genius  destined  to  be  a  Pindar  becomes  an  Anacreon;  and  a 
man  intended  to  be  a  real  teacher  of  young  people  and  to  cure 
their  moral  defects  becomes  a  mere  pedant  and  stoops  to 
"  scholastic  subtleties  and  to  squabbles  over  problems  settled 
long  ago."^'^  The  close  connection  between  philosophy  and 
daily  life  is  emphasized  again  and  again.  Present  philosophers, 
he  declares,  merely  point  out  to  us  that  our  thoughts  and  acts 
are  wrong  and  that  our  mode  of  living  should  be  different  from 
what  it  is.  By  doing  this  they  merely  convince  the  sick  man 
of  his  sickness ;  the  important  point,  however,  is  to  restore  his 
health.^^  Their  sphere  of  activity  is  confined  to  very  narrow 
limits.  But  the  business  of  philosophers  is  to  fight  against 
abuses  of  a  "  von  der  Natur  abgelerntes  Verfahren,"  to  contend 
for  truth  and  worldly  wisdom.^® 

Like  Shaftesbury,  Wieland  finds  this  ideal  realized  among 
the  Greeks.  The  instruction  of  the  youths,  says  Wieland,  in 
the  duties  of  religion,  state  and  society  was  called  by  the  Greeks 
philosophy  and  was  considered  as  the  most  essential  part  of 
the  system  of  education.  Philosophy,  he  continues,  was  with 
the  Greeks  not  a  matter  of  speculation  but  of  bringing  up  vir- 

35  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,   109;  VIII,  215,  226,  216. 
36 "  Ciceros    sammtliche   Briefe,   ubersetzt  und    erlautert   von   Wieland," 
V   (Ziirich,    1812),  p.   137. 

37  "  Sympathien,"  Goschen,  XXIX,  50-2. 

38  "  Nachlasz  des  Diogenes,"  Hempel,  XXIV,  119. 

39  "  Agathodamon,"  ibid.,  XXIII,  207,  47,  36. 


94 

tnotis  citizens  for  the  state;  it  was  considered  a  study  neces- 
sary for  everybody,  since  everybody  had  notions  to  be  cleared 
up,  proclivities  to  be  directed  to  the  best  purpose,  faults  to  be 
mended  and  virtues  to  be  enhanced.  Philosophy  was  so  prac- 
tical that  the  training  in  citizenship  and  statesmanship  was 
attended  to  by  philosophical  societies.  These  societies  had  cer- 
tain mental  exercises,  by  which  young  men  were  accustomed 
to  the  most  necessary  virtues,  such  as  moderation,  patience, 
contempt  of  pain,  love  of  work  and  the  like.*° 

This  attitude  to  philosophy  may  perhaps  be  ascribed  not  only 
to  Shaftesbury's  influence  but  to  the  joint  influence  of  Shaftes- 
bury and  Socrates,  who  also  made  philosophy  a  matter  of  daily 
life  and,  with  whom,  as  we  have  mentioned,  Wieland  became 
acquainted  very  early.*^  Socrates  was  certainly  neither  a  pedant 
nor  a  solitary  speculator  nor  a  teacher  that  instructs  ex 
cathedra.  He  did  not  even  commit  anything  to  writing,  and 
what  we  know  of  his  philosophy  we  gather  from  Plato's  dia- 
logues and  Xenophon's  remininscences.  His  philosophy  was 
always  unfolded  in  the  course  of  a  conversation  which  he  was 
ever  ready  to  begin  with  anybody  that  was  inclined  to  it.  Thus 
he  introduced  philosophy  into  the  most  common  affairs  of  daily 
life;  for  any  matter  coming  from  daily  observation  or  daily 
occupation  gave  'him  a  subject  for  some  philosophical  dis- 
cussion. 

3.     The  Virtuoso 

Wieland,  as  we  have  seen  above,  blended  the  Shaftesburian 
"virtuoso"  with  the  Greek  ideal  of  kalokagathia.  It  is, 
therefore,  necessary  to  see  what  conception  Wieland  had  of  the 
Greek  ideal.  By  the  word  kalokagathia,  he  says,  the  Greeks 
understood  all  perfections  which  distinguish  a  free  and  noble 
man  from  a  slave  and  a  man-like  animal,  all  the  qualities  which 
enable  one  to  play  a  noble  part  in  life.*^    The  usual  meaning 

40  "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  III,   104-5. 

41  As  early  as  1752  he  is  impressed  by  the  fact  that 

Die  Weisheit,   die  vor  ihm  die  Himmel  nur  durchspiirt, 
Hat  Sokrates  zuerst  zur  Erden  abgefiihrt. 

"  Moralische  Briefe,"  9  Brief,  lines  147-8,  Gruber,  I,  301. 

42  "Plan  einer  Akademie,"  III,  102. 


95 

of  a  kaloskagathos,  as  used  in  Athens,  corresponded  in  gen- 
eral to  what  they  call  in  England  a  gentleman  and  what  they 
called  in  France  under  Louis  XIV  a  galant-homme  and  later 
a  honncte-homme.^^  Often  the  word  signified  nothing  more 
than  a  person  of  prominent  birth  and  education.  In  its  moral 
meaning  of  "  schongut "  or  "  gutedel,"  he  adds,  it  seems  first 
to  have  been  taken  from  Socrates.**  It  came  to  designate  a 
person  who  united  in  himself  the  good  and  the  beautiful;  a 
man  with  inner  beauty  and  goodness,  by  which  he  is  rendered 
amiable,  noble-minded,  benevolent  and  happy;  an  individual 
possessing  all  physical  and  spiritual  excellences.*^ 

It  may  be  questioned  whether  all  this  covers  exactly  the 
same  concept  as  is  embraced  by  Shaftesbury's  "  virtuoso." 
Lessing  objects  very  strongly  to  Wieland's  identification  of  the 
two  ideals.  Lessing  insists  that  with  the  Greeks  kaloskaga- 
thos was  no  more  than  what  we  now  call  a  "  hiibscher,  guter, 
Mann  " ;  that  the  Greek  ideal  has  no  connection  whatever  with 
Shaftesbury's  "  virtuoso  " ;  that  by  trying  to  combine  the  two 
Wieland  is  "  throwing  dust  into  his  readers'  eyes."*®  Herder 
agrees  neither  with  Lessing  nor  with  Wieland.  The  Greek 
kaloskagathos,  he  claims,  is  much  more  than  a  "  guter,  hiibscher 
Mann,"  as  Lessing  thinks,  but  much  less  than  a  Shaftesburian 
"  virtuoso,"  as  Wieland  would  have  it.  The  Greeks,  says 
Herder,  taught  their  sons  everything  that  cultivated  the  under- 
standing and  developed  a  fine  taste  and  strong  body.  An 
Athenian  kaloskagathos,  while  being  neither  of  the  three, 
possessed  the  ability  of  becoming  a  sage,  poet  and  Olympic 
victor.  The  kaloikagathoi,  however,  Herder  declares,  in  ac- 
cordance with  Shaftesbury's  broad  conception,  never  existed  in 
Athens.*^ 

The  Shaftesburian  ideal  is,  as  we  have  mentioned  above,  the 

43 "  Sokratische  Gesprache,"  Attisches  Museum,  IIIi,   146. 

44  "  Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXIV,  292. 

45"Theages,"  Goschen,  XXXIII,  414.  "Die  Abderiten,"  ibid.,  XIII,  14. 
Teutscher  Merkur,  Feb.,  1777,  p.  132.  "  Der  neue  Amadis,"  Goschen,  XV, 
306. 

46 "  Brief e  die  neueste  Litteratur  betreffend,"  10  Literaturbrief,  Lach- 
mann-Muncker  edition,  VIII,  22. 

47 "  Fragmente  zur  deutschen  Litteratur,"  2  Sammlung,  Suphan  edition, 
I,   303   ff. 


96 

culmination  of  his  moral-esthetic  philosophy.  Wieland  himself 
considers  the  virtuoso-ideal  as  pervading  all  of  Shaftesbury's 
philosophy,  as  something  "  que  Shaftesbury  peint  si  admirable- 
ment  dans  tous  ses  ecrits."*^  He  defines  Shaftesbury's  "  vir- 
tuoso "  as  "  a  man  reared  by  the  Muses  and  Graces ;  a  lover  of 
nature  and  art ;  one  who  is  acquainted  with  the  masterpieces  of 
human  wit  and  diligence;  who  esteems  every  talent;  who  has 
studied  the  world,  the  character,  constitutions,  laws,  manners, 
religion,  arts  and  inventions  of  the  various  peoples;  who  knows 
in  all  this  what  is  right  and  beautiful."*®  This  definition  cor- 
responds almost  entirely  to  Shaftesbury's  own  definition,  which 
is  found  in  the  first  chapter  of  the  third  Miscellany  and  to 
which  Wieland  refers  in  a  foot-note.  On  another  occasion  we 
are  referred  to  the  virtuosi  as  men  striving  after  the  beautiful, 
and  we  are  told  that  virtuosoship  consists  of  a  fine  instinctive 
skill  to  avoid  the  two  extremities  of  defect  and  excess.^" 

Cicero  is  spoken  of  as  a  man  who,  on  account  of  the  wealth 
of  his  natural  gifts  and  the  "greatness  of  his  virtuosoship," 
holds  one  of  the  highest  positions  among  the  heroes  of  man- 
kind." And  Danischmend  defends  the  virtuosi  against  the 
attack  of  the  hypocritical  "  Kalender."  In  a  cynical  tone  the 
latter  speaks  of  the  virtuosi  as  enthusiasts  of  virtue  who  do  no 
evil  because  they  are  inactive;  who  have  fine  sentiments  and 
beautiful  and  lofty  ideas  of  virtue,  but  can  never  have  these 
ideas  realized.  'In  reply  to  the  cynic,  Danischmend  asserts  that 
at  any  rate  the  virtuosi  preserve  the  ideals  of  the  good  and 
beautiful  and  perform  an  immense  service  thereby .^^ 

Wieland  then  wishes  to  make  Aedon,  the  hero  of  the  sixth 
Sympathie,  "zu  einem  groszeren  Virtuoso."  He  tells  him  to 
travel  through  the  whole  realm  of  beauty  and  to  convince  him- 
self that  there  are  higher  beauties  than  rosy  cheeks  and  white 
breasts;  that  there  are  higher  joys  than  those  coming  from  the 
lips  of  girls  and  from  bubbling  glasses;  that  virtue,  wisdom  and 

48  Letter  to  Zimmermann,  March  12,  1758,  "  Ausgewahlte  Brief e,"  I,  259. 

49  "  Plan  einer  Akademie,"  III,  112. 
50"Horazens  Briefe  iibersetzt "   (1782),  I,  295-6. 

51 "  Ciceros  sammtliche  Briefe  iibersetzt  und  erlautert,"  I  (1808),  Pref- 
ace, p.  xiii. 

62  "  Danischmend,"  Goschen,  IX,  70,  74. 


97 

innocence  deserve  our  highest  admiration  and  love.^^  He  speaks 
in  lofty  terms  of  the  character  of  La  Roche,  mentioning  among 
his  other  quahties  a  knowledge  of  everything  "w^as  unser 
Shaftesbury  zu  seinem  Virtuosen  fordert."^*  And  Nicias  is 
introduced  to  us  as  a  "Virtuoso  nach  den  Begriffen  unseres 
Shaftesbury."  Nicias  is  a  fine  connoisseur  of  the  beauty  of 
nature  and  art.  By  means  of  the  most  perfect  models  Italy  has 
cultivated  his  taste  for  music,  painting  and  architecture;  and 
owing  to  all  this  he  esteems  poetic  art  all  the  more.^^  Finally, 
Wieland  himself,  as  he  reports  in  1758,  "  loves  all  perfections, 
esteems  all  arts,  loves  human  nature,  and  aspires  to  the  char- 
acter of  the  virtuoso,  which  Shaftesbury  portrays  so  admirably 
in  all  his  writing."  He  is  as  yet,  he  tells  us,  far  behind  this 
kind  of  character,  but  he,  nevertheless,  strives  to  attain  it.^^ 

53  "  Sympathien,"  Goschen,  XXIX,  24-5. 

54  Letter  to  Geszner,  "  Auswahl  denkwiirdiger  Brief  e,"  I,  94. 

55  "  Theages,"  Goschen,  XXXIII,  222. 

66  To  Zimmermann,  March  12,  1758,  "Ausgewahlte  Brief e,"  I,  259. 


CHAPTER  V 

Wit  and  Humor 

I.     The  Gloomy  and  the  Cheerful.     Good  Humor  and  Rail- 
lery.    Enthusiasm  and  Fanaticism 

By  freedom  of  tdt  and  humor  Shaftesbury  means,  as  we 
have  seen,  complete  freedom  in  investigating  and  perfect 
familiarity  in  treating  even  the  most  serious  matters,  questions 
of  divinity  not  excepted.  He  employs  the  doctrine  as  a  sort  of 
antidote  to  exaggerated  solemnity,  unnecessary  gravity  and  ex- 
travagant sobriety.  In  his  capacity  as  a  cheerful  philosopher 
Shaftesbury  fights  against  all  these  faults  and  very  strongly 
urges  jest,  mirth  and  a  good-humored  view  of  things  in  gen- 
eral. So  much  for  the  doctrine  in  general,  which  has  been 
somewhat  elaborated  above.  But  before  Wieland's  attitude  to 
the  Shaftesburian  doctrine  can  be  fully  determined,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  explain  Shaftesbury's  manner  of  using  the  individual 
terms  "wit  and  humor."  He  never  intends  to  let  the  terms 
stand  each  for  a  specific  notion.  On  the  contrary,  he  uses  the 
expression  "  wit  and  humor  "  as  a  whole  for  a  certain  concept, 
which  becomes  clear  enough  from  the  context.  Without  any 
intervening  explanation  Shaftesbury  somehow  shifts  from  "  wit 
and  humor  "  to  the  notion  of  raillery,  which  is  described  now 
as  a  "  species  of  wit,"^  now  as  a  "  kind  of  humor."^  "  Raillery  " 
then  becomes  a  close  companion  of  "  wit  and  humor."  Thus, 
we  are  told  that  "  wit  can  never  have  its  liberty  where  the  free- 
dom of  raillery  is  taken  away,"  and  that  the  Epicurean  and 
other  sects  in  Greece  were  allowed  to  use  "  the  force  of  wit  and 
raillery  "  against  superstition.^  It  is  this  immediate  transition 
from  "  wit  and  humor  "  to  "  raillery  "  which  removes  from  the 

1 "  Characteristics,"  I,  62. 

2  Ibid.,  I,  61. 

s  Ibid.,  I,  19  and  18. 

98 


99 

latter  the  notion  of  mere  ridicule  and  attaches  to  it  the  idea  of 
jest,  familiarity  and  good  humor.* 

Coming  to  Wieland,  we  find  first  of  all  frequent  occurrence 
of  the  Shaftesburian  terms.  On  several  occasions  the  terms 
are  used  in  the  English  original.  He  demands  for  the  poet 
"  so  viel  freedom  of  Wit  and  Humor"  as  is  consistent  with  the 
laws  of  propriety.^  Quoting  the  introductory  part  of  a  letter 
received  from  one  of  his  readers,  Wieland  remarks  that  the 
author  of  the  letter  intended  to  convey  at  the  very  outset  an 
excellent  impression  "  von  seinem  belletristischen  Wit  and 
Humor."*'  And  on  another  occasion  he  compliments  Johann 
Heinrich  Merck  on  being  "  ein  Mann  von  Wit  and  Humor."'^ 
The  expression  "  Witz  und  Laune  "  occurs  a  great  number  of 
times,  apparently  in  the  Shaftesburian  sense  of  "wit  and 
humor  "  or  "  raillery  and  humor."  The  Athenians  are  spoken  of 
as  being  especially  susceptible  to  "  Witz  und  Laune."  Krates, 
we  are  told,  is  admitted  by  all  to  be  a  man  of  ingenuity,  a  man 
"voll  Witz  und  guter  Laune  und  auszerst  angenehm  im  Um- 
gang."  Lucian  is  referred  to  as  an  author  combining  in  him- 
self genius,  good  taste,  elegance,  "  Witz  und  Laune."*  Lais  is 
said  to  excel  in  the  vivacity  and  multiformity  "  des  Witzes 
und  der  Laune."     In  the  philosophical  gatherings  of  Athens 

4  This  appears  very  clearly  especially  from  the  following  passage :  We 
should  be  considered  very  "  morose  and  ill-humored,  if  instead  of  treating 
the  matter  in  raillery  we  should  think  of  revenging  ourselves  on  the 
offending  parties  who  out  of  their  rustic  ignorance,  ill-judgment  or  in- 
credulity had  detracted  from  our  renown  "  (I,  37). 

5  Quoted  by  J.  Steinberger :  "  Lucians  Einflusz  auf  Wieland,"  Gottingen, 
1902,  p.  139.     Steinberger  refers  to  the  Morgenblatt  for  1828,  p.  497. 

^  Teutscher  Merkur,  June,   1776,  p.  282. 

7  Letter  to  Merck,  Apr.  16,  1780:  Karl  Wagner:  "  Briefe  an  J.  H.  Merck 
von  Goethe,  Herder,  Wieland  und  anderen  bedeutenden  Zeitgenossen," 
Darmstadt,  1835,  P-  235.  In  another  letter,  Aug.  29,  1781,  Wieland  asks 
Merck  to  contribute  to  the  Merkur  whatever  he  pleases,  "  es  sei  Wit  oder 
Humor,"  ibid.,  p.   306. 

^  Attisches  Museum,  III,  p.  vii.  "Krates  und  Hipparchia,"  Letter  XIII, 
Hempel,  X,  109.  "Lucians  Lebensmittel,  Character  und  Schriften  "  (1788), 
Hempel,  XXXVII,  357.  The  phrase  "  Witz  und  Laune  "  occurs  in  many 
other  instances,  of  which  the  following  may  be  referred  to:  K.  Wagner: 
"Briefe  an  Merk,"  etc.,  p.  307;  "  Ciceros  Briefe  iibersetzt,"  I,  299; 
"  Horazens  Satiren  iibersetzt,"  II,  6  and  112;  Schnorrs  Archiv,  XIII, 
505;  Goschen,  XXIII,  193;  XXXIII,  288;  Hempel,  XX^III,  121;  XXXVI, 
175;  XXXVII,  22s,  365,  201;  XXXII,  228. 


100 

Socrates  is  the  animating  spirit  on  account  of  his  "  trefifender 
Witz  und  muntere  Laune."^  So  Shaftesbury  declares  that 
"  raillery  and  humor  are  the  only  thing  which  makes  good  com- 
pany."^" In  the  sense  of  "  raillery  "  Wieland  uses  not  only  the 
term  "  Spott "  but  also  "  Witz."  This  is  especially  evident 
from  a  passage  in  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  where  we  are  told 
that  IVit::  is  something  "  dessen  wichtigster  Gebrauch  ist,  alles, 
was  in  den  Meinungen,  Leidenschaften  und  Handlungen  der 
Menschen  mit  der  gesunden  Vernunft  und  dem  allgemeinen 
Gefii'hl  des  Wahren  und  Schonen  einen  Miszlaut  macht,  das 
ist,  alles,  was  ungereimt  ist,  als  belachenswiirdig  darzustellen."^^ 
As  early  as  Oct.  i8,  1756,  Wieland  expresses  his  admiration 
for  Shaftes'bury's  cheerful  and  serene  view  of  life.  "Hat  Sie 
nicht  eben  Shaftesbury  iiberzeugt,"  he  writes  to  Zimmermann, 
"  dasz  wir  alle  schwermiitige,  traurige,  finstere  Betrachtungen, 
alle  dunkle  Empfindungen  wie  unsre  argsten  Feinde  bestreiten 
sollen  ?  Ohne  Zweifel  hat  er  Sie  es  gelehrt ! "  We  must,  he  con- 
tinues, be  conscious  of  our  faculties  before  we  can  act  with 
courage.  We  must  have  cheerful  thoughts  in  order  to  be  suc- 
cessful. We  must  examine  the  human  race  from  the  better  side 
in  order  to  be  favorably  inclined  to  it,  and  in  order  to  love  God 
we  must  represent  Him  to  ourselves  as  good.  Many  of  the 
moralists,  he  continues,  transgress  against  these  rules.  They  do 
not  realize  that  self -contempt,  doubt,  fear,  melancholy,  poison 
our  souls,  and  that  all  things  are  to  be  looked  at  from  the  bright- 
est and  serenest  side.^^  Wieland  remains  a  li  f  e-long  advocate  of 
this  cheerfulness  and  good  humor.  Like  Shaftesbury,  he  con- 
tends against  the  notion  of  making  virtue  unduly  solemn  and 
objects  to  conceiving  of  it  as  opposed  to  joy.  ''What  claims 
can  we  lay  to  happiness  if  we  despise  nature  and  consider  vir- 
tue as  a  destroyer  of  joy?"  This  latter  notion  is  held  by  the 
tyrant  Dionysius,  in  whose  court  Agathon  spends  some  time. 
Dionysius  entertains  "  the  wrong  but  very  common  prejudice 
that  virtue  must  'be  a  professed  enemy  of  all  the  gods  of  joy."" 

»"Aristipp,"  Goschen,  XXII,  io6,   185. 

10  "  Characteristics,"  I,   76. 

11  "Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,   181. 

12  "  Ausgewahlte  Brief  e,"  I,  223-4. 

13 "  Gesicht  von   einer  Welt  unschuldiger  Menschen"    (1755),   Goschen, 
XXIX,  87.     "Agathon,"  Goschen,  VI,  47. 


101 

*'I  do  not  confound  wisdom  with  austerity,"  Wieland  writes 
March  12,  1758,  "  I  am  not  grateful  to  those  authors  who  wish 
us  to  love  a  virtue  as  ugly  and  disgusting  as  they  represent  it 
to  us."^*  Virtue,  'he  insists,  makes  pleasure  and  joy  a  duty  to 
us.  "  A  cheerful  heart  and  a  rose-colored  or  sky-blue  fancy  " 
are  indispensahle  in  many  activities  if  they  are  to  prosper. ^^ 

Among  the  excellences,  therefore,  enabling  the  Scheschian 
priests  to  become  worthy  teachers  of  their  nation  is  their  con- 
stant cheerfulness.  Out  of  Psyche's  earnest  features  there 
smiles  forth  a  "  sanfte  Heiterkeit."^"  So  Clarisse  is  sedate 
without  being  melancholy,  earnest  but  not  gloomy.  General 
benevolence  seems  to  be  the  very  element  in  which  she  breathes. 
Cheer  and  good  humor  are  always  diffused  over  her  lovely 
face  and  present  the  same  appearance  as  sunshine  upon  a 
charming  valley.  And  Musarion's  element  is  "  heitre  sanfte 
Freude."  All  things  appear  to  her  in  a  "  rosy  light " ;  she  com- 
bines earnest  thought  with  playful  jest.^^  Only  in  a  playful 
attitude  the  muses  offer  the  best  instruction.^^  All  human 
beings  are  born  with  more  or  less  proclivity  for  the  wonderful. 
The  history  of  nations  begins  with  speaking  animals  and 
theophanies.  Gods  and  demigods,  genii  and  fairies,  giants  and 
dwarfs,  play  a  prominent  part  in  the  earliest  histories  of  nations. 
Each  has  its  supply  of  stories,  its  mythology,  which  is  strongly 
intertwined  with  its  history,  religion,  moral  and  social  consti- 
tution. Because  the  cheerful  and  good-humored  way  of  pre- 
senting morality  gives  the  best  results,  fables  were  the  first 
method  of  teaching,  allegory  the  earliest  veil  of  philosophy, 
fairy-tales  the  material  of  the  oldest  and  greatest  poets. 
Kamchadales,  Persians,  Greeks  and  Icelanders  all  agree  on  this 
point.^^  It  is  for  the  same  reason  that  Virgil  and  Homer  are 
more  than  merely  amusing  poets,  for  while  entertaining.  Homer 
teaches  more  practical  philosophy  than  Chrysippus  and  Kran- 

1*  To   Zimmermann,  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,   260. 

15  "  Combabus,"  Goschen,  X,  92.     "  Danischmend,"  IX,   18. 

16  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VIII,  208.     "Agathon,"  V,  2-j. 

17  "  Das  Hexameron  von  Rosenhain,"  Hempel,  XIII,  102.  "  Musarion," 
lines  1 150— I,  1406,  Prohle,  I,  49  and  56. 

i8"Idris  und  Zenide  "  (1768),  ist  Canto,  6tli  Stanza,  Hempel,  XVI,  8. 
i9"Aristipp,"     Goschen,     XXIII,      124.     "  Dschinnistan "      (Winterthur, 
1786-9),  preface,  I,  p.  iii-iv. 


102 

tor.^**  And  so  Aesop  is  referred  to  as  "  der  groszte  Philosoph 
und  Sittendichter."-^ 

The  playful  presentation  of  truth  and  wisdom  becomes  a  very 
essential  part  of  Wieland's  philosophy.  'In  spite  of  their  wis- 
dom and  honesty  the  members  of  Schach-Gebal's  divan  fail  to 
exert  a  sufficient  influence  on  him  on  account  of  their  lack  of 
cheer,  their  inability  to  jest  and  "to  give  to  wisdom  a  laughing 
appearance."--  Wieland  speaks  of  the  large  number  of  "  poor 
and  mediocre  moralizing  books  which,  under  promising  titles, 
oppress  the  world  with  commonplace  observations  and  perverse 
thoughts  of  their  tedious  authors."  Of  much  greater  advantage 
to  the  common  welfare  are  comical  novels  like  "  Gil  Bias  "  or 
"  Gargantua  and  Pantagruel."  Much  to  be  preferred  are  the 
books  in  which  "  truth  is  told  with  a  laugh,"  which  are  the 
more  successful  in  their  instruction,  the  more  they  merely  seem 
to  entertain  the  reader.  Even  if  such  books  did  nothing  else 
than  to  serve  as  recreation  to  busy  persons  in  their  hours  of 
leisure,  or  give  harmless  occupation  to  idle  persons ;  even  if 
they  accomplished  nothing  else  than  entertaining  the  good 
humor  of  a  people,  they  would  still  be  a  thousand  times  more 
useful  than  that  "  moral  straw  thrashed  out  long  ago,"  that 
"methodical  mishmash  of  missshapen  and  variegated  ideas," 
which  may  do  more  harm  than  good.^^  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  he  attaches  special  importance  to  making  his  "  Beitrage 
zur  geheimen  Geschichte  des  menschlichen  Verstandes  und 
Herzens  "  not  a  gloomy  but  cheerful  work.  He  prefers,  as  he 
says  in  the  foreword,  to  be  accused  by  "  feeble-minded  critics  " 
of  not  'having  a  serious  purpose  rather  than  to  pose  as  a  phi- 
losopher and  to  put  the  reader  to  sleep  by  a  monotonous  and 
didactic  tone.-* 

Finally,  we  have  a  lengthy  glorification  of  joy  and  good 
humor,  which  in  every  respect  reminds  one  of  Shaftesbury.  A 
wise  man,  we  read,  is  by  no  means  a  hater  of  joy.     What  better 

20  "  tjber  das  Verhaltnis  des  Angenehmen  und  Niitzlichen  zum  Schonen," 
Hempel,  XXXII,  35. 

^'^Teutscher  Merkur,  Feb.,   1782,  p.  99. 

22  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,   10. 

23 "  Don  Sylvio  von  Rosalva  "   (1764),   Part  II,  Goschen,  II,  5-6. 

24  "  Beitrage,"  etc.,  Leipzig,  1770,  I,  10. 


103 

thing  than  joy  have  the  gods  granted  us?  Tlie  life  they  have 
given  us  would  certainly  have  been  a  very  insignificant  gift  if 
they  had  not  intended  us  to  enjoy  it.  Wisdom  and  virtue  con- 
stitute the  surest  way  to  joy,  and  joy  is  the  best  manner  of 
partaking  of  wisdom  and  virtue.  When  the  authorities  of  a 
state  have  succeeded  in  promoting  art  and  industry,  in  securing 
peace  and  safety  for  their  people, — what  else  have  they  done 
than  to  place  their  people  in  a  cheerful  attitude?  Without 
joy  mankind  would  be  very  unfortunate.  Whoever  objects  to 
worship  of  this  beneficent  goddess  is  a  rascal.  The  best  ad- 
vice that  can  be  given  to  a  ruler  is  to  place  his  people  in  a  con- 
dition of  good  humor.  Short-sighted  persons,  however,  fail 
to  realize  the  importance  of  such  a  condition.  A  cheerful 
people  suffers  much  less  and  performs  its  duties  much  more 
willingly  than  a  gloomy  people.  The  former,  therefore,  is 
much  more  easily  governed.  Political  and  religious  fanaticism 
have  no  access  to  a  people  which  is  susceptible  to  mirth  and 
jest.  Whenever  troublesome  whims  arise  they  can  be  "jested 
away  "  by  those  possessing  the  gift  of  humor.  On  the  contrary 
when  similar  whims  arise  among  a  melancholy  people  they 
lead  to  fatal  disturbances.  It  is  certainly  a  bad  sign  when 
virtue  assumes  an  unduly  sober  and  grave  appearance;  such  a 
state  of  affairs  leads  to  stupidity  and  barbarism.  "  Virtue, 
which  is  itself  the  mother  of  the  best  joys,  is  consistent  with 
every  blameless  pleasure."  Take  away  cheer  and  good  humor 
and  you  may  as  well  take  life  itself.  Pericles,  Socrates,  and 
the  other  wisest  and  best  Athenians  used  to  gather  in  the  home 
of  the  heautiful  Aspasia  and  there  they  discussed  important 
matters  in  a  cheerful  tone  which  drove  away  tediousness  and 
monotony.  Unimportant  matters  became  interesting  through 
"wit  and  humor"  (Wieland  unquestionably  here  uses  the  ex- 
pression Wits  und  Laune  in  the  Shaftesburian  meaning  of 
"  wit  and  humor  ").  The  finest  thoughts  were  uttered  and  the 
wisest  plans  arranged  in  these  gatherings,  which  had  for  their 
apparent  purpose  nothing  but  recreation  and  amusement. 
Here  philosophy  learned  from  the  Graces  the  art  of  jesting, 
here  expression  was  given  to  ideas  worthy  to  be  written  by 
Xenophon;  and  this  was  kept  up  until  the  Muses,  disguised  as 


104 

lovely  maidens,  closed  the  gathering  with  song  and  dance.  Do 
you  suppose  that  Athens  would  have  been  in  a  better  condition, 
if  the  beautiful  Aspasia  and  her  maidens  had  been  sent  away 
and  if  men  like  Socrates  and  Pericles  had  been  compelled  to 
spend  their  evenings  in  a  more  serious  fashion  ?^^ 

In  close  resemblance  to  Shaftesbury,  Wieland  then  argues  in 
favor  of  unlimited  exercise  of  reason,  perfect  liberty  of  inves- 
tigation and  freedom  of  raillery.  The  freedom  of  authors  and 
philosophers,  he  writes  to  Zimmermann  Nov.  8,  1758,  must  be 
unlimited,  provided  they  do  not  disturb  the  universally  accepted 
principles  of  religion  and  morality.  "  Die  Wahrheit,  sagt  unser 
Shaftesbury,  gewinnt  durch  die  Untersuohung,  durch  den 
Zweifel  und  selbst  durch  den  Scherz.  She  may  bear  all  lights."^" 
Nothing  in  the  world,  however  holy  it  may  be,  should  be  with- 
drawn from  the  tribunal  of  reason;  everything  must  be  investi- 
gated and  tested.  All  follies  from  which  the  'human  mind 
suffers  should  be  subjected  to  raillery.  Even  insignificant 
follies  are  often  sources  of  the  greatest  evils.  Hence  no  folly, 
however  insignificant  or  innocent  it  may  appear,  is  to  be  exempt 
from  raillery  (Spott),  "which  is  almost  the  only  efficacious 
preservative  against  its  injurious  influence."^" 

The  limitation  of  the  full  exercise  of  reason  and  of  the  free- 
dom of  raillery  (IVita),  Wieland  argues,  is  bound  to  have 
fatal  consequences.  Such  limitation  tends  to  perpetuate  ignor- 
ance and  folly  and  subjects  the  nation  to  the  danger  of  falling 
back  into  that  state  of  barbarism  which  puts  man  on  a  par  with 
the  lower  animals.  How  shall  we  draw  the  line  of  demarca- 
tion limiting  the  free  exercise  of  reason?  What  rules  should 
be  laid  down  and  who  is  to  determine  whether  these  rules  are 
observed  or  violated  ? — So  Shaftesbury  asks  the  same  question : 
"  But  who  shall  be  judge  of  what  may  be  freely  examined,  and 
what  not  ?  What  remedy  shall  we  prescribe  to  this  in  general  ? 
(I,  10) — And  how  can  we  think,  Wieland  continues,  without 
investigating  and  investigate  without  doubting?     If  this  free 

25  "  Nachlasz  des  Diogenes,"  Hempel,  XXIV,   75-80. 

26 "  Ausgewahlte  Brief e,"  I,  310.  The  special  words  of  Shaftesbury 
quoted  here  occur  in  the  "Characteristics,"  I,  61. 

27 "  Gebrauch  der  Vernunft  in  Glaubenssachen,"  Hempel,  XXXII,  336. 
"  Peregrinus  Proteus,"  Hempel,  XXI,  27. 


105 

exercise  of  reason  is  prevented  from  being  applied  to  all  ob- 
jects, certain  doubts  and  investigations  will  always  be  for- 
bidden by  rulers  in  case  they  find  these  doubts  and  investiga- 
tions disadvantageous  to  their  interest.  The  same  is  also  true 
of  raillery  (Wit^).  Every  limitation  of  the  use  of  raillery 
gives  license  to  folly.  Check  the  free  course  of  reason  and 
raillery,  and  as  inevitable  consequences  you  will  have  stupidity, 
superstition,  fanaticism,  tyranny,  mental  darkness,  corruption, 
rudeness  and  general  barbarism.-^ 

It  is  true  that  the  free  exercise  of  reason  and  raillery  and 
humor  (der  Vernunft,  des  Witzes  und  der  Laune)  is  abused 
by  some  and  is  employed  to  place  virtue  in  a  false  light  and  to 
impede  the  cause  of  truth.  These  evils,  however,  are  rare, 
incidental,  and  very  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the  evils 
coming  in  consequence  of  the  limitation  of  the  exercise  of 
reason  and  raillery.-^  In  fact,  the  majority  of  moralists  and 
theologians  have  done  more  harm  to  virtue  and  to  Christianity 
than  the  whole  crowd  of  railleurs  and  sceptics.  The  safest 
proposition,  therefore,  is  to  overlook  occasional  excesses  that 
are  likely  to  come  from  this  freedom  rather  than  to  be  de- 
prived by  a  stern  regulation  of  "  the  noblest  prerogative  of 
mankind."^"  All  sensible  persons  have  recognized  as  unde- 
niable "  the  good  effect  of  fine  ridicule  employed  at  the  proper 
time  and  in  the  proper  place,  of  irony,  and  of  that  which  is 
called  das  Licht  des  Ldcherlichen  by  Shaftesbury,  whom  the 
D.D.'s  and  M.A.'s  among  his  fellow-countrymen  are  so  fond 
of  misunderstanding."^^ 

But  just  as  we  saw  Shaftesbury  distinguishing  sharply  be- 
tween true  and  false  raillery,  between  proper  jest  and  mere 
buffoonery,  so  we  also  find  Wieland  doing  exactly  the  same 
thing.  Just  as  Shaftesbury  declares  that  "  no  one  of  the  least 
justness  of  thought  can  endure  a  ridicule  wrong  placed,"  that 
"the  vulgar,  indeed,  may  swallow  any  sordid  jest,  any  mere 
drollery  or  buffoonery,"  that  "  it  must  be  a  finer  and  truer  wit 

28  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,    179-181. 

^^  Ibid.,  p.   182. 

30 "  Sympathien,"  Goschen,  XXIX,  58.     "Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,  184. 

31 "  Horazens  Satiren  xibersetzt,"  1786  (Leipzig,  1819,  in  2  parts),  I,  302. 


106 

which  takes  with  men  of  sense  and  breeding"    (I,   ii);  so 
Wieland  expresses  the  same  sentiment: 

Witz  ohne  Geist  ist  ein  vergolcleter  Narr. 
Nur  die  Vernunft,  die  Richterin  der  Dinge, 
Weisz  Witz  und  Schonhcit  weislich  zu  gcbrauchen, 
Zum  auszern  Schmuck  der  Wahrheit  und  der  Giite. 
Der  f alsche  Witz  begniigt  sich,  wenn  wir  lachen ; 
Wir  lachen  auch,  doch  iiber  ihn  allein. 
Er  will  bewundert  sein,  nicht  niitzen, 
Und  bei  noch  groszeren  Thoren  als  er  selbst 
Gelingt  es  ihm.^- 

He  wants  the  abuse  of  raillery  (Wits)  to  cease  and  urges 
the  proper  use  of  it.  It  must  be  a  servant  of  truth,  otherwise 
it  is  "  a  devil  disguised  as  an  angel. "^^  He  hates  the  kind  of 
Wits  which  undermines  virtue  and  thereby  becomes  Aberwits.^^ 
Some  people,  he  says,  employ  this  false  raillery,  for  they  make 
it  perfectly  clear  that  the  main  object  of  their  ridicule  is  to 
attack  virtue  itself.  On  the  other  hand,  whenever  the  wise 
Kador  ridicules  the  fanatic,  deceiver  or  self-deceived  person, 
he  does  it  in  a  manner  which  to  people  of  sound  judgment 
leaves  no  doubt  as  to  his  good  intentions  and  his  adherence  to 
truth  and  virtue.^^  Wieland  also  objects  to  stern  and  harsh 
raillery.  He  praises  the  authors  of  the  weekly  journal.  Die 
Welt,  on  account  of  their  gift  of  entertaining  while  instruct- 
ing and  their  ability  to  chastise  and  ridicule  without  giving 
offence.^"  And  he  asks  Bodmer  to  be  more  sparing  of  Lessing, 
not  because  Lessing  does  not  deserve  the  chastising  rod,  but 
because  the  purpose  aimed  at  by  censure  is  attained,  not  so 
much  by  the  magisterial  tone  as  by  "  die  Shaftesburische 
Manier,  fein  und  kaltsinnig  zu  spotten."^^ 

On  the  basis  of  the  distinction  between  the  gloomy  and 
melancholy,  on  one  hand,  and  the  cheerful  and  good-humored 
on  the  other,  Wieland  distinguishes  together  with  Shaftesbury 

3^  "  Erinnerungen  an  eine  Freundin,"  Goschen,  XXVI,  286. 

33  "  Sympathien,"  Goschen,  XXIX,  61   and  25. 

34  Letter  to  Schinz,  June,  1752.     "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  91. 

35  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VIII,    17. 
^f^Tentscher  Merkur,  June,  1780,  p.  293. 

37  Letter  to  Bodmer,  Jan.  30,  1760,  "Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  II,  119. 


107 

two  kinds  of  enthusiasm,  a  false  or  gloomy  enthusiasm  and  a 
true  or  cheerful  one,  mere  fanaticism  and  divine  inspiration. 
Political  fanaticism  and  religious  fanaticism,  he  says,  are  mon- 
sters capable  of  producing  the  most  terrible  catastrophes.^^ 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  sort  of  inspiration  wherein  the 
contemplation  of  the  beautiful,  perfect  and  divine  seizes  the 
soul,  lifts  it  above  all  earthly  and  physical  elements,  transports 
and  enraptures  it.^^  When  the  love  of  virtue  takes  possession 
of  all  our  proclivities,  when  the  desire  of  the  soul  to  model 
itself  after  the  divine  ideal  of  moral  beauty  becomes  a  real 
passion,  then  the  soul  may  justly  be  said  to  be  possessed  by 
a  deity ;  and  what  test  is  too  hard,  what  sacrifice  too  great,  for 
this  enthusiasm  of  virtue?***  Virtue  is  the  "  supreme  height  of 
the  human  soul,  love,  God  in  us."  There  is  a  kind  of  love 
"  which  Shaftesbury  with  perfect  right  construes  as  a  sort  of 
enthusiasm."*^  Here,  of  course,  Wieland  refers  to  Shaftes- 
bury's doctrine  that  virtue  is  an  enthusiasm  for  the  good  and 
the  beautiful. 

Finally,  we  have  a  somewhat  elaborate  discussion  of  the 
difference  between  fanaticism  and  enthusiasm,  a  discussion 
which  from  beginning  to  end  reminds  us  of  Shaftesbury.  A 
very  clear  distinction,  says  Wieland,  must  be  drawn  between 
Schzmrmerei  on  one  -hand  and  Enthtisiasmus  on  the  other. 
Schzmrmerei  is  a  passion  caused  by  objects  which  either  do 
not  at  all  exist  in  nature,  or  at  least  are  not  such  as  they  appear 
to  the  intoxicated  mind.  This,  he  says,  is  fanaticism.  And 
now  Wieland  illustrates  the  point  by  exactly  the  same  example 
which  is  used  by  Shaftesbury  in  his  discussion  of  fanaticism 
and  enthusiasm.  "  So  far  indeed,"  says  Shaftesbury,  "  the 
innocent  kind  of  enthusiasm  extends  itself  that  when  the  party 
is  struck  by  the  apparition  there  follows  always  an  itch  of 
imparting  it  and  kindling  the  same  fire  in  other  breasts.  For 
thus  poets  are  fanatics  too.  And  thus  Horace  either  is  or 
feigns  himself  lymphatic  and  shows  what  an  effect  the  Nymphs 

38  "  Nachlasz  des  Diogenes,"  Hempel,  XXIV,  77. 

39  "  Gesprache  in  Elysium"   (about  1790),  Goschen,  XXVII,  408. 
40«Agathon,"  Goschen,  VI,  189. 

41  "  Liebe  um  Liebe  "   (1776),  Goschen,  X,   161.     "  Agathon,"  IV,  206. 


108 

and  Bacchus  had  on  him,"  (I,  51).     Shaftesbury  then  quotes 
the  Horatian  verses  (Od.  19,  Hb,  2)  : 

Bacchum  in  remotis  carmina  rupibus 
Vidi  docentem,  credite  posteri, 
Nymphasque  discentes,  etc. 

The  same  example  is  used  by  Wieland  to  ilkistrate  his  defini- 
tion of  Schzvdrmcrei:  "  So  schwarmt,  z.  E.  Horaz,  wenn  ihn 
Bacchus,  von  dessen  Gottheit  er  voll  ist,  in  unbekannte  Hayne 
und  Felsenhohen  fortreiszt."  But,  Wieland  continues,  there 
is  also  an  excitement  of  the  soul  which  is  the  effect  of  imme- 
diate contemplation  of  the  good  and  beautiful,  of  the  perfect 
and  divine  both  in  the  outside  world  and  in  human  nature. 
Such  a  condition  of  the  soul  is  to  be  classed  as  enthusiasm. 
That  which  stirs  our  souls  so  passionately  is  a  divine  touch. 
This  passionate  love  of  the  true,  good  and  beautiful  is  nothing 
less  than  divine  inspiration;  it  is  God  in  us.  Men  who  have 
never  experienced  this  enthusiasm  are  gloomy,  confused  and 
inactive,  while  those  that  are  always  inspired  with  enthusiasm 
are  ever  cheerful,  full  of  life,  courage  and  power,  attractive 
and  instrumental  in  everything  that  is  good  and  noble.  The 
enthusiast,  to  be  sure,  frequently  becomes  a  fanatic;  neverthe- 
less, this  cannot  prevent  us  from  drawing  a  sharp  line  of  dis- 
tinction between  the  two.  The  enthusiast  is  inspired  by  God, 
the  fanatic  by  a  fetich.  Fanaticism  is  a  fever,  a  disease  of  the 
soul ;  but  enthusiasm  is  its  genuine  life.  Enthusiasm  is  the  best, 
noblest  and  most  amiable  thing  which  a  mortal  is  capable  of 
possessing.*- 

This  constitutes  Wieland's  supplementary  remarks  to  an 
extract  from  a  lecture  on  fanaticism  published  in  the  Merkur^^ 
Wieland  praises  the  author  of  this  work,  finds  in  it  much  that 
is  good  and  true,  but  he  also  accuses  the  author  of  a  somewhat 
desultory  treatment  of  the  subject.  Then  he  adds  the  follow- 
ing significant  remark,  which  is  given  here  in  substance :  The 
subject  is  by  no  means  as  yet  exhausted,  but  one  must  plunge 
deeper  into  it  if  he  wishes  to  say  something  new  about  it,  or 

4-  Teutscher  Merkiir,  Nov.,  1775,  151—5. 
43  On  pp.   134-51- 


I 


109 

something  better  than  has  been  said  since  the  time  of  Shaftes- 
bury.** 

2.     Wieland's  Poetry  of  the  Graces 

Likewise  Wieland's  poetry  of  the  Graces  reflects  the  influence 
of  Shaftesbury's  Wit  and  Humor.  What  is  this  poetry  of  the 
Graces  ?  We  let  Geszner  answer  the  question.  "  Und  du, 
Wieland!  Oft  besucht  deine  Muse  ihre  Schwester,  die  ernste 
Weltweisheit,  und  holt  erhabenen  Stoff  aus  ihren  geheimen 
Kammern,  und  bildet  ihn  zu  reizenden  Grazien."*^  Wieland's 
poetry  of  the  Graces,  therefore,  is  another  manifestation  of  the 
good-humored  method  of  presenting  the  most  serious  matters, 
the  playful  way  of  telling  the  truth,  the  jolly  manner  of  giving 
utterance  to  wisdom  and  philosophy,  the  cheerful  attitude  to 
life  in  general;  all  of  which,  as  we  have  shown,  are  so  char- 
acteristic of  Shaftesbury's  philosophy. 

It  has  always  been  the  function  of  wisdom,  says  Wieland,  to 
give  to  beauty  an  attendance  of  Graces,  by  which  the  soul  be- 
comes more  beautiful  and  more  divine.**'  The  Graces,  there- 
fore, are  not  only  the  "  Kammermadchen  der  Schonheit "  but 
also  the  "  Aufwarterinnen  der  Weisheit."*^  Menander  desires 
to  have  as  his  life-companion  a  maiden  reared  by  the  Muses 
and  nursed  by  the  Graces.*^  Agathon  represents  to  himself 
the  Graces  as  playmates  of  the  Muses,  both  always  accom- 
panied by  wisdom.  And  Aristippus  has  been  taught  in  Athens 
to  "  combine  the  cheerfulness  of  the  Graces  with  the  earnest- 
ness of  philosophy."*^ 

Without  the  exhilarating  influence  of  Amor  and  the  Graces 
everything  assumes  a  gloomy  aspect,  wisdom  becomes  ped- 
antry, the  gods  fall  into  a  state  of  rudeness  and  the  Muses  are 
unable  to  achieve  anything  worth  while : 

^'^  Ibid.,  the  footnote  on  p.  134. 

45  "  Der  Wunsch,"  Salomon  Geszner's  "  Schriften,"  Zurich,   1795,  II,  280. 

46  "  Erinnerungen  an  eine  Freundin,"  the  first  6  verses,  Goschen,  XXVI, 
281. 

^"^  Teutscher  Merkur,  June,  1780,  p.  292.  "  Sympathien,"  Goschen, 
XXIX,  61. 

48  "  Menander  und  Glycerion,"  Letter  I,  Hempel,  X,  8. 

49  "Agathon,"  IV,  58  and  VI,  15. 


110 

Minerva,  deren  Ernst  die  milden  Grazien 

Sonst  unvermerkt  erheiterten, 

1st  von  Pedanterei  nicht  langer  auszustehen. 

Der  schone  Bacchus  wird,  seit  Amor  sich  verbannt, 

Mit  Satyrn  stets  bezecht  gesehen; 

Mars  tobt  und  macht  den  Sakripant; 

Die  Musen  krahen  uns  in  fremden  rauhen  Tonen 

Kamtschadalische  Gesange  vor, 

Entsagen,  um  neu  zu  sein,  dem  Schonen, 

Betauben  den  Verstand  und  martern  unser  Ohr.^° 

In  the  following  we  have  a  very  emphatic  glorification  of  the 
beneficial  influence  of  the  Graces.  Before  the  time  of  the 
Graces,  we  are  told,  the  Arcadians  lacked  refinement.  Their 
youths  were  wild  and  stormy,  their  maidens  bashful.  Their 
festivals  were  characterized  chiefly  by  noise  and  extravagant 
merriment,  which  usually  ended  in  general  intoxication.  The 
finer  feeling  of  propriety,  the  nobler  love,  which  is  alone  worthy 
of  the  name,  comely  jest,  witty  laughter,  lovely  inebriation 
which  instead  of  intoxicating  the  soul  fills  it  with  enthu- 
siasm, lulls  it  to  a  sweet  oblivion  of  all  cares,  makes  it  in- 
capable of  sadness — all  these  were  unknown  to  the  Arcadians 
before  the  time  of  the  Graces.  The  Muses,  to  be  sure,  had 
begun  to  communicate  their  gifts  to  the  people,  but  without  the 
Graces  even  the  Muses  are  unable  to  complete  the  embellish- 
ment of  man.  The  Muses  must  join  forces  with  the  Graces 
before  they  can  make  a  complete  human  being  out  of  the 
creature  which  was  merely  started  by  nature.  Through  the 
influence  of  the  Graces  a  general  refinement  spreads  finally  in 
Arcadia.  The  maidens  are  filled  with  a  spirit  of  benevolence 
and  of  gentle  cheerfulness.  Entirely  free  from  jealousy,  each 
one  of  them  seems  to  take  greater  pride  in  her  companion's 
charms  than  in  her  own.  Joy,  innocence,  harmony  and  love 
reign  among  the  Arcadians,  as  long  as  they  remain  worthy  of 
the  protection  of  the  Graces.  Even  in  Olympus  the  Graces 
exert  this  beneficial  influence.  Through  them  the  gods  them- 
selves lose  their  austerity  and  become  more  refined.     Thus, 

50  "Der  verklagte  Amor"  (1774),  5th  Canto,  lines  147-56,  Gruber,  XII, 
214,  or  Goschen,  III,  189. 


Ill 

Juno  becomes  "  die  angenehmste  Frau,"  Jupiter  becomes  "  der 
gefalligste  Ehemami "  and  the  gods  in  general  "  die  beste  Ge- 
sellschaft  von  der  Welt."^^ 

The  sympathy  which  establishes  a  firm  friendship  between 
amiable  creatures  made  the  Muses  and  Graces  the  most  inti- 
mate playmates.  The  former  made  an  infinite  gain  thereby, 
for  their  earnestness  was  in  need  of  being  mitigated  by  the 
charm  of  the  latter.  Even  the  Muse  of  Philosophy  learned 
from  the  Graces  the  art  of  pleasing  and  instructing  at  the  same 
time,  for: 

Aus  ihrer  schonen  Hand 

Empfingen  die  Platon,  die  Humen 

Und  Fontenellen  die  Blumen, 

Womit  sic  den  steinigen  Pfad  der  fliehenden  Wahrheit 
bestreuen.^2 

The  influence  of  the  Graces  extends  also  to  virtue.  The 
conduct  and  character  of  a  good  and  wise  man  must  receive 
from  the  Graces  an  appearance  of  unconstrained  ease.  A  wise 
and  good  man's  life,  if  it  is  to  be  a  beautiful  whole,  must  be 
endowed  by  the  Graces  with  that  splendor  of  consummation  by 
which  it  seems  to  become  more  a  gift  of  nature  than  a  work  of 
art.  The  virtue  of  Cato  of  Utica  lacked  this  Grace,  and  it  is 
this  lack  which  gives  an  unpleasant  and  repulsive  appearance 
to  many  other  presumed  virtues.  Only  under  the  influence  of 
the  Graces  wisdom  and  virtue  lose  the  exaggerated  and  ex- 
travagant, the  harsh,  the  stiff  and  the  awkward;  in  fact  with 
all  these  faults  virtue  and  wisdom  are  undeserving  of  their 
names.  This  is  the  doctrine,  he  adds,  which  Musarion  wanted 
to  teach  her  pupil  and  was  it  possible  not  to  understand  her  ?^^ 

lln  "  Musarion  "^*  Wieland  illustrates  this  philosophy  by  a 
living  example.  He  announced  the  poem  as  "  die  Philosophic 
der  Grazien,"  and  such  it  really  is.     We  must  not  look  here, 

51 "  Die  Grazien"  (1770),  Goschen,  III,  96,  97,  67,  no,  115,  120. 

52  Ibid.,  pp.   121— 2. 

53  Ibid.,  pp.   125-6. 

54  Goethe  was  very  much  impressed  by  this  work  of  Wieland.  "  Musa- 
rion," he  says,  "  wirkte  am  meisten  auf  mich.  Alias  was  in  Wielands 
Genie  plastisch  ist,  zeigte  sich  hier  aufs  Vollkommenste."  See  "  Dichtung 
und  Wahrheit,"  Hempel,  XXI,  54. 


^ 


112 

however,  for  any  direct  didactic  system  of  philosophy.  Wie- 
land  himself  refers  only  indirectly  to  the  philosophical  nature 
of  the  poem.  On  one  occasion  he  calls  it  a  "  systematic  mix- 
ture of  philosophy,  morality  and  satire."'^^  On  another  occa- 
sion he  describes  the  poem  as  "  ein  moralisch-metaphysisches 
komisches  Ding"  containing  quite  an  agreeable  system  of 
morality.'''*'  Musarion,  the  heroine  of  the  poem,  teaches  not 
directly  through  precepts  and  doctrines  but  indirectly  and  in  a 
playful  way,  which  is  all  the  more  effective.  Musarion  herself 
is  a  kind  of  Grace,^^  and  love  is  the  medium  through  which  the 
teaching  is  done : 

Die   Liebe  war's — Wer  lehrt  so  gut  wie  sie?^^ 

She  is  always  pleasant,  cheerful  and  full  of  grace;  even  her 
censure  is  charming,  and  the  Muses  and  Graces  form  in  her  a 
most  beautiful  alHance: 

Gefallend,  wenn  sic  schwieg,  bezaubernd,  wenn  sic  sprach; 

Darum  hatt'  ihr  Witz  auch  Wangen  ohne  Rosen 

Beliebt  gemacht ;  ein  Witz,  dem's  nie  an  Reiz  gebrach, 

Zu  stechen  oder  liebzukosen 

Gleich  aufgelegt,  doch  lachelnd  wenn  er  stach, 

Und  ohne  Gift.     Nie  sahe  man  die  Musen 

Und  Grazien  in  einem  schonern  Bund, 

Nie  scherzte  die  Vernunft  aus  einem  schonern  Mund, 

Und  Amor  nie  um  einen  schonern  Busen.^^ 

55  Letter   to    Geszner,   July  21,    1766:   "  Auswahl    denkwiirdiger   Brief e," 

I,  33. 

56  Letter  to  Riedel,  Feb.  4,   1768,  ibid.,  I,   184. 

57  J.  G.  Jacobi  was  also  strongly  impressed  by  Musarion's  philosophy, 
which  he  describes  as  follows : 

Die  stille  Weisheit,  ohne  Stolz, 
An  deren  Hand  sich  Liebesgotter  freuen, 
Der  sie,  besteckt  mit  griinen  Meyen, 
In  Tempelchen  von  Rosenholz 
Den  Bogen  und  den  Kocher  weihen : 
Die  feurig  ohne  Schwarmerei, 
Nicht  flatterhaft,  und  dennoch  frei, 
Wohlthatig  unser  Herz  entztindet ; 
Mit  einem  Lacheln  oft  ergriindet, 
Was  kiihner  Geister  Neid  erregt,  etc. 
See  "An  aglaja,"  J.  G.  Jacobi's  "  Werke  "  (Zxirich),  1825,  II,  22. 

58  "  Musarion,"  line  1425,  Prohle,  I,  57. 
5^  Ibid.,  lines   150-8,  p.   19. 


113 

Musarion's  constant  cheerfulness  and  the  grace  which  is 
spread  upon  all  her  words  and  acts  soon  dispel  Phanias'  gloom : 

Allein  der  Dame  Witz,  die  freie  Munterkeit, 
Die  was  sie  spricht  und  tut  mit  Grazie  bestreut, 
Und  dann  und  wann  ein  Blick  vol!  Zartlichkeit, 
Den  sie,  als  ob  sie  sich  vergasz,  erst  auf  ihn  heftet, 
Dann  seitwarts  glitschen  laszt — entkraftet 
Den  Unmut  bald,  der  seine  Stirne  krauszt.^° 

Through  her  influence  Phanias  leads  a  wise  and  happy  life, 
and  his  home  becomes  a  genuine  temple  of  the  Graces : 

Gliickselig,  weil  er's  war,  nicht  weil  die  Welt  es  wahnte, 

Bringt  Phanias  in  neidenswerter  Ruh 

Ein  unbeneidet  Leben  zu; 

In  Freuden,  die  der  unverfalschte  Stempel 

Der  Unschuld  und  Natur  zu  echten  Freuden  pragt. 

Der  biirgerliche  Sturm,  der  stets  Athen  bewegt, 

Trifft  seine  Hiitte  nicht — den  Tempel 

Der  Grazien  seitdem  Musarion  sie  ziert. 

Bescheidene  Gunst,  durch  ihren  Witz  geleitet, 

Giebt  der  Natur,  so  weit  sein  Landgut  sich  verbreitet. 

Den  stillen  Reiz,  der  ohne  Schimmer  riihrt. 

Ein  Garten,  den  mit  Zephyrn  und  mit  Floren 

Pomona  sich  zum  Aufenthalt  erkoren ; 

Ein  Hain,  worin  sich  Amor  gern  verliert, 

Wo  ernstes  Denken  oft  mit  leichtem  Scherz  sich  gattet.^^ 

This  notion  of  coupling  "  ernstes  Denken  mit  leichtem 
Scherz,"  the  notion  which  constitutes  the  leading  theme  of 
Shaftesbury's  "wit  and  humor"  philosophy,  underlies,  as  we 
just  had  occasion  to  see,  Wieland's  poetry  of  the  Graces. 
Nobody  else,  he  declares,  loves  "  die  mit  den  Grazien  scher- 
zende  Philosophie "  better  than  he.®^  And  "  Musarion,"  the 
leading  representative  of  his  Grazien-Dichtimg,  he  describes  as 
a  work  which  more  than  any  other  of  his  works  portrays  his 
own  taste  and  philosophy.^^    Shaftesbury's  "  wit  and  humor  " 

60  Ibid.,  lines  769-74,  p.  38, 
6"^  Ibid.,  lines   1392-1406,  p.  56. 

62  Teutscher  Merkur,  Jan.,  1773,  p.  32. 

63  Letter  to  Riedel,  June  2,  1768;  "  Auswahl  denkwiirdiger  Brief  e,"  I,  186. 

9 


114 

philosophy  is  closely  connected  with  a  bright  and  cheerful  atti- 
tude to  life  in  general.  This  is  also  true  of  Wieland's  Grazien- 
Philosophic.  "  Never,"  he  declares  "  with  the  help  of  God  and 
of  my  sound  common  sense,  will  I  have  any  other  philosophy 
than  that  of  the  Graces.  I  examine  everything  in  the  mildest 
light.""* 

This  brings  us  to  Wieland's  life,  which  is  a  living  example  of 
the  doctrines  represented  by  him.  Goethe's  remark  about  Wie- 
land,  "  Mensch  und  Schriftsteller  batten  sich  in  ihm  ganz 
durchdrungen :  er  dichtete  als  ein  Lebender  und  lebte  dichtend,"®^ 
is  also  justified  in  this  case.  Just  as  Wieland's  poetry  was  a 
Grazicn-Diclitung,  so  his  life  was  a  Grazien-Lehen,  if  we  may 
use  such  a  term.  It  is  precisely  the  kind  of  life  which  is  led  by 
his  heroine,  the  serene  and  cheerful  Musarion.  Her  philoso- 
phy, he  says,  her  taste  and  principles,  are  those  according  to 
which  he  lives.  The  mild  aspect  in  which  she  examines  things, 
this  equilibrium  between  enthusiasm  and  indifference,  this  play- 
ful pleasantry  with  which  she  distinguishes  between  the  true  on 
one  hand  and  the  exaggerated,  improper  and  fantastic  on  the 
other,  this  indulgence  toward  the  imperfections  of  human 
nature — "  alle  diese  Ziige  sind  die  Lineamenten  meines  eigenen 
Geistes  und  Herzens."*"*  To  use  the  words  of  Wieland's  biog- 
rapher, J.  G.  Gruber,  the  Graces  were  "  die  steten  Gefahrtinnen 
seines  Lebens."^^ 

Finally  we  have  Goethe's  testimony  in  his  memorial  oration 
on  Wieland.  Wieland's  life,  says  Goethe,  had  always  been 
bright  and  serene.  He  not  only  lived,  Goethe  adds,  but  died  in 
this  serene  and  cheerful  atmosphere.  To  make  the  memorial 
service  more  consistent  with  Wieland's  life,  Goethe  then  would 
make  the  occasion  of  Wieland's  death  an  occasion  of  joy  and 
cheer,  in  order  that  it  may  appear  "  so  froh  und  klar  als  das 
Leben  unseres  Freundes."''^ 

64  Quoted  by  Heinrich  Doring  in  "  Chr.  M.  Wieland.  Ein  biographisches 
Denkmal  "  (Sangerhausen,  1840),  p.  193.  The  words  are  quoted  from  a 
letter  of  Wieland,  but  Doring  has  no  information  as  to  when  or  to  whom 
the  letter  is  written. 

65  "  Zum  Andenken  des  edlen  Dichters,  Bruders  und  Freundes  Wieland," 
Hempel,  XXVII^,  57. 

66  The  Foreword  to  "Musarion,"  Prohle,  I,    10. 

67  "  Wieland  geschildert  von  Gruber,"  II,  536. 

68  Hempel,  XXVII^,  54-55. 


CHAPTER   VI 

Miscellaneous 

I.     Optimism 

Shaftesbury's  optimism  is  also  reflected  in  Wieland,  who  is 
convinced  that  the  good  predominates ;  he  is  filled  with  admira- 
tion and  enthusiasm  for  the  beauty  and  harmony  of  the  uni- 
verse in  general  and  of  human  life  in  particular.  Nature,  he 
says,  has  made  our  brains  and  senses  instruments  of  pleasure. 
If  it  had  only  been  possible  nature  would  not  have  subjected  us 
to  any  pain  whatever.  But  even  as  matters  stand  now,  pain 
has  no  access  to  us  and  our  happiness  is  seldom  interrupted,  if 
we  only  obey  nature's  laws.^  The  good  predominates  in  the 
world,  for  otherwise  the  creator  would  not  tolerate  the  world 
a  single  moment.^ 

But  the  feature  which  above  all  stamps  Wieland's  optimism 
as  Shaftesburian  is  his  Shaftesbury-like  enthusiasm  for  the 
beauty,  order  and  harmony  of  the  universe.  The  harmony  of 
the  universe  is  considered  by  Agathodamon  as  analogous  to  the 
harmony  of  charming  music.  The  manifold  relations  of  the 
various  movements  and  the  operations  of  the  various  creatures 
are  all,  in  spite  of  so  many  real  and  apparent  dissonances,  most 
indissolubly  combined  and  harmoniously  united  with  one 
another.  Charming  music,  therefore,  gives  to  a  noble  soul  a 
vivid  conception  of  this  perfect  harmony  of  things,  "  von  dieser 
aus  unendlich  vielfachen  Tonen,  Stimmen  und  Accorden  durch 
den  Geist  der  Ordnung  und  Liebe  zusammengesetzten  Sym- 
phonic des  Weltalls."^  So  is  Agathon  convinced  of  the  wisdom 
and  goodness  manifested  in  the  individual  parts  of  creation 

1 "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,  71. 

2  "  Sympathien,"  Goschen,  XXIX,   15. 

3  "  Agathodamon,"  Hempel,  XXIII,  191-2. 

115 


116 

and  in  the  plan  and  general  economy*  of  the  whole.  He  is  also 
convinced  that  the  stedfast  contemplation  of  this  wisdom  and 
goodness  is  an  unfailing  means  of  becoming  himself  wise  and 
good.° 

The  harmony  found  in  the  universe  is  manifested  even  to  a 
higher  degree  in  the  fate  and  life  of  man.  While  beholding 
the  beauty  of  nature  we  must  remember  that  we  are  her  chil- 
dren, that  all  the  other  works  of  nature  seem  to  be  merely  the 
preliminary  exercise  by  which  she  prepares  herself  for  her 
masterpiece,  i.  e.,  man;  that  in  him  she  takes  the  deepest 
interest.*'  A  superficial  comparison  of  the  various  creatures 
may  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  nature  takes  the  least  care  of 
the  preservation  of  man.  Thus,  he  is  naturally  unprotected 
against  cold  and  heat  and  is  incapable  of  supporting  himself 
without  long  assistance  from  others.  The  instinct,  which  is 
the  innate  guide  of  the  lower  animals,  is  weak,  unsteady  and 
inadequate  in  man.  But  for  all  these  apparent  disadvantages 
man  is  sufficiently  compensated  by  his  reason  and  taste  for 
beauty:  " Warum  alles  das,  als  weil  sie  (nature)  ihn  durch  die 
Vernunft  und  die  Empfindung  des  Schonen,  die  er  vor  jenen 
(animals)  voraus  hat,  fahig  gemacht  hat  diesen  Abgang  zu 
ersetzen?"  Nature  has  left  to  man  himself  the  continuation 
of  her  work.  Man,  therefore,  must  in  a  way  become  his  own 
"second  creator,"  but  his  life  acquires  a  greater  splendor 
thereby.'^ 

This  reminds  us  directly  of  the  conversation  between  Philo- 
cles  and  Theocles  in  Shaftesbury's  "  Moralists."  Philocles 
there  cites  a  few  advantages  which  the  lower  animal  has  over 
man,  but  Theocles  maintains  his  optimistic  view  by  asserting 
that  men  are  in  no  need  of  these  advantages  possessed  by  the 

4  Shaftesbury  also  employs  the  term  economy  in  connection  with  the 
entire  system  of  the  universe  or  the  general  nature  of  a  creature.  Other 
instances  where  Wieland  uses  the  Shaftesburian  term  are:  "Agathon,"  VI, 
152  and  308;  "Aufsatze  iiber  die  franzosische  Revolution,"  Hempel, 
XXXIV,    103, 

5  "  Agathon,"  V,  2a. 

0  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VII,  74. 

7  "  Koxkox  und  Kikequetzel,"  Hempel,  XXXI,  35  ff.,  or  "  Beitrage  zur 
geheimen  Geschichte  des  menschlichen  Verstandes  und  Herzens "  (of 
which  "Koxkox  und  Kikequetzel"  is  a  part),  I,  91  ff. 


117 

animals :  "  Where  was  the  occasion  or  use  ?  Where  the  neces- 
sity? Have  they  (men)  not  what  is  better  in  another  kind? 
Have  they  not  reason  and  discourse?  Does  not  this  instruct 
them?    What  need  of  the  other."^ 

2.     Doctrine  of  Divinity 

Also  in  the  doctrine  of  divinity  Wieland  adheres  to  Shaftes- 
bury. He  also  uses  the  teleological  proof  for  the  existence  of 
a  Supreme  Being  and  likewise  conceives  of  God  as  the  world- 
soul.  Thus  Archytas  who,  as  we  have  seen,  is  in  many  respects 
modelled  after  Shaftesbury,  declares  that  a  universe  in  which 
there  is  such  excellent  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  such  beau- 
tiful simplicity  in  the  midst  of  the  most  infinite  variety,  such 
harmony  amidst  so  many  different  elements,  such  uniformity 
along  with  this  everlasting  change  of  things — that  such  a  uni- 
verse must  be  the  city  of  God  where  justice  and  wisdom  pre- 
vail, the  lasting  effect  of  an  original  and  fundamental  power, 
the  visible  manifestation  of  an  unlimited  mind.^  Shaftesbury 
likewise  declares  that  "  having  recognized  this  uniform  con- 
sistent fabrick  and  owned  the  universal  system  we  must  of 
consequence  acknowledge  a  universal  mind."^°  Like  Shaftes- 
bury, Wieland  is  also  filled  with  enthusiasm  for  the  notion  of 
the  divine  spirit.  The  soul,  he  declares,  expands  at  the  mere 
conception  of  the  infinite  spirit.  This  conception  has  and 
should  have  the  same  relation  to  our  soul  as  the  sun  to  the 
world.  It  should  give  light  and  warmth  to  the  soul  and  bring 
into  maturity  every  virtue  and  perfection. ^^ 

And  then  Wieland  develops  the  Shaftesburian  conception  of 
God  as  the  world-soul.  The  beauty  of  nature  and  the  harmony 
of  things,  we  are  told,  are  manifestations  of  what  we  call  the 
"  being  of  beings,  the  king  of  spirits  and  the  soul  of  the 
world. "^-  The  world  is  too  excellent  not  to  be  the  work  of  a 
Supreme  Being.  The  Supreme  Being,  to  be  sure,  is  invisible 
to  our  physical  eyes,  but  is  seen  by  the  mind's  eye.     For  just 

8  "  Characteristics,"  II,  300-308. 

8"  Agathon,"  VI,  313- 

10  "  Characteristics,"  II,  290. 

11 "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VIII,  93. 

12  "  Araspes  und  Panthea,"  Goschen,  XXVII,  54. 


118 

as  soon  as  a  man  is  able  to  perceive  the  order  and  harmony, 
the  wise  laws  and  benevolent  purposes  of  nature,  he  cannot 
doubt  the  existence  of  a  supreme  wisdom  and  goodness,  or  the 
"  common  soul  of  the  whole,"  any  more  than  he  can  doubt  the 
existence  of  his  own  soul,  which  is  no  more  visible  to  him  than 
the  soul  of  the  universe}^ 

3.     Dialogue 

Wieland  is  interested  in  the  technic  and  style  of  Shaftes- 
bury's compositions  and  praises  them  again  and  again.  Prais- 
ing the  systematic  treatment  of  Shaftesbury's  "Inquiry"  and 
"  Moralists,"  he  says :  "  Shaftesbury  hat  gewuszt  was  Methode 
ist."^*  And  his  review  of  the  German  translation  of  Shaftes- 
bury of  1776  contains  the  statement  that  "Shaftesbury  bleibt 
uns  allezeit  ein  Muster  feiner  Composition."^^  But  above  all 
Wieland  is  fond  of  Shaftesbury's  form  of  the  dialogue.  K.  A. 
Bottiger  reports  Wieland  as  saying — in  a  conversation  of  Feb. 
6,  1799 — that  Plato's  sophists  reply  like  stupid  fellows,  that 
Lucian  made  an  advance  in  the  form  of  the  dialogue,  but  that 
Shaftesbury  attained  the  greatest  proficiency  in  it;  for  with 
him  every  one  of  the  speakers  is  in  full  earnest.^^  Again,  in 
his  review  of  Galliani's  "  Dialogues  sur  le  commerce  des  bles," 
he  regards  the  work  as  one  of  the  most  excellent  masterpieces 
and  models  of  dialogue  and  considers  no  other  modern  dia- 
logue worthy  of  being  ranked  with  Galliani's  work,  except 
Shaftesbury's  "  Moralists."^^  And  he  himself  writes  "  Timo- 
klea,"  his  first  dialogue,  hoping  that  "  das  Beste  wozu  dieser 
miszlungene  Versuch  in  der  dialogistischen  Schreibart  dienen 
konnte,  ware,  wenn  er  die  Kenner  veranlaszte,  die  Lehren  des 
Shaftesbury  iiber  diese  Art  von  Werken  des  Geistes  unter  den 
Deutschen  bekannter  zu  machen."^^ 

13  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel,"  VIII,  90. 
1*  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  280—1. 

15  Teutscher  Merkur,  Feb.,  1777,  p.  202. 

16  "  Literarische  Zustande  und  Zeitgenossen,"  Leipzig,   1838,  I,  239. 
i''  Teutscher  Merkur,  Dec,  1800,  p.  245  or  Hempel,  XXXVI,  182. 

18  Cf.  Foreword  to  "  Timoklea  "  in  "  Prosaische  Schriften,"  III,  162. 


119 

4-     "  Tahlature  of  the  Judgment  of  Hercules  " 

Wieland  did  not  speculate  about  art  as  such,  and  yet  he  was 
interested  in  Shaftesbury's  "  Tablature  of  the  Judgment  of 
Hercules,"  the  work  containing  Shaftesbury's  artistic  specu- 
lations. In  a  note  to  "Der  neue  Amadis  "  (1771)  he  says: 
"  As  a  commentary  to  the  painting  ('  The  Choice  of  Hercules ') 
we  have  the  '  Tablature  of  the  Judgment  of  Hercules,'  or  the 
seventh  treatise  in  the  Earl  of  Shaftesbury's  '  Characteristics,' 
of  which  Thurneisen  and  Le  Grand  in  Basel  have  given  us  a 
beautiful  new  edition  in  their  valuable  collection  of  the  best 
English  authors."^^  And  in  one  of  the  notes  to  his  translation 
of  the  "  Sokratische  Gesprache  "  (1799),  he  speaks  of  Shaftes- 
bury's "  Judgment  of  Hercules  "  as  being  "  in  mehr  als  einer 
Riicksicht  lesenswiirdig."-''  And  then  he  himself  writes  an 
operette  "Die  Wahl  des  Herkules  "  (1773),  which  is  based  on 
the  same  general  episode  as  Shaftesbury's  work. 

5.     "Advice  to  an  Author" 

Also  in  his  capacity  as  author  and  literary  critic  Shaftesbury 
exerts  an  influence  on  Wieland.  Shaftesbury's  views  on  liter- 
ary art  are  contained  in  his  "  Advice  to  an  Author,"  and  Wie- 
land's  interest  in  this  work  is  attested,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
by  his  frequent  quotations  from  and  allusions  to  it."^  Un- 
doubtedly he  began  the  study  of  Shaftesbury  with  the  "  Advice 
to  an  Author,"  for  there  was  a  German  translation  of  it  as 
early  as  1738.  From  Shaftesbury's  "Advice"  Wieland  learns 
more  than  one  valuable  lesson.  Thus,  when  he  tells  us,  in 
1758,  that  he  had  learned  from  Shaftesbury  the  significance  of 
being  an  author,^-  he  certainly  refers  to  the  inspiration  received 
from  the  "Advice  to  an  Author."  On  March  15,  1755,  he 
writes  to  Schinz :  "  Meine  Zeit  wird  wohl  angewandt,  wenn 
ich  gleich  nicht  immer  schreibe  und  drucken  lasse.     Musz  man 

19  Goschen,  XV,  293.  This  note  must  have  been  written  by  Wieland  in 
the  second  edition  of  "  Der  neue  Amadis  "  (1794).  It  could  not  have  been 
written  in  the  first  edition  of  1771,  since  Wieland  refers  to  the  Thurn- 
eisen edition  of  the  "Characteristics,"  which  did  not  appear  until   1790. 

^'^  Attisches  Museum,  III,   131. 

21  Cf.  Chap.  I,  p,  8,  note  13;  p.  9,  note  16;  p.  17,  note  58;  p.  18,  notes 
59  and  62. 

22  Cf.  Chap.  I,  p.  7,  note  4. 


120 

nicht  wieder  lesen  und  denkeii,  Ideen  sammeln  und  rangleren 
and  bearbeiten,  ehe  man  wieder  schreiben  kann?  Voyes 
Schaftcsbury's  Advice  for  an  Author."^^  Here  Wieland  un- 
doubtedly alludes  to  the  emphasis  laid  by  Shaftesbury  upon  the 
necessity  of  "  that  main  preliminary  of  self-study  and  inzvard 
converse,  which  we  have  found  so  much  wanting  in  the  authors 
of  our  time.  That  their  composition  and  vein  of  writing  may 
be  natural  and  free,  they  should  settle  matters,  in  the  first  place, 
with  themselves.  And  having  gained  a  mastery  here  they  may 
easily  with  the  help  of  their  genius  and  a  right  use  of  art  com- 
mand their  audience  and  establish  a  good  taste."-'*' 

Again,  in  one  of  the  "Sympathien"  he  calls  Amyntor's 
attention  to  the  fact  that  nowadays  the  literary  art  has  become 
considerably  degraded ;  that  whereas  the  literary  profession 
was  formerly  practiced  only  by  enlightened  minds  whose  main 
purpose  was  to  ascertain  the  true  and  noble  and  beautiful, 
people  write  nowadays  either  because  they  wish  to  see  their 
names  in  print,  or  because  it  is  fashionable,  or  for  the  purpose 
of  earning  a  livelihood.  The  author  then  urges  Amyntor  to 
help  to  restore  the  noble  profession  to  its  proper  position  and 
to  make  it  again  only  a  prerogative  of  those  who  are  by  nature 
equipped  to  be  oracles  of  truth.  "  Willst  du  nicht  helfen, 
Amyntor,  diesem  erhabenen  Beruf  seinen  alten  Platz  wieder  zu 
verschaffen?  Willst  du  nicht  einer  von  den  wenigen  sein,  fiir 
welche  der  weise  Shaftesbury  seine  Erinnerungen  nicht  um- 
sonst  gegeben  hat  ?  "^^  To-  the  word  Erinnerungen  Wieland 
attaches  the  following  note:  "Advice  to  an  Author,  im  ersten 
Telle  seiner  Characteristics."^'^ 

Oct.  1 8,  1756,  Wieland  suspects  that  Zimmermann  must 
have  read  Shaftesbury's  "  Advice "  and  that  he  must  have 
retained  in  his  mind  Shaftesbury's  demands  of  symmetry,  pro- 
portion, regular  development  and  the  like ;  that  Zimmermann 
was  displeased  with  his  own  work  "  Uber  die  Einsamkeit," 
because  he  considered  it  as  falling  short  of  Shaftesbury's  de- 

23  "  Ausgewahlte  Brief  e,"  I,  162-3.  The  italicized  phrase  is  given  as  in 
Wieland. 

24  "  Advice  to  an  Author,"  I,  277. 
25G6schen,  XXIX,  55. 

26  Ibid.,  p.  404. 


121 

mands.^^  And  two  years  later  he  criticises  Zimmermann's  book 
on  solitude  and  accompanies  the  criticism  with  the  following 
remark:  As  for  the  rest  I  believe  that  an  author  can  himself 
best  judge  the  plan  of  his  work  and  that  he  is  justified  in 
arranging  his  composition  as  he  pleases,  provided  he  is  skillful 
enough  to  create  well-shaped  bodies  and  no  abortions.  "  Sie," 
he  continues,  "kennen  Shaftesburys  Advice  to  an  Author; 
dieser  erschopft  meines  Bediinkens  alles,  was  sich  davon  sagen 
laszt."-« 

Finally,  in  1780,  Wieland  himself  writes  in  the  Merkur 
"  Noch  ein  kleiner  Advice  to  an  Author."-^  He  attacks  here 
the  habit  acquired  by  German  authors  of  misspelling  well- 
known  Greek  names.  The  contents  of  this  brief  article,  to  be 
sure,  have  no  connection  with  Shaftesbury's  "  Advice  to  an 
Author,"  but  that  Wieland  certainly  had  Shaftesbury  in  mind 
at  the  time  is  quite  obvious  from  the  title  of  the  article. 

6.  Soliloquy 
We  come  finally  to  the  so-called  doctrine  of  soliloquy. 
Shaftesbury  urges  self-investigation  or  soliloquy,  as  he  calls  it, 
upon  authors,  orators,  upon  all  men.  Every  man,  he  claims, 
has  two  souls,  two  natures,  a  reasonable  and  an  unreasonable 
one.  Man  can  and  should  divide  himself  into  two  and  thus 
converse  with  himself.  As  an  illustration  Shaftesbury  then, 
without  mentioning  any  names,  tells  in  brief  the  episode  of 
Xenophon's  Araspes  and  Panthea.^"  Shaftesbury's  doctrine 
of  soliloquy  finds  an  exact  parallel  in  Wieland.  Thus  he 
recognizes  a  proclivity  "  zum  Forschen  in  sich  selbst "  as  one 
of  the  necessary  qualifications  of  a  poet.^^  The  wise  and 
virtuous  man  likes  to  contemplate  himself  and  to  converse 
with  his  thoughts.  He  analyzes  his  ideas  and  studies  his  heart 
• — and  "  c'est  dans  les  entretiens  solitaires  qu'il  decouvre  les 
enchantements  trompeurs  de  I'imagination  et  les  moyens  de 

27  "  Ausgewahlte  Briefe,"  I,  222-3. 
2S  Ibid.,  I,  282. 

29  July,  pp.  45-8. 

30  "  Characteristics,"  I,  176-84. 

31 "  Sendschreiben  an  einen  jungen  Dichter  "  (1782),  Goschen,  XXXIII, 
270. 


^ 


122 

s'en  delivrer,"^^  He  makes  his  Agathon  engage  in  frequent 
self-converse  and  compliments  his  hero  on  this  habit  of  solilo- 
quizing. We  must  not,  he  says,  consider  this  as  in  any  way 
improper,  for  no  less  a  fine  man  of  the  world  than  Horace  was 
accustomed  to  converse  with  himself.  It  is  all  the  worse  for 
us  if  on  certain  occasions  we  do  not  soliloquize  as  readily  as 
■Agathon.  We  should  do  very  well  to  learn  from  him  this 
habit.=^3 

On  another  occasion  we  read  that  real  men,  such  as  we  find 
them  in  daily  life,  will  always  have  two  souls,  a  selfish  and  an 
unselfish  one.  Then  the  author  accompanies  this  remark  by 
the  following  note:  "  S.  Xenofons  Cyropddie  oder,  wem  es 
gelegner  ist,  Shaftesbury's  Characteristics,  Vol.  I,  page  152  u.f., 
in  der  neuen  Baselschen  Ausgabe,"  etc.^* 

In  connection  with  the  question  of  abolishing  hereditary 
nobility  in  France,  Wieland  supports  the  affirmative  side  of  the 
question  by  means  of  a  soliloquy.  We  know,  he  says,  from 
Shaftesbury's  "  Characteristics  "  that  all  soliloquies  are  based 
upon  the  fact  that  every  man  has  two  souls,  a  reasonable  and 
an  unreasonable,  and  that  these  two  often  conflict  with  each 
other.^^  I  do  not  know,  he  continues,  what  Montmorency^^ 
had  actually  said  in  the  national  assembly,  but  if  I  had  to  settle 
the  question  I  should  converse  with  myself  in  the  following 
manner.  And  then  the  author  develops  a  conversation  between 
the  verni'mftige  and  unverniinftige  Seele  and  arrives  in  the 
end  at  the  desirable  conclusion.^''  He  finally  summarizes  his 
approval  of  the  Shaftesburian  doctrine  in  the  following  terms: 
"  Horaz  war  ein  groszer  Liebhaber  von  diesen  Selbstgesprachen, 
und  der  sinnreichste  und  politeste  Philosoph  unseres  Jahr- 
hunderts,  der  Graf  Anton  Shaftesbury,  empfiehlt  sie  mit  Recht 

32  "  Die  Ziiricher  Abschiedsrede  "  (1759),  Vierteljahrschrift  fiir  Litera- 
turgeschichte,  1889,  II,  588. 

33  "Agathon,"  IV,  76;  V,  167. 

34  Sendschreiben  an  Prof.  Eggers  (1792),  Hempel,  XXXIV,  169.  The 
passage  referred  to  is  found  in  our  edition  of  the  "  Characteristics,"  I,  184. 

35  "  tjber  die  Abschaffung  des  Erbadels  in  Frankreich  "  (1790),  Hempel, 
XXXIV,  95. 

36  Montmorency  was  a  French  nobleman  who  was  very  active  in  behalf 
of  abolishing  hereditary  titles  of  nobility.     Cf.  ibid.,  p.  94. 

^"^  Ibid.,  pp.  95-102. 


123 

als  ein  vortreffliches  Hausmittel,  unsere  innerliche  Oekonomie 
auf  einen  guten  Fusz  zu  setzen  und  dem  verniinftigen  Teil 
unseres  Selbst  iiber  den  unverniinftigen  das  gehorige  Uber- 
gewicht  zu  verschaffen."^^  •. 

Conclusion  ^ 

Shaftesbury's  influence  on  Wieland  begins  as  early  as  1752 
and  extends  through  the  entire  life-work  of  the  poet.  His 
knowledge  of  Shaftesbury,  at  the  beginning  somewhat  hazy 
and  blended  with  Platonic  philosophy,  soon  becomes  clearer,  so 
that  by  1755  the  English  philosopher  is  a  distinct  factor  in 
Wieland's  intellectual  life.  Shaftesbury  then  figures  very 
prominently  in  Wieland's  transition  from  the  first  to  the 
second  period  of  his  career.  The  large  concentrated  study  of 
Shaftesbury  seems  to  take  place  in  1758.  But  the  Shaftes- 
burian  influence  predominates  above  all  in  Wieland's  works 
written  after  the  first  period  of  his  career.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  "Musarion"  (1768),  "Die  Grazien  "  (1770),  "  Bei- 
trage  zur  geheimen  Geschichte  des  menschlichen  Verstandes 
und  Herzens"  (1770),  "  Der  goldne  Spiegel"  (1772),  "Aga- 
thon"  (1766-94),  "Aristipp"  (1800-2),  are  Wieland's  great 
store-houses  of  Shaftesburian  philosophy. 

Wieland  was  a  student  of  the  English  in  general.  He  was 
interested  in  and  influenced  by  Sterne,  Fielding,  Spenser  and 
Richardson.  To  none  other,  however,  he  owed  as  much  as  to 
Shaftesbury,  in  whom  he  was  able  to  find  the  healthy  philoso- 
phy of  the  ancients  and  the  Aufkldrung  of  his  own  age.  Goethe 
was  right  in  finding  Wieland  and  Shaftesbury  "  vollkommen 
ahnlich  "  and  in  declaring  that  "  was  der  Englander  verstandig 
lehrt  und  wiinscht,  das  weisz  der  Deutsche  in  Versen  und 
Prosa  dichterisch  und  rednerisch  auszufiihren."^^ 

38  Ibid.,  pp.   102-3. 

39  "  Zum  Andenken  des  edeln  Dichters,  Bruders  und  Freundes  Wieland," 
Hempel  edition,  XXVII^,  60-1. 


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124 


125 

Doell,  M.:  Wieland  und  die  Antike.    Dissertation,  Miinchen, 

1896. 
Doell,  M.:  Die  Beniitzung  der  Antike  in  Wielands  '  Morali- 

schen  Briefen.'     Eichstatt,  1903. 
Doering,  Heinrich:  Ch.  M.  Wieland.    Ein  biographisches  Denk- 

mal.     Sangerhausen,  1840. 
Ermatinger,  Emil:  Die  Weltanschaung  des  jungen  Wieland. 

Frauenfeld,  1907. 
Ferguson,  Adam:  Principles  of  Moral  and  Political  Science 

(in  2  volumes),  Edinburgh,  1892.     Consulted  Vol.  II. 
Fowler,   Thomas:   Shaftesbury   and  Hutcheson,   New   York, 

1883. 
Funck,  Heinrich:  Beitrage  zur  Wieland-Biographie,  Freiburg 

and  Tiibingen,  1882. 
Funck,  Heinrich:  Gesprache  mit  Wieland  in  Ziirich,  Schnorrs 

Archiv  fiir  Liter aturgeschichte,  XIII,  485-97. 
Gizycki,  Georg  v.:  Die  Philosophic  Shaftesburys.     Leipzig  and 

Heidelberg,  1876. 
Gruber,  Johann  Gottfried:  Wieland  Geschildert  von  Gruber, 

Leipzig  and  Altenburg,  1816. 
Gots,   Friedrich:   Geliebte   Schatten,    Mannheim,    1858.     The 

part  relating  to  Wieland. 
Hamann,  Emil:  Wielands  Bildungsideal.     Dissertation,  Leip- 
zig, 1907. 
Hatch,  Irvin  C.:  Der  Einflusz  Shaftesburys  auf  Herder.    Dis- 
sertation.    Stanford  University.     No  date. 
Herchner,  Hans:  Die  Cyropadie  in  Wielands  Werken,  Berlin, 

1892. 
Hettner,  Hermann:  Geschichte  der  englischen  Literatur  (1660- 

'^77^)-     5th  edition.     Braunschweig,  1894.     Book  II,  ist 

Abschnitt. 
Hirzel,  Ludwig:  Wieland  und  Martin   und   Regula  Kiinzli. 

Leipzig,  1891. 
Hirsel,  Ludwig:  Eine  vergessene  Schrift  Wielands.    Schnorrs 

Archiv,  XI,  377-85. 
Hobbes,   Thomas:   Leviathan,   3d  edition,   Glasgow,  London, 

New  York,  1887.     No.  21  in  Morley's  Universal  Library. 
Hutcheson,  Francis:  Inquiry  into  the  Original  of  our  Ideas  of 

Beauty  and  Virtue,  in  2  treatises.     Glasgow,  1772. 


126 

Ischer,  Rudolph:  Beitrage  zur  Kenntnis  von  Wielands  tjber- 
setzungen.     Euphorion,  XIV,  242-56. 

Jacohy,  Gimther:  Herders  und  Kants  Aesthetik.    Leipzig,  1907. 

Kant,  Immamicl:  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft.  Edited  by  Karl 
Kehrbach,  Leipzig, 

Kant,  Immanuel:  Kritik  der  Urteilskraft.  K.  Kehrbach  (Text 
of  edition  A,  1790). 

Kant,  Immanuel:  Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft,  4th  edition, 
Riga,  1797. 

Kcil,  Robert:  Aus  Wielands  Leben.  Vom  Pels  zum  Meer  II, 
112-36. 

Kersten:  Wielands  Verhaltnis  zu  Lucian.     Cuxhaven,  1900. 

Keussler,  Gerhard  v. :   Die  Grenzen  der  Aesthetik,  Leipzig,  1902. 

Klein,  Timotheus:  Wieland  und  Rousseau.  Dissertation,  Ber- 
lin, 1903. 

Klingenspor,  Franz:  Montaigne  und  Shaftesbury  in  ihrer  prak- 
tischen Philosophic.     Dissertation,  Erlangen,  1908. 

Koch,  Max:  Die  Beziehungen  der  englischen  zur  deutschen 
Literatur  im  18  Jahrhundert,  Leipzig,  1883. 

Koch,  Max:  Chr.  M.  Wieland,  Allgemeine  Deutsche  Bio- 
graphic, XLII,  400-19. 

Lechler,  Gotthard  Victor:  Geschichte  des  englischen  Deismus. 
Stuttgart  and  Tiibingen,  1841. 

Leibniz,  Gottfried  Wilhelm:  La  Monadologie.  Edited  by 
Henri  Lachelier,  Paris,  1909. 

Leibniz,  G.  W.:  Theodicee,  in  2  volumes.  Amsterdam,  1747. 
Edited  by  M.  le  Chevalier  de  Jacourt. 

Briefzvechsel  zwischen  Leibniz  und  Coste,  1706-12,  in  Vol. 
Ill;  379-436  of  Philosophische  Schriften  von  Leibniz. 
Edited  by  C.  J.  Gerhardt,  Berlin,  1887. 

Leland,  John:  View  of  the  deistical  writers  that  appeared  in 
England  in  the  past  and  present  century.  London,  1757. 
Consulted  Part  I,  the  letters  on  Hobbes  and  Shaftesbury. 

Lenz,  Ludzvig:  Wielands  Verhaltnis  zu  Spenser.  Dissertation, 
Herrsfeld,  1903. 

Libby,  M.  F.:  Influence  of  the  Idea  of  Esthetic  Proportion 
upon  Shaftesbury's  Ethics.  Dissertation,  Clark  Univ., 
Worcester,  Mass.  (reprint  from  the  American  Journal  of 
Philosophy,  XII,  4). 


127 

Locke,  John:  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  N.  Y. 

1825. 
Loehell,  Johann  Wilhelm:  Wieland,  Vol.  II  of  Die  Entwick- 

lung  der  deutschen  Poesie  von  Klopstocks  erstem  Auf- 

treten  bis  zu  Goethes  Tode,  Braunschweig,  1858. 
Low,   C.   B.:   Wieland   und   Richardson,   Modern   Language 

Quarterly,  VII,  3,  pp.  142-8. 
Lyons,  William:  The  Infallibility  of  Human  Judgment.     3rd 

edition,  London,  1723. 
Mandeville,  Bernard:  The  Fable  of  the  Bees.     5th  edition, 

1729,  in  2  volumes. 
Martin,  John  J.:  Shaftesburys  und  Hutchesons  Verhaltnis  zu 

Hume.     Dissertation,  Halle,  1905. 
Ofterdinger,  L.  R.:  Wielands  Leben  und  Wirken  in  Schwaben 

und  in  der  Schweiz.     Heilbronn,  1877, 
Paley,  William:  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy  (in 2  volumes), 

14th  edition.    London,  1803.    Book  I,  Chapters  V  and  VII. 
Petzet,  Erich:  Studien  zu  Johann  Peter  Uz.     Miinchen  Dis- 
sertation, 1893. 
Pietsch,  Otto:  Schiller  als  Kritiker.     Konigsberg,  1898. 
Plato:  Phaedrus,  Vol.  I;  The  Banquet,  Vol.   Ill;  Philebus, 

Vol.   IV  of  Plato's  Works,   translated  into   English  by 

George  Burgess.     London,  1859. 
Plotinus:  Select  Works  of  Plotinus.     English  translation  by 

T.  Taylor,  London  and  New  York,  1909. 
Plotinus:  Les  Enneades  de  Plotin  (in  3  volumes).     French 

translation  by   M.   Bouillet.     Paris,    1857.     ist   Ennead, 

vi  and  5th  Ennead,  viii. 
Pomezny,  Franz:  Grazie  und  Grazien  in  der  deutschen  Litera- 

tur  des  18  Jahrhunderts,  Hamburg  and  Leipzig,  1900. 
Rand,  Benjamin:  Life,  Unpublished  Letters  and  Philosophical 

Regimen  of  Shaftesbury,  London,  1900.     In  the  Introduc- 
tion there  is  a  sketch  of  Shaftesbury's  life  by  his  son. 
Ranke,  Ernst:  Zur  Beurteilung  Wielands.     Marburg,  1885. 
Rehorn,  Fritz:  Moral  Sense  und  Moralprinzip  bei  Shaftesbury. 

Dissertation,  Bonn,  1882. 
Reid,  Thomas:  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind  on  Principles  of 

Common  Sense,  6th  edition,  1810. 


128 

Rittcr,  Heinrich:  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  Vol.  XI  (Ham- 
burg, 1852),  Book  VI,  429-588. 

Robertson,  John  M.:  The  Introduction  to  his  edition  of  Shaftes- 
bury's "  Characteristics." 

Sauer,  A.:  Uz'  Streit  mit  Wieland  und  den  Schweizern,  pp. 
xx-lxii  in  his  Introduction  to  Uz'  Sammtliche  Poetische 
Schriften,  Stuttgart,  1890  (in  Nos.  33-8  of  Deutsche 
Literaturdcnkmale  des  18  und  ip'  Jahrhiinderts,  edited  by 
Seuffert). 

Scheidl,  Joseph:  Personliche  Verhaltnisse  und  Beziehungen  zu 
den  antiken  quellen  in  Wielands  Agathon.  Miinchen  Dis- 
sertation, 1904. 

Seidensticker,  O.:  Literary  Relations  between  England  and 
Germany  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  Poet-Lore,  II  (1890), 
57-70,  16CH85. 

Seuffert,  Bernhard:  Mitteilungen  aus  Wielands  Jiinglingsalter ; 
Euphorion,  IV  (Erganzungsheft),  63-101  and  XIV,  23- 
37,  227-42. 

Seuffert,  B.:  Prolegomena  zu  einer  Wieland-Ausgabe.  Ah- 
handlungen  der  koniglich  preussischen  Akademie  der  Wis- 
senschaften,  1904,  1905,  1908,  1909. 

Seuffert,  B.:  Wielands  Berufung  nach  Weimar.  Vierteljahr- 
schrift  fi'tr  Literaturgeschichte  (edited  by  Seuffert),  1888, 

I,  342-435- 

Seuffert,  B.:  Wielands  Ziiricher  Abschiedsrede.     Ibid.,  1889, 

II,  579-94. 

Sommer,  Robert:  Grundzuge  einer  Geschichte  der  deutschen 
Psychologic  von  Wolf-Baumgarten  bis  Kant-Schiller. 
Wiirzburg,  1892. 

S piker,  Gideon:  Die  Philosophic  des  Graf  en  von  Shaftesbury, 
Freiburg,  1872. 

Spinoza,  Benedict:  Spinoza's  Works.  English  translation  by 
R.  H.  M.  Elwcs  (in  2  volumes),  London,  1906.  Con- 
sulted his  "Ethics"  and  his  Letters  (in  Vol.  II). 

Introduction  to  "  Die  Ethik  im  Urtexte,"  by  Hugo  Ginsberg, 
Leipzig,  1875. 

Spinoza's  Life  and  Philosophy,  by  Frederick  Pollock,  2d  edi- 
tion, New  York  and  London,  1899. 


129 

Steinberger,  Julius:  Lucians  Einflusz  aiif  Wieland,  Disserta- 
tion, Gottingen,  1902. 

Steinberger,  J.:  Wielands  Metamorphose  in  seiner  eigenen  Be- 
urteilung.  Archiv  fi'ir  das  Studium  der  neueren  Sprachen 
und  Literaturen,  XV  (1905),  290-7, 

Stemplinger,  E.:  Wielands  Verhaltnis  zu  Horaz,  Euphorion, 
XIII,  473-90- 

Stephen,  Leslie:  Essays  on  Freethinking  and  Plainspeaking. 
New  York  and  London,  1905.  Chapter  VI,  "  Shaftes- 
bury's Characteristics." 

Shaftesbury,  Anthony  Ashley  Cooper,  3d  Earl  of : 

A.     Works  and  Letters 

"  Characteristics,"  Baskerville  edition  of  1773  in  3 
volumes.  Vol.  I:  Letter  concerning  Enthusiasm  (ad- 
dressed to  Lord  Somers  and  published  separately  in  Lon- 
don, 1708),  Sensus  Communis  or  Essay  on  the  Freedom 
of  Wit  and  Humor  (appeared  in  May,  1709),  Soliloquy 
or  Advice  to  an  Author  (London,  1710) ;  Vol.  II:  In- 
quiry concerning  Virtue  and  Merit  (the  work  was  pub- 
lished surreptitiously  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
author,  during  his  absence  in  Holland.  Shaftesbury  men- 
tions the  fact  in  "  Letters  to  a  Young  Man  at  the  Uni- 
versity," Letter  VIII),  The  Moralists  or  a  Philosophical 
Rhapsody  (January,  1709);  Vol.  Ill:  Miscellaneous  Re- 
flections (the  only  treatise  not  published  previous  to  the 
first  edition  of  the  "Characteristics"),  Notion  of  the 
Tablature  of  the  Judgment  of  Hercules  (appeared  first  in 
1713),  Letter  concerning  Design  (appeared  first  in  the  2d 
edition  of  the  "Characteristics"). 

"  Letters  to  a  Young  Man  at  the  University,"  London, 
1716. 

Shaftesbury's  Letters  in  "  Original  Letters  of  Locke, 
Algernon  Sydney  and  Shaftesbury,"  by  F.  Forster,  Lon- 
don, 1830. 

Shaftesbury's  Letters  in  B.  Rand:  Life,  Unpublished 
Letters  and  Philosophical  Regimen  of  Shaftesbury. 
10 


130 

B.    Editions  of  the  "Characteristics"'^ 

Characteristics  of  Men,  Manners,  Opinions,  Times, 
171 1,  three  volumes  (anonymous). 

Characteristics,  The  Second  Edition  Corrected,  17 14. 

Characteristics,  The  Third  Edition,  1723. 

Characteristics,  The  Fourth  Edition,  1727. 

Characteristics,  The  Fifth  Edition,  Corrected,  1732. 
(Editions  2-5  printed  by  John  Darby,  London.) 

Characteristics,  London,  1733  (reprint). 

Characteristics,  The  Sixth  Edition,  1737.  Printed  by 
James  Purser,  London. 

Characteristics,  1743-5  (printer  and  printing  place  not 
mentioned). 

Characteristics,  1749. 

Characteristics,  1758.  Glasgow,  4  volumes.  The  4th 
volume  contains  the  letters  which  appeared  up  to  date  and 
the  Introduction  to  Whichcote's  sermons. 

Characteristics,  The  Fifth  Edition,  Birmingham,  printed 
by  John  Baskerville,  1773. 

Characteristics,  Basel,  1790.  Printed  by  J.  J.  Tourn- 
eisen  and  D.  L.  Legrand.  The  ist  volume  contains  the 
letters  published  up  to  date. 

Characteristics,  1870,  London.  Edited  with  marginal 
analysis,  notes  and  illustrations  by  Rev.  Walter  M.  Hatch. 
Only  the  ist  volume  appeared. 

Characteristics,  Edited,  with  introduction  and  notes,  by 
John  M.  Robertson  in  2  volumes.     London,  1900. 

C.     German  Translations  of  Shaftesbury's  Works 

Venzky :  Unterredungen  mit  sich  selbst.  1738.  Magde- 
burg. 

Spalding:  Die  Sittenlehrer,  Berlin,  1745. 

Spalding:  Untersuchung  iiber  die  Tugend.    Berlin,  1747. 

Wichmann:  Anton  Ashley  Cooper,  Graf  ens  v.  Shaftes- 
bury Characteristics.  Leipzig,  1768.  The  translation  is 
incomplete. 

1  For  the  bibliographical  data  I  am  indebted  to  P.  Ziertmann  "  Beitrage 
zur  Kenntnis  Shaftesburys  "  (Archiv  filr  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  XVII 
(neue  Folge,  X),  1904,  p.  483  ff. 


131 

Letters  to  a  Young  Man  at  the  University.  Trans- 
lated, Halle,  1772. 

Holty  and  Bentzler:  Des  Graf  en  von  Shaftesbury  phi- 
losophische  Werke  aus  dem  Englischen  iibersetzt.  Leip- 
zig, 1776-9. 

tJber  Verdienst  und  Tugend,  ein  Versuch  von  Shaftes- 
bury (translated  from  the  French  version  of  Diderot), 
1780,  Leipzig. 

P.  Ziertmann :  Translation  of  the  "  Inquiry,"  1905. 

Toland,  John:  Christianity  not  Mysterious.     London, 
1702. 
Vater,  Paul :  Pope  und  Shaftesbury,  Dissertation,  Halle, 

1897. 

Wagenseil:  Wie  kam  Wieland  zum  Mysticismus  und 
Pietismus.  Und  wie  geschah  es,  dasz  er  in  der  Folge 
wieder  auf  die  Gegenseite  geriet.  Literarisches  Almanack, 
IV  (1830),  227-46. 

Walter,  Karl:  Chronologie  der  Werke  Wielands  1750- 
60,  Dissertation,  Greifswald,  1904, 

Wieland-Literatur  in  Deutschland  1751-1851.  Cassel 
(Ernst  Balde),  1852. 

Walzel,  Oscar  F. :  Shaftesbury  und  das  deutsche  Geist- 
esleben  des  18  Jahrhunderts.  Germanisch-Romanische 
Monatsschrift,  1909,  pp.  416-37. 

Walzel,  Oscar  F, :  Introduction  to  Schillers  Sacular- 
Ausgabe,  Vol.  XL 

Walzel,  O.  F. :  Introduction  to  Goethe's  Jubilaums-Aus- 
gabe.  Vol.  XXXVI. 

Warburton,  William:  Dedication  to  Free-Thinkers,  in 
his  "Divine  Legation  of  Moses,"  5th  edition,  London, 
1766. 

Whittaker,  Thomas:  The  Neo-Platonists,  Cambridge, 
1901. 

Windelband,  Wilhelm:  Lehrbuch  der  Geschichte  der 
Philosophic,  4th  edition,  Tubingen,  1907,  Parts  V  and  VI. 

Wolfstieg,  A. :  Englischer  und  franzosischer  Deismus 
und  deutsche  Aufklarung.  Monatshefte  der  Comenius 
Gesellschaft,  XVII,  IZ7-A7- 


132 

Wieland,  Christoph  Martin. 

'A.    Wieland's  Works 

Sammtliche  Werke,  J.  G.  Gruber,  Leipzig,  1824-28,  50 
volumes. 

Sammtliche  Werke,  G.  J.  Goschen,  Leipzig,  1839-40, 
36  volumes. 

Sammtliche  Werke,  G.  Hempel,  Berlin,  no  date  (1879 
ff.),  40  volumes. 

Wielands  Werke,  H.  Prohle,  Volumes  51-6  in  Deutsche 
National  Literatur. 

Prosaische  Schriften,  Ziirich,  1758,  3  parts. 

Beitrage  zur  geheimen  Geschichte  des  menschlichen 
Verstandes  und  Herzens,  Leipzig,  1770,  2  parts. 

Dschinnistan,  Winterthur,  1786-9. 

Hermann,  edited  with  an  introduction  by  F.  Muncker, 
Deutsche  Literaturdenkmale,  Vd  (1882). 

Vierzehn  Gedichte  von  C.  M.  Wieland.  Mitgeteilt  von 
Dr.  P.  V.  Hoffmann- Wellenhof ;  in  Archiv  fiir  das  Stu- 
diiim  der  Neuern  Sprachen  und  Literaturen,  edited  by  L. 
Herrig,  LXVI  (1881),  49-76. 

Der  Teutsche  Merkur,  Weimar,  1 773-1 789. 

Der  Neue  Teutsche  Merkur,  1 790-1 810  (edited  with 
the  assistance  of  K.  L.  Reinhold  and  K.  A.  Bottiger). 

Das  Attische  Museum,  Ziirich  and  Leipzig,  1 797-1 803. 

Das  Neue  Attische  Museum,  1805-9  (edited  with  the 
assistance  of  J.  J.  Hottinger  and  F.  Jacobs). 

Horazens  Briefe  iibersetzt;  Leipzig,  1816,  in  2  parts. 

Horazens  Satiren  iibersetzt;  Leipzig,  1819,  in  2  parts. 

Ciceros  sammtliche  Briefe  iibersetzt  und  erlautert.  7 
volumes,  Zurich.  Only  the  first  5  volumes,  1808-12,  are 
by  Wieland.    (The  last  two,  1818  and  1821,  are  by  Grater.) 

Luciam  from  the  Greek  with  comments  and  illustrations 
of  Wieland  and  others,  by  William  Tooke,  London,  1820, 
2  volumes. 

Einige  Nachrichten  von  den  Lebens-Umstanden  des 
Herrn  Wilhelm  Shakespear.  At  the  close  of  the  8th 
volume  of  Wieland's  translation  of  Shakespear  (Shake- 


133 

spear  Theatralische  Werke  aus  dem  Englischen  iibersetzt 
von  Wieland.    Zurich,  iy62-^6). 

B.     Wieland's  Letters 

Ausgewahlte  Briefe  von  Wieland  an  verschiedene 
Freunde,  1751-1810.     4  parts,  Ziirich,  1815. 

Auswahl  denkwiirdiger  Briefe,  edited  by  L.  Wieland, 
Wien,  1815. 

Wieland  und  Reinhold:  by  Robert  Keil,  Leipzig  and 
Berlin,  1885.     Wieland's  letters  are  in  Part  II,  71-276. 

Karl  Wagner:  Briefe  an  Merck  von  Goethe,  Herder, 
Wieland  und  anderen  bedeutenden  Zeitgenossen.  Darm- 
stadt, 1835.    The  book  contains  60  letters  of  Wieland. 

Seuffert,  B. :  Wielandbriefe,  in  the  Marbacher  Schiller- 
buck  (Stuttgart  and  Berlin,  1905),  pp.  293-304. 

Hirzel,  L. :  Ungedruckte  Briefe  Wielands  an  Lavater, 
Schnorrs  Archiv,  IV,  300-22. 

Prohle,  H. :  Aus  dem  Briefwechsel  zwischen  Wieland 
und  Gleim,  ibid.,  V,  191-232. 

C.  Schiiddekopf :  Briefe  Herders  und  Wielands,  ibid., 
XV,  254-64. 

J.  Keller:  Ungedruckte  Briefe  Wielands  an  Isaac  Isehn, 
ibid.,  XIII,  187-219. 

Joh.  Criiger:  Zwei  Wieland'-Briefe  (to  Breitinger) ; 
ibid.,  220-8. 

C.  Schuddekopf :  Briefe  an  Eschenburg;  ibid.,  498-507. 

K.  W.  Bottiger:  Aus  Wielands  Brief  en  an  Bottiger 
(K.  A.),  in  Literarische  Zustande  und  Zeitgenossen,  II, 
I53-S7- 

Xenophon:  Xenophons  Erinnerungen  an  Sokrates. 
German  translation,  by  Ch.  E.  Finkh,  in  volumes  I  and  II 
of  Griechische  Prosaiker  in  neuen  Ubersetzungen,  Stutt- 
gart, 1827. 

Sokratische  Gesprache  aus  Xenofons  denkwiirdigen 
Nachrichten;  translation  by  Wieland:  Attisches  Museum, 
IIP,  296-336. 


134 

Xenofons  Gastmahl;  translation  by  Wieland:  Attischcs 
Museum,  IV,  78-148. 

Versuch  iiber  das  Xenofontische  Gastmahl;  Wieland: 
ibid.,  IV^,  99-124. 

Zart,  Gustav:  Einflusz  der  englischen  Philosophen  seit 
Bacon  auf  die  deutsclie  Philosophie  des  18  Jahrhunderts. 
Berlin,  1881. 

Ziertmann,  Paul:  Beitrage  zur  Kenntnis  Shaftesburys, 
Archiv  fi'ir  Geschichte  dcr  Philosophie,  XVII  (neueFolge, 
X),  Berlin,  1904,  pp.  480-99. 

Zimmermann,  Robert :  Geschichte  der  Aesthetik  als  phi- 
losophische  Wissenschaft  (in  2  parts,  Wien,  1858).  Part 
I,  the  sections  entitled :  Plato,  Plotin,  Die  Englander. 

Chronological  List  of  Wieland's  Works 

The  following  is  by  no  means  a  complete  list  of  the  writings 
of  our  extremely  prolific  author.  Some  of  the  minor  works, 
to  which  I  had  no  occasion  to  refer,  are  excluded  from  the  list. 

175 1  Die  Natur  der  Dinge. 
Lobgesang  auf  die  Liebe. 
Hermann. 

1752  Moralische  Briefe. 
Anti-Ovid. 

Erzahlungen  (Balsora,  Zemin  und  Gulindy,  Serena,  Der 
Unzufriedene,  Melinde,  Selim  und  Selima). 

Der  Friihling. 

Hymne  (auf  die  Grosze  und  die  Giite  Gottes). 

Schreiben  an  Herrn  ,  .  .  von  der  Wiirde  und  der  Be- 
stimmung  eines  schonen  Geistes. 

1753  Briefe  von  Verstorbenen  an  hinterlassene  Freunde. 
Der  gepriifte  Abraham. 

Plan  von  einer  neuen  Art  von  Privat-Unterweisung. 
Hymne  auf  Gott. 
Hymne  auf  die  Sonne. 
Erinnerungen  an  eine  Freundin. 

1754  Ode  auf  die  Geburt  des  Erlosers. 

Ode  auf  die  Auferstehung  des  Erlosers. 
Betrachtungen  iiber  den  Menschen. 


135 

Gesicht  des  Mirza. 

Philosophic  als  Kunst  zu  leben  und  Heilkunst  der  Seele 
betrachtet. 

1755  Hymnen  auf  die  Allgegenwart  und  Gerechtigkeit  Gottes. 
Empfindungen  eines  Christen. 

Gesicht  von  einer  Welt  unschuldigcr  Menschen. 
Theages  oder  Unterredung  von  Schonheit  und  Liebe. 
(In   his    "Prolegomena   zu    einer    Wieland-Ausgabe," 

1904,  p,  49,  Scuffert  puts  the  work  "several  years 

before  1758.") 
Sympathien. 
Timoklea.     Ein  Gesprach  iiber  scheinbare  und  wahre 

Schonheit. 

1756  Plan  einer  Akademie  zu  Bildung  des  Verstandes  und 

Herzens  junger  Leute. 

1758  Lady  Johanna  Gray. 

1759  Cyrus. 

Rede  beim  Abschied  von  den  Ziiricher  Schiilern. 

1760  Araspes  und  Panthea. 
Clementina  von  Porretta. 

Eine  Unterredung.     Lysias  und  Eubulus. 
1762-6     Shakespear  Theatralische  Werke.     Aus  dem  Engli- 
schen  iibersetzt. 

1764  Die  Abenteuer  des  Don  Sylvio  von  Rosalva. 

1765  Komische  Erzahlungen. 
1766-94     Geschichte  des  Agathon. 
1768     Idris  und  Zenide. 

Musarion. 
1769-70    Die  Dialogen  des  Diogenes  von  Sinope. 

1770  Beitrage   zur    geheimen    Geschichte    des    menschlichen 

Verstandes  und  Herzens. 
Koxkox  und  Kikequetzel. 
Combabus. 
Die  Grazien. 

1771  Der  neue  Amadis. 

1772  Gedanken  iiber  eine  alte  Aufschrift. 
Der  goldne  Spiegel. 

Aurora,  ein  Singspiel. 


136 

1773-^9    ^^^  Teutsche  Merkur. 
1772)    Alceste.     Ein  Singspiel. 

Die  Wahl  des  Herkules.     Ein  lyrisches  Drama. 

1774  Der  verklagte  Amor. 
1774-81     Die  Abderiten. 

1775  Der  Monch  und  die  Nonne. 

Das  Urteil  des  Midas.    Ein  Komisches  Singspiel. 
Geschichte  des  weisen  Danischmende. 
Unterredungen  zwischen  W  .  .  .  und  dem  Pfarrer  zu  .  .  . 
Das   Verhaltnis   des   Angenehmen   und    Schonen   zum 
Niitzlichen. 

1776  Ein  Wintermarchen. 
Liebe  um  Liebe. 
Was  ist  Wahrheit? 

1777  Geron  der  Adelich. 

Betrachtungen  iiber  die  Abnahme  des  menschlichen  Ge- 

schlechts. 
Das  Sommermarchen. 

1778  Der  Vogelsang,  oder  die  drei  Lehren. 
Rosamund.     Ein  Singspiel. 

Hann  und  Gulpenhee. 
Schach  Lolo. 

1779  Pervonte  oder  die  Wiinsche. 
Pandora. 

1780  Oberon. 

1782  Horazens  Briefe  iibersetzt. 

1782-4     Sendschreiben  an  einen  jungen  Dichter. 

1783  Clelia  und  Sinibald. 
Die  Aeropatomanie. 

1784  Die  Aeronauten. 

1786  Horazens  Satyren  iibersetzt. 

1786-9     Dschinnistan  (select  fairy  tales,  partly  composed' by 
Wieland,  partly  translated  and  remodelled). 

1787  Eine  Lustreise  in  die  Unterwelt. 

1788  Gedanken  von  der  Freiheit  iiber  Gegenstande  des  Glau- 

bens  zu  philosophiren. 
1788-9    Lucians  sammtliche  Werke.    A'us  dem  Griechischen 
iibersetzt. 


137 

1789  Moral  der  Natur. 

1789-1800    Aufsatze  iiber  die  franzosische  Revolution. 
1789-93     Gottergesprache. 

1790  Geschichte  der  Troglodyten. 
Gesprache  in  Elysium. 

1790-1810    Der  Neue  Teutsche  Merkur. 

1 79 1  Geheime  Geschichte  des  Philosophen  Peregrinus  Pro- 

teus. 
1795     Die  Wasserkufe. 
1 797-1 803    Das  Attische  Museum. 

1798  Gesprache  unter  vier  Augen. 

1799  Sokratische    Gesprache    aus    Xenofons    denkwiirdigen 

Nachrichten  von  Sokrates.     (Translation  in  the  At- 
tisches  Museum.) 
Agathodamon. 
1800-2    Aristipp  und  einige  seiner  Zeitgenossen, 

1802  Xenofons  Gastmahl.     tjbersetzt  von  dem  Herausgeber 

des  A'.  Museums.  (Wieland's  translations  are  pub- 
lished for  the  greater  part  in  the  Attisches  Museum 
and  Neues  Attisches  Museum.) 

1803  Menander  und  Glycerion. 

1804  Krates  und  Hipparchia. 
1805-9    Das  Neue  Attische  Museum. 

1805  Euthanasia.    Drei  Gesprache  iiber  das  Leben  nach  dem 

Tode. 
Das  Hexameron  von  Rosenhain. 
1808-12     Ciceros  sammtliche  Briefe  iibersetzt  und  erlautert. 


INDEX 


This  Index  contains  all  the  proper  names  and  the  titles  of  the 
works  of  Wieland  and  Shaftesbury  as  far  as  the  bibliography.  Where- 
ever  names  are  found  indented  they  belong  to  the  particular  works  of 
Wieland  in  question. 


"Abderiten,  die":   i8,  58,  65,  68, 
95. 
Democritus :    50. 
Strobylus:  6s 
Aesop:  41,  92,   102. 
"  Agathodamon  " :  65,  67,  93,   115. 
Agathodamon:   115. 
Domitian :  65. 
"Agathon":  14,  18,  58,  60,  61,  64, 
66,  69,  71,  72,  75,  77-9,  86,  100, 
Id,  107,  109,  1 16-7,  122-3. 
Agathon:  58,  59,  61,  66,  69,  70, 
7h  75,  77,  79-80,  86,  100,  109, 
115,    122. 
Aristippus:  61,  77,  109. 
Archytas:  77-80,  117. 
Chariclea:  77. 
Danae:  58,  77. 
Daphne:   58. 
Dion :    66 
Dionysions :  100. 
Hippias:  66,  79,  80,  86. 
Psyche,  58,  loi. 
Amalia    (duchess)  :  7Z- 
Anacreon :   15,  93. 
"  Anmerkungen     iiber    Alexander 
Dows    Nachrichten    von    der 
Religion  der  Braminen":   76. 
"An  Psyche":  75. 
"Anti-Ovid":  4,  56,  64. 
"Araspes  and   Panthea":    13,    14, 
18,  57,  59,  60,  64,  ^,  117. 
Araspes :  60. 
Panthea:  60. 


"Aristipp":  14,  18,  59,  61,  62,  64, 
66-71,  78-9,  82,  95,  loo-i,  123. 
Aristippus:  61,  66,  68,  70,  79. 
Eros:  66. 
Lais :  61,  99. 
Aristophanes :  58. 
Asgil:  31. 
Assezat,    J :    31. 
Attisches  Museum:  9,   12,   14,  23, 

55,  58,  66,  95,  99,   119. 
"  Aufsatze  iiber   die   f ranzosische 

Revolution":   116. 
Augustus :  8. 

B. 

Bacon:  2. 

Baskerville:  5,  11. 

"  Beitrage  zur  geheimen  Geschich- 

te  des   menschlichen   verstan- 

des  und  Herzens  " :  71,  72,  89, 

102,   116,    123. 
Bentzler :   2. 
Berkeley,  George :  24-5,  34,  36,  39, 

43- 
Alciphron :   24,   36. 
Crito :    36. 
Euphranor:  25. 
Biese,   Alfred:   31. 
Blijmner,  Hugo:  53. 
Blyenbergh:  45. 
Bodmer:  15,  16,  106. 
Bondeli,  Julie:  16. 
Bondi,  Georg:  3. 
Bottiger,   K.  A:    118. 
Boucke,  E.  A:  25,  38. 


138 


139 


Bouillet,  M.  N:  23. 

"  Brief e   von    Verstorbenen ' 

IS,  56,  59,  60,  62,  82. 
Bruno:  23,  36,  38,  42. 
Brutus:  8. 

Burgess,  George :  23,  28. 
Burnett,  T:  45. 


"  Empfindungen  eines   Christen  " : 

59,  84. 
Epicure:  98. 
Erasmus :   89. 
"  Erinnerungen    an    eine    Freun- 

din":   4,   56,   106,   109. 
Ermatinger,   Emil :   4. 
"  Essay    concerning   the    freedom 

of  wit  and  humor":  i,  8. 
Euripides:    55,    91. 
Ion   (in  Euripides)  :  55. 

F. 

Ferguson,  Adam :  47-9. 

Fielding:   123. 

Finkh,  C.  E:  23. 

Florus :  8. 

Fontenelle:   iii. 

Fowler,  T:  31. 

Francke :    15. 

Funck,  Heinrich:  6,  65,  90. 


Caesar:  91,  loi. 
Carl  August:  73. 
Cato:    III. 
Chaulieu:  15,  18. 
Chrysippus :  loi. 
Cicero :   10,  66,  91,  96. 
"  Ciceros  Briefe  iibersetzt  und  er- 
lautert  von  Wieland":  66,  93, 
96,  99. 
Cleomenes^ :  34. 
Collins,  A:  31. 
"  Cyrus  " :  4,  13,  18,  54,  60,  64,  69. 

Cyrus,  13,  54,  60. 

Tigranes :   60. 
"Combabus  "  :  83,   loi. 
Corneille :  89. 
Coste:  45. 

D. 
"  Danischmend " :    64,   69,   73,   76, 
84,  88,  96,   loi. 

Danischmend :  76,  88,  96. 

Perisadeh:  88. 
Demosthenes:   91. 
Descartes :  42,  46-7. 
Diderot:  i,  2,  8,  31. 
Dilthey,   Wilhelm:  21. 
"  Don   Sylvio "  :   18,   102. 
Doring,    Heinrich:    114. 
"  Dschinnistan  " :    loi. 
Diirr :  2. 
Dutens :  45. 

E. 
Eberhard :  3. 

Elwes    (translator    of    Spinoza) : 
45,   47- 

*  Whenever  the  names  Cleomenes  and  Horatio  occur,  they  designate 
the  two  heroes  of  Mandeville's  "  Five  Dialogues  between  Horatio  and 
Cleomenes." 


G. 

Galileo:  89. 

Galliani:    118. 

Gay,  16. 

"  Gebrauch  der  Vernunft  in  Glau- 

benssachen  " :   75,   104. 
"  Gedanken   uber    eine   alte   Auf- 

schrift":  72,  85,  89. 
"  Geheimnisz    des    Cosmopoliten- 

Ordens":  82. 
Gellert:  24,  34. 
Gerhardt :   45. 

"Geschichte  der  Troglodyten":  88. 
"Gesicht  des  Mirza":  59,  60,  78. 

Mirza:  78. 
"  Gesicht    von     einer    Welt    un- 

schuldiger     Menschen " :     60, 

100. 
"  Gesprache  in  Elysium":  107. 
Geszner,  Solomon :  16,  17,  97,  109, 

112. 
Gizycki,  Georg  v. :  2. 


140 


Gleim:   i6. 

Goedeke:  2i7- 

Goethe:  4,   M,   16,  21,  25,  37,  38, 

80,  81,  99,  III,  114,  123. 
"  Goldner  Spiegel " :  58,  59,  61,  64, 
68,   69,   72,   75,   76,   77,   83-8, 
92-3,  100-2,  105-6,  115-18,  123. 
Azor:  92. 
Danischmend :    yz- 
Eblis:  7Z- 
Isfandiar:  57. 
Psammis :  60,  64  88. 
Schach-Gebal :   72,   102. 
Tifan:  69,  77,  83. 
Kador:  72. 
Goschen:    5,    7,    12,    13-15,    17-18, 
56,  62,   64-73,  75-9,  82-6,  88, 
93,     95-7,     99-102,      105-107, 
109-111,    115,    117,    119,    120, 
121. 
Grater :  66. 
"  Grazien,  die":  61,  iio-iii,  123. 

Aglaia:  60. 
Grimarest:  45. 

Gruber,  J.  G:  4,  5,  12,  13,  14,  I5, 
17,  56,  59,  60,  62,  64,  65,  69, 
82,  94,  iia-14. 
Gutermann,  Sophie  von:  15. 

H. 

Haller:   3,   89. 

Hatch,  I.  C:  3- 

Haym,  R:  12. 

Heiddeger:  89. 

Hempel:  5,  12,  14,  16,  18,  58,  59, 
60,  64-8,  71,  72,  7S-8o,  84-9, 
93,  99,  101-2,  104,  107,  109, 
III,  114,  1 15-16,  118,  122-3. 

Herder:  1-3,  9,  10,  12,  33-5,  43, 
^2,  63,,  65,  75,  95,  99- 

Hettner,  Hermann:  31. 

"  Hexameron     von     Rosenhain  " : 
66,  79,   loi. 
Clarisse:  79,  loi. 
Narcissus :  66. 
Narcissa :  66. 


Hirschling:  2. 

Hirzel,  L:    16,  89. 

Hobbes:  26-7,  48-9,  72-3. 

Holty:  2. 

Homer:   90-1,    loi. 

Horace:  7,  8,  10,  11,  18,  91,  96,  99, 

105,   107-8,   122. 
Horatio:  34. 
Hottinger :   14. 
Hume:  iii. 

I. 
"  Idris  und  Zenide " :    18,   loi. 
"  Inquiry    concerning    virtue    and 

merit":  i,  2,  7,  8,   il,  31,  82, 

91,  118. 
Isocrates :  91. 

J. 
Jacobi,  J.   G:   54,  55,    112. 
Jacourt,  M.  le  chevalier  de:  45. 
Job:  41. 
Jonas,  F:   Z7- 
Jordens :  H :  2. 

K. 

Kant:   24,   37,  46,  62-3. 
Kehrbach   (Karl)  :  Z7,  46,  62. 
Keil,  Robert:  55,  61,  65. 
Keussler,  Gerhardt:  56. 
Klopstock:  4,  18. 
Koch,  Max:   i,  3,  13,  7^. 
"  Koxkox  und  Kikequetzel " :  67, 
86-7,  1x6. 

Tlantlaquakapatli :  87. 
Krantor :  loi. 

"  Krates  und  Hipparchia  "  :  58,  60, 
77,  99. 

Hipparchia:  58,  60. 

Krates:  58,  77,  99. 

Melanippe:  5,  8. 
Kiinzli :   16. 

L. 
Lachelier,  H :  47. 
Lachmann-Muncher :    16,    45,    75, 

95. 
"  Lady  Johanna  Gray  "  :  16. 


141 


La  Fontaine:   i6. 

La  Roche:   17,  65,  97. 

La  Roche,  Sophie:  55,  65. 

Lechler,  G.  V:  31. 

Legrand:   11,   119. 

Leibniz:  45,  47,  50,  89. 

Leland,  John:   23,  43- 

Lessing:    16,  45,   53,   75,   95,    106. 

"  Letter    concerning    Design "  :    7, 

53- 
"  Letter  concerning  Enthusiasm  "  : 

1,8. 
"  Letters  to  a  young  man  at  the 

University":  2,  34. 
"  Liebe  um  Liebe  " :  107. 
Locke,  John:  9,   50,  72,  73,  89. 
Loebell,  J.  W. :  4. 
Louis  XIV:  95. 
Lucian:  10,  99,  118. 
"  Lustreise  ins  Elysium  "  :  71. 
Lyons,  W:  31. 

M. 
Maecenas :    8. 
Mandeville:   33-34.  37,  43,   73-75, 

80. 
Meister,   J.   H:   58. 
Meister,   L:    13,    17,    19. 
Menander:  9. 
"  Menander   und   Glycerion "  :   58, 

64,  66,   109. 
Hermotimus :    64. 
Glycera:  64. 
Leontion :  64. 
Menander:  58,  66,  109. 
Mendelssohn :  3. 
Merck,  J.  H :  33,  50,  99. 
Metastasio:  89. 
"  Miscellaneous    Reflections  " :    6, 

8,  9,  10,  37,  96. 
Montesquieu:  89. 
Montmorency :    122. 
"Moral   der  Natur":   58,  86. 
"Moralische   Briefe":    5,    12,    14, 

56,  82,  94. 
"Moralists":    i,   2,   7,   8,    11,   45, 

116-7,  118. 


Morley:  26. 

"  Musarion  " :  5,  14,  59,  77,  79,  loi, 
111-113,  114,  123. 
Musarion:  76,  79,  80,  loi,   112- 

114. 
Phanias:  76,  79,  113. 

N. 

"  Nachlass  des  Diogenes  "  :  84,  86, 
93,  103,  104,  107. 
Aspasia :    103-4. 
Bacchides :  86. 
Diogenes :  86. 
"  Natur  der  Dinge  " :  5,  12,  62. 
"  Neuer  Amadis " :   12,  14,   18,  57, 

95,   119- 
Neuer  Teutscher  Merkur:  9,   10, 

62-3,  65. 
Neues  attisches  Museum:  65. 
Newton:  89. 
Nicolai:  6. 

"Notion  of  the  Tablature  of  the 
Judgment    of    Hercules":    7, 

53,   119. 

O. 

"Oberon":  14. 
Oldenburg:  47. 
Ovid:  15,  16. 

P. 

Paley,  W:  34. 

Palladio:  89. 

"  Peregrinus  Proteus  " :  59,  66,  67, 
78,  104. 
Dioclea:  78. 
Peregrinus  Proteus :  59,  66,  78. 

Pericles :  103,  104. 

"  Philosophie  als  Kunst  zu 
leben":  78. 

Pindar:  93. 

Piso:  8. 

"  Plan  einer  Akademie  zu  Bildung 
des  Verstandes  und  Herzens 
junger  Leute":  5,  6,  10,  14, 
64,  65,  69,  82,  90-2,  94,  96. 

"  Plan     einer     neuen     Art     von 


142 


Privat-Unterweisung " :    5,    8, 

9,  90. 
Plato:  4.  10,  12-15,  18,  23,  28,  79, 

80,  94,  III,  118,  123. 
"  Platonische    Betractungen    iiber 

den    Menschen " :   56,   60,   68, 

76,  78. 
Pliny:    91. 
Plotinus:  23,  44. 
Plutarch :  7. 
Pomezny,    Franz :   4. 
Pope:    45. 
Prior:    16. 

Pruhle:  5,  59,  "^J,  79,  loi,  1 12-14. 
Prometheus:  21. 
"  Prosaische  Schriften":  6,  10,  13, 

14,   17,  56,  60,  64,  65,  69,  71, 

78,  82,  83,  86,  91,   118. 
"  Prufung  Abrahams":  60,  65. 
Abiasaf:  65. 
Isaac :   65. 
"  Psyche  unter  den  Grazien  " :  58. 

Medusa:  58. 
Pythagoras :  'jy. 

R. 

Raphael:   89. 

"  Reflexionen  "  :  85. 

Reid,  Thomas:  47,  48,  51. 

Reinhard,   C.   R  V:   80. 

Reinhold :   61. 

Reinhold,  Sophie :  55,  61,  65. 

Richardson :   123. 

Riedel,  F.  J:   16,  54,   1 12-13. 

Ring:  6,  13,  65. 

Ritter,  Heinrich :   50. 

Rousseau:  8,  71,  89. 


Sauer:   15,  16,  54. 
Schefifner :  2. 

Schiller:  21,  23,  24,  Z7,  38. 
Schinz:    106,    119. 
Schleiermacher :    '^'j, 
Schnorr    (Archiv   fiir    Literatur- 
geschichte)  :  6,  89,  90,  99. 


"  Schreiben   von   der   Wiirde   und 

Bestimmung     eines      schonen 

Geistes  " :    15. 
Schulthesz :   58. 

Schurmann,  Anna  Maria  von :  75. 
"  Scndschreiben   an   einen  jungen 

Dichter":  70,   121. 
"  Sendschreiben     an     Prof.     Eg- 

gers  " :  12,  122-3. 
Seuffert,  B :  4,  6,  15,  54,  73,  89,  92. 
Socrates :    4,    10,    12,    14,   23,   28, 

38,  66,  83,  92,  94,  95,  100,  103, 

104,   119. 
"  Soliloquy  or  Advice  to  an  Au- 
thor":   I,    8,    9,    14,    17,    18, 

119-121. 
Spalding:  2,  8,  11. 
Spener:    15. 
Spenser :   123. 
Spicker,  G:  53. 

Spinoza:  21,  26-8,  30,  32,  45,  47. 
Stadion,  Friederich :  17. 
Stall,  Madame  de:  65. 
Steinberger,  J :  99. 
Steinmetz :    15. 
Sterne:    123. 
Sulzer:  3. 

Suphan:   i,  34,  43,  95. 
Swift:  9. 
"  Sympathien " :  5,   I3,   IS,  56,  58, 

60,  69,  70,  71,  78,  85,  93,  97, 

105-6,  109. 
Aedon :  96. 
Alcest:   15,  71. 
Amyntor :    17,    120. 


Tacitus:  91. 

Taylor,   Thomas :   23,  44. 
Teutscher  Merkur:  10,  11,  14,  55, 
58,  61,  75,  89,  95,  99,  102,  106, 
108-9,  113,  118,  121. 
"  Theages  " :  4,  5,  7,  I3,  H,  57,  60, 
69,  78,  95,  97- 
Aspasia:  60. 
Nicias :  7,  97. 


143 


Theages :  57. 
Thurneisen:  9,  11,  12,  119. 
Tibullus:   15. 

"Timoklea":  4,  57,  60,  78,  83, 
86,  118. 

Cefise:  56. 

Pasithea:   56,  57. 

Timoklea :    56,    83. 
Tindal:  31. 
Toland,  John:  31. 
"  Traum  ein  Leben  " :  76. 

U. 

"  Uber  das  Verhaltnis  des  Ange- 
nehmen  und  Schonen  zum 
Niitzlichen":   68,   102. 

"  Uber  die  Abschaffung  des  Erba- 
dels  in  Frankreich  "  :  122. 

"  Uber  die  vorgebliche  Abnahme 
des  menschlichen  Ge- 
schlechts  " :   64. 

"  Uber  weibliche  Bildung  "  :  64. 

"  Unterredungen  mit  dem  Pfar- 
rer  *  *  *":  16. 

Uz:  6,   15,   16,  54- 

V. 

Veitch,  J:  47. 

Venzky:    I,    il. 

"Verklagter  Amor":  no. 

"  Versuch  iiber  das  Xenofontische 

Gastmahl, " :    66. 
Virgil:  91,  loi. 


"  Vorbericht  zum  Anti-Cato  " :  61, 

75- 
Vosz,  H :  2. 

W. 
Wagner,  Karl :  99. 
"  Wahl  des  Herkules":  119. 
Walzel,  O.  F:  2,  3,  5,  21,  38. 
Warburton:  33,  43. 
"  Wasserkufe,   die  "  :   71,  76. 

Lutz:   71. 
Weigand:   11. 
Wichmann :   2,    11, 
Williams,  L:  23. 
Windelband :  28. 
Wolff:  so. 
Wolfstieg,  A:  31. 

X. 

Xenophon:  7,  9,  10,  12-14,  23,  55, 
91,  94,  103,  12 1-2. 
Lykon  (in  Xenophon's  Sympos- 
ium) :  55. 

Y. 
Young,  Edward :  18. 

Z. 

Zart,  Gustav:  2,  3. 

Ziertmann,    Paul :    I,   2. 

Zimmermann,  J.  G:  7,  8,  11,  14- 
16,  l8-9,  57,  62-4,  70,  80,  89, 
96-7,  loo-i,  104,  120-1. 

Zimmermann,  Robert :  23. 

"  Ziiricher  Abschiedsrede  " :  70, 
122. 


VITA 

The  author  of  this  monograph  was  born  in  Russia,  on 
August  2,  1887.  He  received  his  early  education  from  private 
teachers.  At  the  age  of  fifteen  he  came  to  the  United  States 
and  entered  the  high-school  of  Kane,  Pa.  Owing  to  his  pre- 
vious education  he  was  able  to  complete  the  high-school  course 
in  two  and  one  half  years.  He  then  entered  Bucknell  College 
(Lewisburg,  Pa.),  where  he  took  the  A.B.  degree  in  1909. 
The  year  1909-10  was  spent  in  Harvard  University,  where  he 
studied  German  Literature  under  Professors  Howard  and 
Francke,  and  Philology  under  Professors  Walz  and  von  Jage- 
mann.  The  A.M.  degree  was  conferred  on  him  in  1910.  The 
following  year  he  taught  German  and  French  in  the  high- 
school  of  Great  Harrington,  Mass.  In  the  fall  of  191 1  he 
entered  Columbia  University  as  a  candidate  for  the  Ph.D. 
degree.  During  the  two  years  of  his  residence  in  Columbia 
University  he  studied  Germanics  under  Professors  Thomas, 
Remy,  Carpenter  and  Tombo,  the  greater  part  of  the  work 
having  been  pursued  under  Professors  Thomas  and  Remy.  He 
also  took  French  courses  under  Professors  Cohn,  Todd  and 
Loiseaux. 


144 


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